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ABSTRACT 
 
At what point in development does the capacity to reason about what people think emerge? 
While developmental psychologists have been investigating this question for more than thirty years, 
the evidence they have gained so far is conflicting. On the one hand, the results of traditional, direct 
false-beliefs tests, which involve asking participants how a person with a false belief will act, suggest 
that most children under four years of age are still unaware that beliefs can be false. On the other, 
false-belief tests using indirect measures, such as, for example, looking times or anticipatory look-
ing, suggest that even infants ascribe false beliefs to other people. As many have noted, these results 
pose a deep developmental puzzle.  
In this work, I defend the claim that infants can already reason about beliefs. On the one 
hand, I argue that alternative interpretations of indirect false-belief tests fall short of the mark. On 
the other, I argue that the fact that young children fail direct false-belief tests can be explained in 
either of two ways, both of which are compatible with the claim that the capacity to reason about 
beliefs emerges early on. The first option is to maintain that young children fail because of perfor-
mance difficulties. This type of position has been defended by other authors, but I’ll argue that the 
particular proposal I put forward (which I call the processing-time account) offers a better account of 
the evidence. In contrast, the second option (which I call they hybrid approach) is one that, to the 
best of my knowledge, no one else has defended so far. This consists in arguing that direct and 
indirect false-belief tests recruit distinct cognitive systems, each of which can independently sustain 
the ability to reason about beliefs, but which follow different developmental trajectories.  
After laying out these two options, in the last chapter I will also consider which is best sup-
ported by the evidence.  
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I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
Mentalising (also known as folk psychology, theory of mind or mindreading) is the capacity 
to reason about what other people think, want or feel; it is one of the pillars around which human 
social life is built. Humans seem to spend a significant portion of their waking life wondering about 
the mental lives of their con-specifics, ruminating over each other's past actions or trying to antic-
ipate their next moves. 
In this work, I focus on belief-reasoning (i.e., the capacity to reason about beliefs) and its 
development. While developmental psychologists have been investigating this question for more 
than thirty years, the evidence they have gained so far is conflicting. On the one hand, the results 
of traditional, direct false-beliefs tests, which involve asking participants how a person with a false 
belief will act, suggest that most children under four years of age are still unaware that beliefs can 
be false. On the other, false-belief tests using indirect measures, such as, for example, looking times 
or anticipatory looking, suggest that even infants ascribe false beliefs to other people. As many 
have noted, these results pose a deep developmental puzzle. Does an understanding of belief 
emerge early, already being present in infancy, or does it emerge later on, around the fifth year of 
age? This is the topic of the present work.  
In §1, I review the results of direct and indirect false-belief tests. Then, to provide some 
context, in §2 I offer a brief overview of the rest of the evidence on the development of mentalising. 
In §3, I summarise the implications of our topic for the debate between nativists and 
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constructivists. In §4, I discuss its implications for other topics in philosophy and cognitive science. 
Finally, in §5, I lay out the plan for the rest of the thesis. 
 
1. A Puzzle about Development 
1.1 Direct False-Belief Tests 
1.1.1 The Original False-Belief Test 
The first false-belief test was carried out by Hanz Wimmer and Josef Perner (1983). Children 
were told a story about Maxi, a boy who really liked chocolate. In the story, Maxi’s Mom comes 
back from shopping and she has bought ingredients to bake a cake, including chocolate. Maxi helps 
his Mom put the ingredients away; they put the chocolate in the blue cupboard. After helping his 
Mom, Maxi goes outside to play. While Maxi is outside, his Mom uses some of the chocolate, then 
puts it away in a different cupboard, this one green. At this point Maxi’s Mom realises she forgot 
to buy eggs, so she goes to her neighbour to ask whether she can have some of hers. While his 
Mom is away, Maxi is feeling hungry, so he comes back in the house to eat some chocolate. At this 
point children were asked where Maxi would look for the chocolate. Notice that answering cor-
rectly requires understanding that Maxi does not know his Mom put the chocolate in the green 
cupboard, and thus still thinks the chocolate is in the blue cupboard, where they had put it previ-
ously. Most of the three- and four-year-olds in Wimmer and Perner’s study pointed to the green 
cupboard; about half of the five-year-olds pointed to the green cupboard, while the other half 
pointed to the blue cupboard; almost every six-, eight- and nine-year-old pointed to the blue cup-
board. As we will see, most of the false-belief studies that have been carried out since have found 
better performance in four- and five-year-olds, though, crucially, not in three-year-olds.  
1.1.2 Other False-Belief Tasks 
The type of task used by Wimmer and Perner is often referred to as the unexpected-transfer 
or, alternatively, change-of-location task. There are a few other tasks that are commonly used in 
false-belief tests, detailed below.  
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Unexpected-contents task. The unexpected-content task was first used in a study by Perner, Su-
san Leekam and Wimmer (1987). In this study, children were shown a box of Smarties and asked 
what was inside. After children said the box contained Smarties, the experimenter opened it and 
allowed them to peek inside it, thus revealing that it contained crayons instead. At this point, the 
experimenter asked what another person, who had not yet looked inside the box, would think is in 
it. To answer correctly, participants must understand that the person in question, not having looked 
inside the box, will assume it contains Smarties. 
Appearance-reality task. The appearance-reality task was introduced by John Flavell, Eleanor 
Flavell and Frances Green (1986). Children were shown a deceptive object (a sponge that looked 
like a rock) and asked what it looked like. After children identified the apparent nature of the toy 
(“it’s a rock!”), they were allowed to touch it, discovering its true nature. Children were then asked 
what the object really was (e.g., a sponge) and what it looked like to them now (e.g. a rock). Notice 
that, strictly speaking, this is not a false-belief task, since children are not asked about anybody’s 
beliefs. Nonetheless, several psychologists have argued that an understanding of misleading ap-
pearances presupposes an understanding of the representational nature of mind; as a result, the 
appearance-reality tests is often used in tests that include batteries of false-belief tests.  
Unexpected-identity task. The unexpected-identity task, first used by Alison Gopnik and Janet 
Astington (1988), is a variation on the appearance-reality task. As in the latter, children are shown 
a deceptive object, say a sponge that looks like a rock, and asked what it is; after they say it is a 
rock, they are allowed to inspect it. Then, children are asked: (1) what the object really is, and what 
it looks like; (2) whether another person, who has seen but not touched the object, will take it to 
be a sponge or a rock; (3) what they themselves thought it was before touching it. To answer 
correctly, participants must understand that someone who has no touched the object has no way 
of knowing its true nature and will thus take it to be what it looks like. 
The explicit false-belief task. In the explicit false-belief task, introduced by Henry Wellman and 
Karen Bartsch (1988), children are told a brief story about a girl, Jane, who wants to find her kitten. 
The kitten is in the playroom, but Jane thinks it’s in the kitchen. Children are then asked where 
Jane will go look for her kitten.  
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1.1.3 A Meta-Analysis of False-Belief Studies 
In 2001, Wellman, David Cross and Julanne Watson published a meta-analysis of false-belief 
tests, which looked at the results of 178 separate studies, using a variety of tasks. The results of the 
meta-analysis show that children’s performance improves steadily over the preschool years, with 
young three-year-olds being below-chance and four-year-olds being above-chance. Some task ma-
nipulations were found to increase children’s performance, allowing them to pass the test a few 
months in advance; for example, children were found to perform better if they had played an active 
role in the change of location that resulted in the agent’s false belief (some of these results will be 
discussed further in Chapter IV, §2). Nonetheless, young children still performed worse than their 
older peers. Similarly, performance was found to vary across different countries; American chil-
dren, for example, performed worse than their Australian peers but better than the Japanese; still, 
in every culture performance increased with age, moving from below-chance to above-chance. 
1.1.4 The Late-Emergence Approach 
Many have taken the results of direct false-belief tests to show that belief-reasoning abilities 
only emerge around the age of four. Call this the late-emergence approach. For many years, the 
late-emergence approach was the majority view in developmental psychology. As we are about to 
see, however, recent findings challenge this point of view. 
1.2 Indirect False-Belief Tests 
1.2.1 Infants Pass a False-Belief Test 
In a ground-breaking report published in 2005, Kristine H. Onishi and Renée Baillargeon 
showed that even 15-month-olds could pass a false-belief test when indirect measures were used 
(Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005). Since simply asking such young infants what someone would do was 
not an option, Onishi and Baillargeon adapted the unexpected-transfer task to the violation-of-
expectation paradigm. Since infants tend to look longer at events that are, for them, unexpected, 
by comparing how long infants look at each of two possible events one can infer which is more in 
line with their expectations. As infants watched, an experimenter (E1) played with a toy watermelon 
slice, then put it in a green box and left. While E1 was absent, the toy moved from the green box 
  
14 
 
into a yellow box next to it. In the test phase, after E1 had come back, half the infants saw her 
reaching for the green box, where she had put the toy, while the other half saw her reaching for 
the yellow box, where the toy really was. Looking times were longer for the second group, suggest-
ing that infants had understood E1 thought the toy was still in the green box, where she had left it, 
and thus expected her to reach there. 
Since 2005, many experiments have been carried out in several different laboratories, repli-
cating or extending the initial finding by Onishi and Baillargeon. Their result has been extended in 
three important ways: (1) first, evidence of belief-reasoning in infants has been obtained with a 
variety of experimental paradigms besides the violation-of-expectation method; (2) second, positive 
results have been obtained with much younger infants, as young as six months old; and (3) third, 
positive results have been obtained with a variety of belief-reasoning tasks.  
1.2.2 A Variety of Experimental Paradigms 
Evidence has been obtained with a variety of experimental paradigms, including violation-
of-expectation, anticipatory-looking, interactive, preferential-looking and two EEG-based para-
digms. Let us zoom in on each of these paradigms in turn.  
Violation-of-expectation. Most indirect false-belief studies have employed the violation-of-ex-
pectation method, described above. These include: Kovács, Téglás, and Endress (2010), Luo 
(2011a), Onishi and Baillargeon (2005), Song and Baillargeon (2008); Song, Onishi, Baillargeon, 
and Fisher (2008), Scott and Baillargeon (2009), Scott, Baillargeon, Song, and Leslie (2010), Scott, 
Richman, and Baillargeon (2015), Surian, Caldi, and Sperber (2007), Träuble, Marinović, and Pauen 
(2010). 
Anticipatory-looking. Several indirect false-belief studies have used the anticipatory-looking par-
adigm, which takes as a dependent measure where infants look first, and longer, in anticipation of 
the target agent’s reach (Clements & Perner, 1994; He, Bolz, & Baillargeon, 2012; Senju, Southgate, 
& Snape, 2011; Southgate, Senju, & Csibra, 2007; Surian & Geraci, 2012). If, for example, partici-
pants look first and longer at the green box as opposed to the yellow one, this is taken to show that 
they expect the agent to look there.   
Interactive. Several indirect false-belief studies have used the interactive paradigm (D. 
Buttelmann, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009; D. Buttelmann, Over, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2014; 
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F. Buttelmann, Suhrke, & Buttelmann, 2015; Knudsen & Liszkowski, 2012a, 2012b; Southgate, 
Chevallier, & Csibra, 2010). In this paradigm, participants are expected to help a target agent, who 
has a false belief; the tasks are set up in such a way that, given what infants do in trying to help the 
agent, it is possible to infer whether they are aware of her false belief. This is best illustrated with 
an example. Consider the experiment by David Buttelmann and colleagues (2009). An agent (E1) 
tries to retrieve a toy from the box where she had put it (i.e., the pink box). Unbeknownst to her, 
however, a second agent (E2) moved the toy to a second box (i.e., the yellow box.) and locked both 
boxes with pins. Thus, E1 is now struggling to open the pink box, even though the toy she is 
looking for is really in the yellow box. Infants are encouraged to help E1. If they are aware that E1 
believes the toy to be in the pink box, they should realise she is trying to get the toy and should 
thus point or crawl to the yellow box, where the toy really is. If, on the other hand, they are not 
aware of E1’s false belief, then they should assume E1 has her reasons for opening the pink box 
and should thus try to help her do that. Buttelmann and colleagues report that the sixteen- and 
eighteen-month-olds in their study approached the pink box more often than the yellow box, sug-
gesting they knew E1 had a false belief. 
Preferential-looking. One study has used the preferential-looking paradigm (Scott, He, 
Baillargeon, & Cummins, 2012). An experimenter narrated a false-belief story (of the unexpected-
transfer type) while participants looked at a picture book depicting the events in the story. The 
story ended with a vague statement (e.g., “Sally is looking for her marble”) and two pictures, each 
depicting one of the two possible outcomes (e.g., Sally looking either in the basket, where she had 
put the marble, or in the box, where the marble actually was.) The two-year-olds in this study 
looked mostly at the picture depicting Sally looking in the basket, suggesting they expected her to 
look there, consistently with her false belief. 
Predictive neural activation. A recent study by Victoria Southgate and Angelina Vernetti has used 
a novel paradigm involving EEG which, for lack of a better term, I will call predictive neural acti-
vation paradigm (Southgate & Vernetti, 2014). It is well known that, when people expect someone 
to engage in a goal-directed action, their motor cortex exhibits heightened activation 
(Muthukumaraswamy, Johnson, & McNair, 2004); furthermore, in infants, motor  cortex activation 
has been shown to correlate with a decrease in the amplitude of the alpha rhythm over their motor 
cortex, which can be detected using EEG (Southgate, Johnson, El Karoui, & Csibra, 2010). 
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Building on these previous findings, Southgate and Vernetti modified the unexpected-transfer task 
so that the event to be predicted was whether the agent would or would not reach for the object 
in a box; they then used EEG to look at whether participants exhibited alpha suppression. Specif-
ically, in the “FB-ball” condition, the agent (E1) watched as a ball rolled into a box; then, while E1 
was away, the ball rolled out. Thus, in this condition, E1 thought the ball was in the box while in 
fact it was not. In the “FB-no-ball” condition, the opposite happened: E1 watched as the ball rolled 
out of the box, then, while E1 was away, the ball rolled back into it. Thus, in this case, E1 thought 
the box was empty while in fact was not. The six-month-olds in this study expected E1 to reach in 
the FB-ball condition but not in the FB-no-ball condition, consistently with what her false beliefs.  
Object representation. Another study, by Dora Kampis, Eugenio Parise, Gergely Csibra and Ko-
vács Ágnes (2015) also introduced a novel paradigm involving EEG. A previous study had found 
that, when six-month-old infants witnessed the occlusion of an object as opposed to its disappear-
ance, an increased gamma activation could be detected over the temporal areas (Kaufman, Csibra, 
& Johnson, 2003). Kaufman and colleagues took this increased activation to be the signature of a 
sustained object representation in the infant brain. In other words, according to Kaufman and 
colleagues, the increased temporal activation signals that infants are representing the object to be 
still there, albeit occluded. In their first study, Kampis and colleagues found that the same activation 
could be detected in eight-month-olds when the object was occluded from an agent’s perspective 
but not from the infant’s. Building on this finding, in their second study, Kampis and colleagues 
had the object disappear while occluded from the agent but not from the infants, thus making the 
agent’s belief that the object was still there false. Increased gamma activation was detected even in 
this case, suggesting that infants were representing the agent’s false belief. 
 
Notice that all these different paradigms (violation-of-expectation, anticipatory-looking etc.) 
have something in common: at no point are participants asked what the target agent thinks, or what 
she will do. Rather, experimenters infer what participants think the target agent thinks in a more 
oblique, “indirect” way based on their looking behaviour, or the way they try to help the agent, or 
the patterns of activity in their brain. Consequently, I use the term “indirect” to describe these 
false-belief tests and distinguish them from the more traditional type of test that we saw in §1.1. 
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1.2.3 A Variety of Belief-Reasoning Tasks 
In a typical unexpected-transfer task, the target agent’s (e.g. Maxi) belief about the location 
of the object is based on her having last seen the object in that location. In contrast, some indirect 
false-belief tests have used tasks where the agent’s belief is the result of either testimony or infer-
ence from other beliefs. Let us see a couple of examples.  
• Song et al. (2008). This study involved two agents (E1 and E2), a toy (a ball) and two 
containers (a blue box and a red mug). Like Onishi and Baillargeon (2005), the study in-
cluded a “familiarisation” trial, where E1 put the ball in the box, and a “belief-induction” 
trial, where E1 was absent and E2 moved the ball from the box into the mug. However, 
this study also included an “intervention” trial, where E2 told E1 either “the ball is in the 
mug” (informative-intervention condition) or “I like the mug” (uninformative-interven-
tion condition). In the informative-intervention condition, infants expected E1 to reach 
for the mug, while in the uninformative-intervention condition they expected her to reach 
for the box, which is where E1 had put the ball in the first place. 
• Song and Baillargeon (2008). This study involved two experimenters (E1 and E2) and two 
toys (a toy skunk and a doll with blue hair). During the familiarisation trials, E1 always 
reached for the doll, thus displaying her preference. During the belief-induction trial, two 
boxes were introduced: one had a plain lid (plain box), the other had a lid with a tuft of 
blue hair (like the doll’s) sticking out from underneath (hair box). As E1 is away, E2 puts 
the skunk in the hair box, and the doll in the plain one. Infants expected E1 to reach for 
the hair box, seemingly understanding that she would mistake the tuft of blue hair to be 
the doll’s. 
1.2.4 Earliest Evidence of Belief-Reasoning Abilities 
While most indirect false-belief studies have investigated the belief-reasoning abilities of in-
fants in their second year of life, some have looked at much younger infants. Specifically, the two 
EEG studies mentioned in §1.2.2, by Southgate and Vernetti (2014) and Kampis et al. (2015), ob-
tained positive results with six and eight-month-olds, respectively; a violation-of-expectation study 
by Kovács et al. (2010) found evidence of belief-reasoning in seven-month-olds; and a violation-
of-expectation study by Luo (2011a) found evidence in ten-month-olds. Importantly, none of these 
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studies found negative results with younger infants. This is important because it means that infants 
have provided evidence of possessing belief-reasoning abilities as early as they have been tested. 
1.2.5 The Puzzle 
In contrast with the results of direct false-belief tests, these new findings suggest that belief-
reasoning abilities are already present in infants. Call this the early-emergence approach. This con-
flicting pattern of results gives rise to the following puzzle: are belief-reasoning abilities already 
present in infants (as maintained by the early-emergence approach) or do they emerge later, around 
the age of four (as maintained by the late-emergence approach)? Investigating this issue will keep 
us busy for the rest of this work. 
2. Putting the Puzzle in Context 
Before we begin to discuss our puzzle, it is important to put the problem in context. To this 
end, in this section we are going to broaden our focus and take a look at the evidence concerning 
the development of other key folk psychological notions, besides belief. We will look first at the 
data from mentalising studies using indirect paradigms, in §2.2, and then move on, in §2.3, to those 
using direct methodologies.  
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2.1 Other Indirect Mentalising Studies 
2.1.1 Intention 
A few months after birth, infants already seem able to correctly identify the goal of simple 
actions, like grasping and reaching. That infants see action as directed to goals was shown, most 
notably, in a seminal visual-habituation study by Amanda Woodward (1998). Woodward habituated 
5- and 9- month-old infants to a hand reaching for and grasping one of two toys, which were placed 
on two platforms next to each other. After the habituation phase, the two objects were moved so 
that they switched places. In the test events, the hand either moved along the same path, thus 
ending in contact with a different object (new-goal event), or reached for the same object as before, 
though moving along a different path (new-path event). Nine-month-olds and, to a lesser extent, 
five-month-olds, looked longer at the new-goal event, showing that they considered this event 
more novel than the other. This, in turn, suggests that the infants had categorised the reaching 
movement shown during the habituation phase in terms of its goal (e.g. grasping a particular toy) 
rather than merely in terms of its physical properties (e.g., its trajectory). 
A violation-of-expectation study by Luo (2011b), using a similar task, suggests that an un-
derstanding of goal-directed action is already in place in three-month-olds. In the orientation event, 
a box moved back and forward, ostensibly self-propelled; this was done so that the infants would 
recognise the box as agentive. Then, in the familiarisation trials, the box stood at the centre of the 
stage, with a cone on its left and a cylinder on its right, before “reaching” for the cone; this event 
was repeated several times. In the test phase, the cone was now at the box’s right and the cylinder 
at its left, and the box reached either for the cone again (old-goal event) or for the cylinder (new-
goal). Consistently with what Woodward had found, the three-month-olds in this study looked 
longer at the new-goal event (see also: Sommerville, Woodward, & Needham, 2005). 
A series of studies by Gergely Csibra, Gyorgy Gergely and colleagues provide evidence that 
infants expect agents to choose means that are adequate and efficient to bring about their goals 
(Csibra, 2008; Csibra, Biró, Koós, & Gergely, 2003; Csibra, Gergely, Biró, Koós, & Brockbank, 
1999; Gergely, Nádasdy, & Csibra, 1995). In the visual-habituation study by Csibra (2008), for 
example, infants were habituated to computer-generated events involving a self-propelled box 
  
20 
 
moving around an obstacle to reach a box on the other side of the room. In the test phase, the 
obstacle was removed, and the box either travelled around a similar path as before, making a detour 
around the spot where the obstacle had been (detour-path event), or followed a straight line to the 
other box (straight-path event). The six-month-olds in this study looked longer at the detour-path 
event, suggesting that they expected the agent to adjust her action to the changed situational con-
straints.  
The results of visual-habituation and violation-of-expectation studies receive further corrob-
oration by those of imitation studies, which show that infants do not simply mimic the agent’s 
bodily movements but take into account her goal (Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2005; Gergely, 
Bekkering, & Király, 2002; Hamlin, Hallinan, & Woodward, 2008; Meltzoff & Moore, 1997; 
Schwier, Van Maanen, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2006; Zmyj, Daum, & Aschersleben, 2009). Con-
sider for example Meltzoff (1995). Eighteen-month-olds watched as an experimenter attempted to 
perform an unfamiliar action involving a tool, such as, for example, pushing the button on the 
surface of a box using a stick. Since none of the attempts were successful, the infants in this study 
did not witness the outcome the agent intended to bring about. However, when they were given 
the chance to handle the tools themselves, instead of mimicking the exact movements of the agent 
most of the infants acted so as to bring about the outcome that those movements where aimed at; 
for instance, they used the stick to push the button.  
2.1.2 Preference 
Variations on the task introduced by Woodward (1998) have been used to investigate 
whether infants can attribute preferences to an agent. A natural interpretation of the findings re-
ported by Woodward is that infants take the fact that the agent always picked the same of two 
objects as a sign that she had a preference for that one over the other. Luo and Baillargeon (2005) 
put this interpretation to the test with 5-month-olds, using a self-propelled box task similar to the 
one described above. In the familiarisation trials, the box “reaches” repeatedly for the cone on its 
right, while in the test event it reaches either for the cone, now on its left, or for the cylinder, on 
its right. In the no-preference condition, only the cone was present during the familiarisation trials, 
while in the preference condition, similarly to Woodward’s original task, both objects were present 
throughout. If infants ascribe preferences, they should look longer at the new-goal event in the 
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preference condition but not in the no-preference condition. This is because the box reaching for 
the cone during the familiarisation trials only conveys a preference for the cone if the cylinder is 
also present. In the no-preference condition, infants should not be able to tell which of the two 
objects the box liked best and should thus have no expectations. On the other hand, if infants do 
not ascribe preferences but simply expect the box to repeat the same action it performed in the 
familiarisation trials, then they should look longer at the new-goal event in both conditions. Luo 
and Baillargeon found a significant difference in looking times only in the preference condition, 
thus suggesting that five-month-old infants possess an understanding of preference. 
An early study by Repacholi and Gopnik (1997) looked at whether infants would be able to 
ascribe to other people preferences opposite to theirs. An experimenter tasted two foods, one 
which children typically like (crackers) and one which they typically dislike (broccoli). The experi-
menter tasted the foods and, using typical facial and verbal expressions, conveyed whether she liked 
them or not. In the “match” condition, the experimenter liked the crackers but disliked the the 
broccoli; in the “mismatch” condition, she liked the broccoli but disliked the crackers. After tasting 
the foods, the experimenter asked children if they could give her “some”. In the mismatch condi-
tion, most of the eighteen-month-olds passed the experimenter crackers in the match condition 
and broccoli in the mismatch condition. Most of the fourteenth-month-olds, however, gave her 
crackers in both conditions. 
2.1.3 Seeing 
A few violation-of-expectation studies suggest that infants understand which objects agents 
can or cannot see from where they stand (Luo & Baillargeon, 2007; Luo & Beck, 2010; Luo & 
Johnson, 2009). As mentioned above, the study by Luo and Baillargeon  shows that infants do not 
expect the agent to reach again for the same object she reached for in previous trials when a second 
object is introduced in the test phase. A follow-up study by the same authors shows that, in ascrib-
ing a preference, six-month-old infants take into account only the objects the agent can see (Luo 
& Baillargeon, 2007). During the familiarisation trials, an experimenter sat at the centre and back 
of a stage, which had a box on the left side and a football on the right side. An occluder stood 
between the box and the experimenter. In the hidden-box condition, the occluder was tall enough 
to hide the box from the experimenter’s view; in the visible-short-box condition, the box was the 
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same size but the occluder was shorter; in the visible-tall-box condition, the occluder was the same 
size as in the hidden-box condition, but the box was now taller. As in previous studies, in the 
familiarisation trials the agent repeatedly reached for one of the two objects (the football). In the 
test trials, the occluder was removed and the objects were switched of position: the box was now 
on the right and the football on the left. The experimenter reached either for the football again 
(old-goal event) or for the box (new-goal event). The infants looked longer at the new-goal event 
in the visible-short-box and visible-tall-box conditions, but not in the hidden-box condition; they 
thus seemed to understand that, if the experimenter could not see the box, her reaching for the 
football could not be taken to express a preference. 
Support for the claim that infants understand seeing is provided also by studies on gaze 
following. Although three-month-old infants already follow an agent's gaze (D'Entremont, Hains, 
& Muir, 1997), it is not until the tenth month that they start taking into account the eyes specifically, 
and not just the orientation of the head (Brooks & Meltzoff, 2005). Twelve-month-olds seem to 
understand the referential aspect of looking: they can identify which object the agent is looking at, 
and if a barrier prevents them (but not the agent) from seeing the object, they will lean and move 
in order to gain sight of it (Caron, Kiel, Dayton, & Butler, 2002; Moll & Tomasello, 2004; Wellman, 
Phillips, Dunphy-Lelii, & LaLonde, 2004). Furthermore, they understand that an agent's sight of 
an object can be impeded by an opaque barrier located between her and the object, and, by the 
fourteenth month, they understand that a blindfold can also prevent seeing (Brooks & Meltzoff, 
2002). Interestingly, whereas twelve-month-olds usually follow the gaze of blindfolded agents as if 
they could see, they correct this behaviour if they are given the chance to wear the blindfold them-
selves, experiencing its effect on seeing; conversely, if eighteenth-month-olds are given the chance 
to wear a trick blindfold, which does not prevent seeing, they will start to follow the gaze of blind-
folded agents more frequently (Meltzoff & Brooks, 2008). By fourteen months, infants are also 
capable of using gaze direction in order to identify the object an agent is 'emoting' about (Repacholi, 
Meltzoff, & Olsen, 2008) and can use this insight in order to predict which object the agent may 
grasp (Phillips, Wellman, & Spelke, 2002). 
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2.1.4 Knowledge 
Some of the false-belief studies mentioned in section 1 included, as controls, conditions 
where the agent lacked the crucial piece of information as opposed to having it wrong (He, Bolz, 
& Baillargeon, 2011; Knudsen & Liszkowski, 2012a; Scott & Baillargeon, 2009; Scott et al., 2010). 
Consider for example the experiment by Zijing He and colleagues (2011). Two agents (E1 and E2) 
are playing the following game: E2 hides a toy in one of two boxes and E1 has to point to where 
it is. There were three conditions. In the knowledge condition, E1 is present as E2 hides the toy. 
In the ignorance condition, E1 is not present as E2 hides the toy. In the false-belief condition, E1 
sees E2 hide the toy in one box, but E2 then moves it to the other box when E1 is absent. In the 
knowledge condition, He and colleagues found longer looking times when E1 pointed to the wrong 
box; in the false-belief condition, in contrast, they found longer looking times when E1 pointed to 
the correct box; and in the ignorance condition they found no significant difference in looking 
times.  
That infants correctly predict the behaviour of agents that are unaware as opposed to wrong 
is also suggested by studies of informative pointing. For example, an early study by Daniela O'Neill 
(1996) shows that, if two-year-old toddlers need the help of an adult in order to retrieve a toy, they 
point more often to the location of the toy if the adult was not present, or had her eyes closed, as 
the toy was being put there. In a series of experiments, Ulf Liszkowski and his colleagues have 
shown that even twelve-month-old infants can use pointing to provide to others the information 
they need (Liszkowski, Carpenter, Striano, & Tomasello, 2006; Liszkowski, Carpenter, & 
Tomasello, 2007, 2008). For example, if an agent accidentally and unknowingly drops an object or 
misplaces it, and then starts looking for it, 12-month-old infants will point to the current location 
of the object; if the agent accidentally misplaces two objects, but is looking only for one of them, 
infants will point to that object specifically; if the agent misinterprets their message, infants will 
keep pointing and show signs of dissatisfaction. 
Lastly, an experiment by Tomasello and Haberl (2003) suggests that infants keep track of 
which objects an agent is already acquainted with. Tomasello and Haberl let 12- and 18- month-
old infants play with two new toys, together with two agents (Sally and Anne.) After a while Sally 
leaves the room and Anne and the infant start playing with a new toy. When Sally comes back, she 
looks at the three toys (placed all together) and asks, “Wow! That’s cool! Can you give it to me?” 
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Infants give to Sally the new toy more often in this condition than in a control condition in which 
Sally was present throughout the play. 
2.2 Other Direct Mentalising Studies 
2.2.1 Desires 
Children seem display at least a basic understanding of desire as early as they have been tested 
with direct methodologies (Cassidy, 1998; Cassidy et al., 1995; Joseph & Tager‐Flusberg, 1999; 
Lillard & Flavell, 1992; Moses, Coon, & Wusinich, 2000; Rakoczy, Warneken, & Tomasello, 2007; 
Wellman & Liu, 2004; Wellman & Woolley, 1990). For example, the first experiment in the study 
by Kimberly Cassidy, Maura Cosetti, Ressa Jones and colleagues (1995) suggests that young three-
year-olds already know that other people can have different likes and dislikes from them. The three-
year-olds in this study were shown four foods and asked to choose one they really liked (say, candy) 
and one they really did not like (say, broccoli). The children were then told a story about a boy (call 
him Tom). While Tom is at the grocery shop with his Mom, he tells her he really likes broccoli and 
hates candy (the opposite food preferences from the child). The next day, Tom’s Mom comes back 
from shopping; she has bought broccoli and candy and tells Tom he can pick one to eat. Which 
will Tom pick? Most of the three-year-olds in this study answered correctly (e.g., saying Tom would 
eat the broccoli.)  
Similarly, the second study in Cassidy et al. (1995) shows that three-year-olds an also infer 
preferences from past experiences. For example, in “implicit past-experience” trials, children were 
told about a child who had almost drowned while swimming at sea, but who had had fun having a 
picnic at the park. The next day, her mom asks her whether she would like to go on a picnic or 
swimming at the beach. Children were asked what the child will say. Even in this case, three-year-
olds were above-chance. 
2.2.2 Seeing 
 Concerning vision, Flavell and colleagues have introduced an important distinction between 
level-1 and level-2 perspective taking (Flavell, Everett, Croft, & Flavell, 1981; Masangkay et al., 
1974). Level-1 perspective-taking consists in understanding which objects another person can see 
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from where she stands. Level-2 perspective-taking, in contrast, consists in understanding how an 
object will look to the other person. 
Children pass level-1 perspective taking tests as early as they have been tested using direct 
methodologies. For example, Wellman, Ann Phillips and Thomas Rodriguez (2000) used a screen 
and two objects, each placed on a different side of the screen. After being allowed to inspect the 
set-up, children were sat on one side of the screen and asked which objects a person sitting on the 
other side could see. Most of the two-year-olds in this study judged correctly that the person could 
only see the object placed on her side of the screen. 
In contrast, direct level-2 perspective taking tests are typically passed around the fourth birth-
day. In a typical level-2 perspective-taking tasks, children sit at a table with a picture of a turtle on 
it. Children are asked whether the experimenter, sitting opposite to them, sees the turtle as being 
right side up or upside down. Typically, three-year-olds are at chance (Masangkay et al., 1974).  
2.2.3 Emotions 
Children seem capable of ascribing simple emotions like happiness and sadness as early as 
they have been tested with direct methodologies (Hadwin & Perner, 1991; Rakoczy et al., 2007; 
Stein & Levine, 1989; Wellman et al., 2000; Wellman & Woolley, 1990). For example, in the task 
used by Hannes Rakoczy et al. (2007), children are told that two characters (Susi and Tom) are at 
a lake, on a boat together. Susi says: “we should go to that house”, but Tom says: “No, we should 
go to that tree!”; then, the wind blows the boat to one of the two locations, and children are asked 
whether Susi is happy or sad and whether Tom is happy or sad. Most of the three-year-olds in this 
study answered correctly.  
For another example, consider the perception-to-emotion task used by Wellman and col-
leagues (2000). Participants were asked to judge how a person (Ann) would feel upon receiving, as 
a present, either an empty box or a box containing a desirable toy, and how they themselves would 
feel upon receiving the desirable toy as a present. All the three-year-olds in this study said both 
they and Ann would feel happy upon receiving the desirable toy; most of them also said Ann would 
be sad upon receiving the empty box. 
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2.2.4 The ToM Scale 
The “ToM Scale” is a series of direct mentalising tests that children typically pass in a specific 
order; it was designed by Wellman and Liu (2004) to map out the specific developmental progres-
sion followed by children. The scale includes the following seven tasks.  
1. Diverse Desires. Children are asked which of two snacks they prefer; for example, whether 
they like cookies or carrots best. The experimenter then tells them a short story involving a person 
(Mr. Jones) with the opposite preference, who is hungry, wants to have a snack, and must choose 
between cookies and carrots. Children are asked which food the character will choose. 
2. Diverse Beliefs. Children are told about a person (Linda) who is looking for her cat, which 
could be in either of two locations (the garage or the bushes). Children are asked where they think 
the pet is. Whatever they say, they are told Linda thinks her cat is in the other location. Children 
are then asked where Linda will look for her cat. 
3. Knowledge Access. Children are allowed to peek inside a container (e.g., a box or a drawer) 
to see what is inside; then, they are asked whether another person (Polly), who has not looked 
inside the container, knows what is in it. 
4-5. False Belief. Wellman and Liu (2004) included two false-belief tasks in their Scale: an 
unexpected-contents task and an explicit false-belief task (both of which were described in §1.1.2). 
6. Belief-Emotion. The belief-emotion task is a variation on the unexpected-contents task. Chil-
dren are told that a boy (Teddy) loves Cheerios (an American brand of cereal) and are shown a 
Cheerios box with rocks inside it. Children are then asked how Teddy will feel when he is first 
given the box (happy, because he loves Cheerios) and how he will feel after he is allowed to look 
inside it (sad, because there are rocks, not Cheerios, inside the box).  
7. Real-Apparent Emotion. Participants are told a story about a boy (Matt) who is being made 
fun of; the character does not find the joke funny but laughs all the same because he does not want 
to be called a baby. Participants are asked whether the character is happy or sad and whether she 
looks happy or sad.  
Wellman and Liu (2004) and Wellman, Fang, and Peterson (2011) show that most children 
in Western societies pass the tests in this order.  
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3. The Nativism-Constructivism Debate 
Why should one care about whether belief-reasoning abilities emerge early or late? A good 
reason to care about it is because of its implications for the debate between nativism and construc-
tivism (other reasons will be discussed in §4). After clarifying what this debate is about in §3.1, in 
§3.2 and §3.3 we will consider how the early-emergence and late-emergence approaches, respec-
tively, relate to nativism and constructivism.  
3.1 What is the debate about? 
The question of how much of our knowledge is innate may be as old as philosophy itself – 
it was first brought under the spotlight by Plato, and then re-examined centuries later in the works 
of philosophers like Descartes, Locke, Hume and Leibniz (Cowie, 1999; Samet, 2008; Simpson, 
Carruthers, Laurence, & Stich, 2005). Empiricism, the doctrine that all knowledge is learned from 
experience, came out as a clear winner from this second round of the debate, and was the domi-
nating view for the best part of the two centuries that followed. The innateness controversy is 
currently experiencing a second revival, however, thanks to a large extent to Chomsky’s seminal 
work in linguistics (e.g. Chomsky, 1959). Crucially, for the first time in history, cognitive science 
has now given us the tools we need to settle the question experimentally.  
At first blush, nativism is simply the claim that most of our knowledge is innate, while con-
structivism (the modern-day incarnation of empiricism) is the claim that most of our knowledge is 
learned (or “constructed”) from experience. Indeed, it is common to see nativism defined precisely 
along these lines (e.g., Prinz, 2002; Samet & Zaitchik, 2017). On closer inspection, however, the 
debate appears to be more nuanced (Carruthers, Laurence, & Stich, 2007; Margolis & Laurence, 
2012; Pinker, 1997). A better way to bring the disagreement between nativists and constructivists 
into focus may be to look at the type of cognitive mechanisms that, according to each type of 
position, allow organisms to acquire the psychological traits they possess. Nativists about a given 
psychological trait tend to argue that the trait in question is acquired thanks to the contribution of 
domain-specific cognitive mechanisms (sometimes called modules) that contain a good deal of innate 
structure. In contrast, a constructivist would argue that the trait is acquired thanks to a domain-
general learning mechanism.  
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Notice that one can be a nativist about certain traits but a constructivist about others. In 
addition, a cognitive mechanism can be specialised and innate to varying degrees, and in principle 
these two features may vary independently of each other. As a result, nativism and constructivism 
should not be understood to be clearly demarcated, mutually exclusive alternatives. A good way to 
visualise the debate is to imagine specialisation and innateness as two knobs that can be turned up 
or down, independently of each other. Turn them both all the way up, and you get radical forms 
of nativism; turn them both all the way down, and you get radical forms of constructivism; in 
between, lots of intermediate positions, some of which will be hard to classify as belonging to either 
camp.  
3.2 Nativism and the Early-emergence Approach 
The early-emergence approach has been defended, pretty much without exception, by re-
searchers belonging to the nativist camp. The reason for this should be obvious: the early emer-
gence of a trait is good evidence that the trait is either innate or acquired thanks to a specialised 
mechanism, allowing the organism to acquire the trait quickly, with relatively little exposure to the 
stimuli. Let us see some examples of early-emergence accounts in the literature.  
3.2.1 Alan Leslie 
Alan Leslie (1987) was among the first cognitive scientists to defend a nativist position about 
mentalising, and his account has been an inspiration for many of the early-emergence account that 
followed. He argued that representing propositional attitudes (like pretend or believe) requires the 
contribution of a special-purpose, domain-specific cognitive mechanism, which he called Theory of 
Mind Mechanism (ToMM for short). Leslie argued that ToMM was innate and would typically come 
online by the second year of life. This, notice, was several years before the results of the first indirect 
false-belief test were published; Leslie’s claim was based mainly on the observation that young 
children engage in pretend play which, he argued, requires representing that one is pretending. In 
a later publication, Scholl and Leslie (1999) argued that ToMM was likely to have many of the 
properties traditionally associated with modules, including informational encapsulation, localised 
neural implementation, and disposition to selective impairment. At the same time, however, Scholl 
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and Leslie stressed that nothing in their position precluded the possibility of children acquiring new 
knowledge about the mind through learning (see also: Leslie, 2000a).  
3.2.2 Renée Baillargeon 
Based on the results of several indirect false-belief studies, Baillargeon, Scott, and He (2010) 
argue that humans possess an innate mentalising system, allowing them to interpret behaviour in 
terms of the underlying mental states. They argue that this system comprises two subsystems that 
may come online at different times. The first subsystem (SS1) would allow one to represent moti-
vational states (like desires and intentions) and reality-congruent informational states (like true be-
lief or absence thereof) but not reality-incongruent informational states (like false belief); to repre-
sent the latter, the second subsystem (SS2) would be needed. This is because, Baillargeon and col-
leagues argued, representing false beliefs requires not just “masking” the information the agent 
does not have but maintaining two contradictory representations of reality (one’s own and the 
agent’s). 
3.3 Constructivism and the Late-emergence approach 
The late-emergence approach has been defended mainly, although not exclusively, by con-
structivists. Let us look at some examples. 
3.3.1 Alison Gopnik and Henry Wellman 
Gopnik and Wellman (1992, 1994) defend one of the most influential constructivist accounts 
to date, the theory-theory. This claims that children possess a domain-general learning mechanism 
which they use to construct and then progressively revise theories about the world, in a way not 
dissimilar from how scientists go about formulating and revising their theories. During the pre-
school years, Gopnik and Wellman argue, children would gradually move from a desire-perception 
theory, in which mental states are conceived non-representationally, to a representational belief-
desire psychology. In many cases, two-year-olds’ desire-perception psychology will lead to incorrect 
predictions and fail to offer sensible explanations. As it happens in the case of scientific theories, 
however, children will not immediately abandon it; rather, they will try to dismiss the counterevi-
dence or to elaborate auxiliary hypothesis. Three-years-olds would be in such a transitional stage, 
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entertaining the possibility of false beliefs only as an auxiliary hypothesis to account for otherwise 
recalcitrant data. Finally, around the age of four, children would acquire a fully representational 
conception of the mind, which would allow them to pass direct false-belief tests. 
3.3.2 Josef Perner 
Another influential version of the theory-theory was proposed by Perner (1991). Like Go-
pnik and Wellman, Perner maintains that children acquire a representational theory of mind around 
the age of four. However, he argues that this process of theory change is enabled by a development 
in children's ability to entertain mental models of the world. One-year-olds, according to Perner, 
are only capable of entertaining a single model, which is a representation of the current situation. 
During the second year, children would then acquire the capacity to entertain multiple models, thus 
being able to simultaneously represent not only the current situation but also past, future and hy-
pothetical situations. In Perner’s eyes, this is what allows two-year-olds to engage in pretend play, 
which, he argues, requires behaving as if a possible situation were actual. Finally, around the age of 
four, children would acquire the capacity to meta-represent, by which Perner means representing 
the representational relation itself. This, Perner argues, requires building a meta-model, which rep-
resents that a certain situation (e.g. the situation shown in a picture, or the situation presented by a 
belief) represents another situation (e.g. reality.), either truly or falsely. The capacity to entertain 
meta-models would allow four-year-olds to acquire a concept of representation, opening the door 
to a representational understanding of the mind. 
4. Wider Implications 
We have seen in the last section that the question of how early belief-reasoning abilities 
emerge has important implications for the debate between nativism and constructivism. In this 
section, we take a quick look at other ramifications of this issue, specifically at its connections with 
consciousness, communication and moral judgement.  
4.1 Consciousness 
The most mystifying and intriguing aspect of conscious experience is its phenomenal char-
acter, the fact that there is something it is like for the subject to have a conscious experience — 
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something which seems to be impossible to put into words or communicate to anyone who has 
not had a similar type of experience (Block, 1995). Thus, a blind person will never know what it is 
like to see a rainbow, and we will never know what it is like for a bat to perceive the environment 
through echolocation (Nagel, 1974). Phenomenal character has been argued to pose the hardest 
challenge to cognitive science, forever resisting all attempts to be explained in physical terms 
(Chalmers, 1995; Levine, 1983). Nonetheless, several philosophers have argued that consciousness 
can be explained, and the favoured approach among these philosophers has been to try and reduce 
phenomenal consciousness to representational content (Dretske, 1995; Lycan, 1996; Tye, 1995). 
These representational approaches divide in two broad categories: first-order and higher-order. 
Higher-order representationalists maintain that for a state to possess phenomenal character, it must 
itself be represented by a higher-order state (Carruthers, 2000; Lycan, 1996; Rosenthal, 1997); first-
order representationalists, in contrast, deny this (Dretske, 1995; Tye, 1995). 
An important implication of higher-order representationalism is that only creatures that are 
capable of entertaining higher-order states can be conscious in the phenomenal sense. Notably, the 
results of direct false-belief tests have often been taken to show that children younger than four 
cannot entertain higher-order states. Fred Dretske (1995), for example, uses this to mount an ob-
jection to higher-order theories: since the evidence suggests that children younger than four cannot 
entertain higher-order states, it follows from higher-order representationalism that they must not 
be phenomenally conscious; and yet, surely, they are. Of course, as they say, one philosopher mo-
dus ponens is another’s modus tollens. Thus, Carruthers (2000) argues that if it is true that children 
younger than four cannot entertain higher-order states, than the right conclusion to draw is not 
that higher-order representationalism is false but that children younger than four are not phenom-
enally conscious.  
4.2 Communication 
Understanding what someone means by an utterance or gesture seems to require represent-
ing what she intended to communicate by means of it. Indeed, in a seminal paper entitled “Mean-
ing”, Paul Grice argued that ‘meaning something by utterance U’ should be analysed as ‘intending 
U to produce some effect in the audience by means of the recognition of this intention’ (1957, p. 
385). Grice’s analysis has inspired several influential theories of communication (e.g. Schiffer, 1972; 
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Sperber & Wilson, 1986). These so-called “neo-Gricean” theories have the implication that under-
standing what a speaker means requires being able to entertain complex higher-order representa-
tions (Breheny, 2006; Thompson, 2014a). An important implication of this is that if children under 
four cannot ascribe mental states, then they have no way of understanding what people mean by 
their utterances. Thus, the development of communication appears to be bound to that of mental-
ising.  
4.3 Sociomoral Abilities 
The ability to make moral judgements seems to presuppose the capacity to ascribe mental 
states. Thus, for example, to decide whether you should blame Tom for hitting you on the head, 
you need to consider whether he did so intentionally or accidentally. Surprisingly, the effect seems 
to go in the opposite direction as well, since when people (including children from the age of four, 
see Leslie, Knobe, & Adam, 2006) find the consequence of an action to have a negative valence 
they are much more likely to judge that it was intentional (Knobe, 2003).  
In recent years, developmental psychologists have begun using indirect methodologies to 
investigate what infants understand of the social and moral sphere. There is now a growing body 
of findings suggesting that infants have specific expectations concerning fairness, reciprocity, au-
thority, ingroup-outgroup dynamics and other sociomoral concepts (Baillargeon et al., 2015). As 
Baillargeon and colleagues note, this provides converging evidence that infants possess mentalising 
abilities, since a sociomoral abilities presuppose mentalising abilities. On the other hand, this means 
that how we interpret the evidence from indirect false-belief studies will affect how we interpret 
the evidence from indirect sociomoral studies.  
5. Plan of the Thesis 
In Chapter II, we will consider how late-emergentists have proposed to explain the results 
of indirect false-belief tests. In Chapter III, on the other hand, we will consider how early-emer-
gentists have proposed to explain the results of direct false-belief tests. In Chapter IV, I will present 
my own, early-emergentist explanation of direct false-belief results, called the processing-time account. 
In Chapter V I will explore a new option, alternative to both early-emergence and late-emergence 
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accounts, which I call the hybrid approach. Finally, in Chapter VI, I will consider which offers the 
best account of all the evidence – the processing-time account, or the hybrid approach. 
  
  
34 
 
II 
ALTERNATIVE 
INTERPRETATIONS OF INDIRECT 
FALSE-BELIEF TESTS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Late-emergentists have argued that the results of indirect false-belief tests provide no evi-
dence that infants can reason about what other people think. This is because, they claim, there are 
ways infants could pass these tests without being aware of other people’s beliefs. In the literature, 
one can find many different proposals about how infants could do this, varying significantly in 
respect to the level of intellectual sophistication they presuppose.  
On one end of the spectrum, we find very frugal accounts, maintaining that quite basic abil-
ities or dispositions, such as, for example, a preference for low-level novelty, would be sufficient 
for passing an indirect false-belief test (Heyes, 2014; Perner & Ruffman, 2005). In the following, I 
will refer to these as low-level interpretations. On the opposite end, we find richer accounts, claiming 
that some mentalising abilities would be required, though, crucially, not a proper understanding of 
belief (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Hedger & Fabricius, 2011; Wellman, 2010, 2014). I will refer to 
these alternative interpretations as mentalistic. And as one might expect, several proposals occupy 
the middle ground between these two extremes, maintaining that infants can predict behaviour 
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without however ascribing any mental states (De Bruin & Newen, 2012, 2014; de Bruin, Strijbos, 
& Slors, 2011; Perner, 2010; Perner & Ruffman, 2005; Zawidzki, 2011). These I will call behavioural 
interpretations1.  
Low-level interpretations will be discussed in §1; behavioural interpretations, in §2; and men-
talistic interpretations, in §3. As we will see, none of these alternative interpretations can explain all 
indirect false-belief results, which means that the face-value, early-emergentist interpretation is the 
best we’ve got. 
1. Low-Level Proposals 
Low-level accounts maintain that indirect false-belief results can be explained without attrib-
uting to infants any understanding of behaviour or any capacity to predict behaviours as such. 
Mainly two lean accounts have been proposed: Josef Perner and Ted Ruffman’s (2005) three-way 
association account, which will be discussed in §1.1, and Cecilia Heyes’ (2014) low-level novelty 
account, which will be discussed in §1.2. 
1.1 The Three-way Association Account 
Perner and Ruffman (2005) argue that the differences in looking times found by Onishi and 
Baillargeon (2005) can be explained on the assumption that infants form three-way associations 
between agents, objects and locations. After the change of location, half the infants in this study 
were shown the agent (E1) reaching for the green box (green-box event), while the other half were 
shown E1 reaching for the yellow box (yellow-box event). Since both groups had already seen E1 
reaching for the green box during the familiarisation trials, both would already have formed a three-
way association between E1, the green box and the toy. Thus, only the infants in the yellow-box 
event would form a new association, this time involving E1, the yellow-box and the toy. According 
to Perner and Ruffman, this might well be the reason why the infants in the yellow-box group had 
longer looking times: not because they were expecting E1 to reach for the green box, but simply 
                                                 
1 Notice that behavioural interpretations do not deny that the infants themselves possess mental states – what 
they deny is that infants would ascribe mental states to other people (or even themselves.) 
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because, having never seen E1 reaching for the toy in the yellow box, they were in the process of 
forming a new three-way association. 
This proposal seems to be ruled out by one of the control conditions in Onishi and 
Baillargeon (2005). The condition described above is the FB-Green condition. In the TB-Yellow 
condition, E1 stayed and witnessed the object moving from the green box into the yellow box. 
This flipped the looking times: the infants now looked longer when E1 reached for the green box 
as opposed to the yellow box. In terms of three-way associations, however, we would expect to see 
similar looking times in the two conditions, since in neither case E1 reaches for the yellow box 
until the test phase. Thus, in the TB-Green condition as in the FB-Green condition, infants would 
still have to form a new association in the yellow-box event but not in the green-box event.  
To circumvent this difficulty, Perner and Ruffman suggest that three-way associations may 
be formed not just based on reaching but also based on looking. E1 looked at the toy as it was 
going in the yellow box; this may have led infants to associate E1 with the yellow box and the toy 
already during the belief-induction phase. Notice, however, that this falls short of fixing the issue. 
For, now, by the time they get to the test phase, infants will have formed both associations: E1-
Toy-Yellow Box and E1-Toy-Green Box. Thus, neither in the case of the green-box event nor in 
the case of the yellow-box event would infants form a new association, which means three-way 
associations cannot explain the difference in looking times2.  
Another suggestion made by Perner and Ruffman (2005) may be argued to solve this prob-
lem. Perner and Ruffman maintain that parts of the brain (“neurons in non-frontal regions”) code 
for the recency of the stimuli. Infants may thus look longer at one event compared to the other not 
because one of the two involves an entirely novel agent-object-location triad, but because one event 
involves a less recent triad compared to the other, i.e., one that was seen less recently. In the TB-
Yellow condition, E1 looked at the toy in the yellow box after she reached for the toy in the green 
                                                 
2 Oddly, as they try to explain the TB-Yellow and FB-Yellow conditions, Perner and Ruffman (2005) refer to 
“E1-toy-green box” as a new combination of elements, which would induce infants to form a new association. Perner 
and Ruffman seem to forget, however, that infants already saw E1 reaching for the toy in the green box during the 
familiarisation trials. Thus, the combination is not really new, and no new association would have to be formed. (Alt-
hough see the next footnote.) 
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box. Thus, the E1-Toy-Yellow Box triad was more recent than the E1-Toy-Green Box one, thus 
eliciting less looking time3.  
Well, let’s suppose that this works, and thus that Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) can be ex-
plained in terms of three-way associations. Perner and Ruffman’s account still seem to fare poorly 
with plenty of other studies. The classic experiment by Woodward (1998), described in Chapter I, 
§2.2.1, seems to offer a very elegant illustration of its difficulties. An agent (E1) reaches repeatedly 
for one of two objects (always in the same location). In the test phase, the two objects are in 
reversed positions, and E1 reaches either for the same object as before (new-path event) or for the 
other one (new-goal event). Note that in either case participants witness a novel agent-object-loca-
tion combination: in the new-path event E1 is reaching for the same object as before, but at a new 
location, whereas in the new-goal event she is reaching for a new object, but at the old location. 
Notice that neither triad would be “less recent” than the other; they would both be entirely novel. 
The three-way association account would thus predict equal looking times. In fact, however, the 
infants in this study looked longer at the new-goal event, as one would expect if they attributed to 
her a preference for the object she grasped in previous trials. 
Crucially, it is not an accident that the three-way association cannot account for all the evi-
dence; indeed, the opposite would have been truly surprising, for there is now a large number of 
mentalising studies employing looking times as a measure. For the three-way association account 
to work, in each of these studies the event that is not consistent with the agent’s mental states (at 
which infants look longer) would always have to involve a novel or, at least, less-recent agent-
object-location triad (thus resulting in the formation of a new three-way association). Since these 
two properties are not causally related (as the study by Woodward goes to show), there is no reason 
why they should be reliably co-instantiated, other than sheer coincidence.  
The three-way association account suffers from another problem as well, just as threatening 
as the first. Not all indirect mentalising studies have used looking times as a measure. Some of the 
studies that have used other paradigms, such as, for example, interactive studies, are clearly prob-
lematic for the three-way association account. Consider for example the study by D. Buttelmann 
et al. (2009), which was described in Chapter I, §1.2.1. An agent (E1) tries to retrieve a toy from 
                                                 
3 Or, perhaps: infants simply have a bad memory, only remembering the most recent combination of agent, 
object and location. This seems to fix the problem too. 
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the box where she had put it. Unbeknown to her, however, a second agent (E2) has moved the toy 
to a second box and locked both boxes with a pin. Thus, E1 is now struggling to open the first 
box, which does not actually contain the toy she is looking for. Most of the infants in this study 
tried to help her by pointing or crawling to the second box; they thus seemed to understand that 
E1 was only trying to open the first box because she thought the toy was in there. The problem 
for the three-way association account here is that infants’ behaviour in this and similar studies 
appears to be the outcome of an episode of practical reasoning; that is, it appears to be motivated 
by a desire to help the agent coupled with a belief that the agent is looking for the toy. That infants 
associate the experimenter with the toy and one of the boxes cannot be the reason they point or 
crawl to the other box; while associations can of course influence behaviour, as in episodes of 
priming, they are not the right kind of state to either inform or motivate action. 
1.2 The Low-Level Novelty Account 
The low-level novelty account, defended by Heyes (2014), maintains that infants enjoy look-
ing at events that involve novel combinations of colours, shapes and other low-level, perceptible 
properties. This simple fact, Heyes argues, can explain most indirect false-belief results. Consider, 
for example, the study by Onishi and Baillargeon (2005).In the FB-Green condition, E1 is absent 
as the toy “crawls” out of the green box into the yellow one. All the infants will have seen E1 
reaching for the green box during the familiarisation trials; thus, to the infants in this condition, E1 
reaching for the yellow box will seem more perceptually novel, explaining why infants looked 
longer at the yellow-box event. 
The low-level novelty account seems to be ruled out by the TB-Yellow condition in Onishi 
and Baillargeon’s study. In this case, E1 stayed as the object moved from one box to the other; it 
is still true, however, that E1 never reached for the yellow box. Thus, the yellow-box event should 
still look more novel. In this case, Heyes claims that the toy moving into the yellow box should 
make E1 reach into the yellow box look less perceptually novel, since the two events are perceptu-
ally similar — in both cases there is movement towards the yellow box.4  
                                                 
4 Notice that this actually does not fix the issue. The yellow-box event may not look novel since infants saw the 
toy moving the yellow box; but the green-box event would not look novel either, since infants also saw E1 reaching 
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Alright; does this not mess up the explanation for the FB-green condition, however? For in 
that condition, as well, infants saw the object move into the yellow box. Here Heyes maintains that 
the fact that E1 reappeared right after the toy moved might have caused retroactive interference. 
That is, the infants in the FB-Green condition were so captured by E1’s reappearance that they 
forgot what had just happened (the toy moving from the green to the yellow box). Hence, E1 
reaching for the yellow box still looked more perceptually novel to them. (Since, in the TB-Yellow 
condition, E1 stayed as the toy moved, there was no retroactive interference in that case.)  
Heyes acknowledges that not all indirect false-belief studies can be explained in terms of 
perceptual novelty. In some cases, she claims, we must take into account “imaginal novelty”. Con-
sider, for example, the experiment by Song and Baillargeon (2008), which was described in Chapter 
I, §1.2.3. The study involved two experimenters (E1 and E2) and two toys (a toy skunk and a doll 
with blue hair). During the familiarisation trials, E1 always reached for the doll, thus displaying her 
preference. During the belief-induction trial, two boxes were introduced: one had a plain lid (plain 
box), the other had a lid with a tuft of blue hairs (like the doll’s) sticking from underneath (hair 
box). In the false-perception condition, as E1 was away, E2 put the skunk in the hair box, and the 
doll in the plain one. The true-perception condition was similar expect that E1 stayed as E2 put 
the objects in the boxes. In the test phase, E1 reached either for the plain box (plain-box event) or 
for the hair box (hair-box event). 
Now, the true-perception condition seems to pose a problem for Heyes. Infants saw E1 
reaching for a doll with blue hair during the familiarization trails. During the test phase, neither 
object is visible, but the hair box has a tuft of blue hair. The less novel event for them should thus 
be E1 reaching for the hair box, instead of the plain one. Heyes suggests that this problem can be 
solved by appealing to what infants are likely to imagine, instead of what they perceive. If infants 
imagine the doll in the plain box and the skunk in the hair box, then E1’s reaching for the plain 
box will be the less novel event. (In the false-perception condition, however, E1’s disappearance 
and re-appearance causes retroactive interference, thus preventing the infants from imagining the 
contents of the boxes. Consequently, they do expect her to reach for the hair box.)  
                                                 
for the green box during the familiarisation trials. Thus, neither should look novel, which would predict equal looking 
times. 
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Can all indirect false-belief studies be explained in terms of low-level novelty? For this to be 
the case, the event that is inconsistent with the mental states of the agent would always have to be 
the one infants either perceive or imagine as more novel; as in the case of the three-way association 
account, however, there is simply no reason this should be the case, aside from sheer coincidence. 
The study by Woodward (1998) provides, once again, a neat counter-example. The new-goal event 
is similar to previous events in that the hand moves along the exact same path as before, but also 
dissimilar in that the hand ends up touching a different toy. On the other hand, the new-path event 
is similar to previous events in that the hand ends up touching the same toy as before, but also 
dissimilar in that the hand is now moving along a different path. Overall, both are novel in some 
respects but not in others. On Heyes’ account, then, one would thus expect to see roughly similar 
looking times; and yet, Woodward (1998) found that infants looked longer at the new-goal event.  
Like the three-way association account, the low-level novelty account suffers from a second 
problem, as well: it does not seem to apply to interactive studies. To illustrate, consider again the 
interactive study by D. Buttelmann et al. (2009). The fact that infants associate E1 with the toy and 
one of the boxes cannot explain why infants crawl to the other box; and neither can the fact that 
infants prefer novel stimuli. In fact, that infants exhibit any helping behaviour at all should be 
problematic for Heyes. Plainly, to even try and help someone achieve their goals, one must first 
ascribe some goals to them. If infants conceived of E1 simply as an interesting but mindless con-
figuration of shapes and colours, trying to help her would not make much sense5. 
                                                 
5 In discussing the study by Buttelman and colleagues, Heyes mentions that the infants may crawl to the box 
where the toy is simply because they want to play with the toy, and not because they are trying to help the agent. The 
study by Southgate, Chevallier, and Csibra (2010) seems to rule out this suggestion. The study used a design similar to 
the one by Buttelman and colleagues, except that it involved two toys. E1 puts one toy in box A and the other in box 
B. Then, as E1 is away, E2 switches them. When E1 comes back, she points to Box A, saying to the infant, “can you 
give me the Sefo?” (“Sefo” is a made-up word.) Infants retrieve the object that is in Box B, apparently understanding 
that the Sefo is the object E1 wrongly takes to be in Box A. Now, the problem For Heyes is that there are two toys. 
The authors tried to match the toys to make them look equally novel and interesting. Furthermore, they counterbal-
anced both which toy was in which box and which box E1 pointed at. Thus, if infants simply reached for the toy they 
liked, we would expect to see roughly half of them reach for box A and the other for Box B, which is not what 
Southgate and colleagues found. 
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1.3 Summary 
Both the proposals we have considered in this section can explain the results of the study by 
Onishi and Baillargeon only to the extent that, in this study, the event that is consistent with the 
agent’s mental states happens to be one that is more novel along some dimension or other. There 
is no reason why these two properties should be aligned in all indirect mentalising studies, however, 
and, indeed, we have seen at least one counterexample. In addition, neither Perner and Ruffman’s 
three-way association account nor Heyes’ low-level novelty account had an explanation for indirect 
false-belief studies using an interactive paradigm. Thus, overall, we can consider these proposals 
ruled out by the evidence.  
2. Behavioural Proposals 
In this section we will discuss those alternative proposals of indirect false-belief studies that 
attribute to infants some ability to predict behaviour as such, without however ascribing to them 
any understanding of the mind. Perner’s behaviour-rule account will be discussed in §2.1; the af-
fordance-based account put forward by Leon de Bruin, Derek Strijbos and Marc Slors, in §2.2; 
Tadeusz Zawidzki’s enhanced teleological-reasoning account in §2.3; and, finally, the association 
account defended by de Bruin and Albert Newen, §2.4.  
2.1 The Behaviour-Rule Account  
2.1.1 The “search-where-last-seen” rule 
Several authors have suggested that infants may predict behaviour by relying on superficial, 
non-mentalistic generalisations, sometimes called “behaviour rules” (Gallagher & Povinelli, 2012; 
Perner, 2010; Perner & Ruffman, 2005; Ruffman, 2014; Ruffman, Taumoepeau, & Perkins, 2012; 
Sabbagh, Benson, & Kuhlmeier, 2013). Specifically, Perner and Ruffman (2005) suggest that the 
task used by Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) could be passed using the generalisation that people 
look for things where they last “saw” them (i.e., where they were last on their direct line of sight.) 
This works because in the study by Onishi and Baillargeon (as in the typical unexpected-transfer 
task) the box where E1 takes the object to be is also the box where the toy was last in her 
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unobstructed line of sight. So long as this is the case, knowing the latter piece of information is 
enough to predict which box E1 will reach for; one does not actually need to ascribe a belief to 
her.  
This is an important weak spot in Onishi and Baillargeon’s study6, one that (as we will see in 
the rest of this chapter) many alternative interpretations have tried to exploit. Nonetheless, many 
of the indirect false-belief studies published since 2005 have used different belief-reasoning tasks, 
where the agent does not take the object to be where she has last seen it (e.g., Scott & Baillargeon, 
2009; Scott et al., 2010; Scott et al., 2015; Song & Baillargeon, 2008; Song et al., 2008; Träuble et 
al., 2010) Consider, for example, the study by Song et al. (2008), which was described in Chapter I, 
§1.2. In the informative-intervention condition, E1 leaves a ball in a blue box, then goes away; 
while E1 is absent, E2 moves the ball into a mug; when E1 comes back, E2 tells her the ball is now 
in the mug. If infants were using the search-where-last-seen rule, they would expect E1 to reach 
for the blue box, which is where, presumably, E1 last saw the ball. Instead, the infants in Song and 
colleagues’ study expected E1 to reach for the mug, thus seeming to understand that E1 would 
update her belief based on E2’s testimony. Or, to see a second example, consider again the false-
perception condition in the study by Song and Baillargeon (2008), where E1 has not seen the object 
she is looking for (i.e., a doll) in either of the boxes. In this case, if infants were using the search-
were-last-seen rule, they should not have any expectations about what E1 will do. Instead, the 
infants in this study expected E1 to reach for the hair box, thus anticipating that E1 would take the 
blue hair coming out of the box to be the doll’s. These studies (together with the others mentioned 
above) decisively show that infants are not using the search-where-last-seen rule. 
2.1.2 Behaviour Rules Redux: The Shortcut Argument 
Despite this, Perner (2010) argues that there are other behaviour rules that could allow in-
fants to pass the tests mentioned above. In fact, he claims, all the mentalising tests that have been 
used with infants are necessarily open to behaviour-rule interpretations. The argument that sup-
ports this bold claim was put forward by Povinelli and Vonk (2003), and was originally directed at 
                                                 
6 It is worth noting that Onishi and Baillargeon are not to be blamed for this — first, because, as mentioned 
above, this weak spot was already present in the original unexpected-transfer task, which Onishi and Baillargeon simply 
adapted to the violation-of-expectation paradigm; and second, because all studies are inevitably open to some alterna-
tive interpretation or other, which must be ruled out in follow-up studies. 
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mentalising studies in apes and other non-human species, but can be easily extended to infants. 
The argument takes its move from the observation that since mental states cannot be directly ob-
served (you cannot look in my head to see what I’m thinking) one has no choice but to infer them 
from behavioural cues and other observable features of the situation. Now, the problem is that if 
the agent’s action can be predicted based on the mental states attributed, and those mental states 
can be inferred based on the events observed, then it should always be possible to take a shortcut, 
as it were, and predict the agent’s action directly from the events observed, skipping the interme-
diate, mentalistic step. Call this the shortcut argument.  
To see the argument in action, consider again the study by Song et al. (2008) mentioned 
above. To pass this task through mentalising, one would have to infer where E1 thinks the ball is 
based on what happened during the belief-induction trials — specifically, based on where she last 
saw the ball and on what E2 told her. It seems, however, that one could also take a shortcut, thus 
expecting E1 to look where E2 told her the ball was, without ascribing to her the corresponding 
belief. Put in the form of a rule, the shortcut would look something like this: 
BR1: If an agent does not have a direct line of sight to an object, then, if she was 
told the location of the object, she will look for it there, otherwise she will look for 
it where it was last in her direct line of sight.    
  Of course, this particular rule cannot explain all indirect false-belief studies; it cannot ex-
plain, for example, the study by Song and Baillargeon (2008). Nonetheless, the shortcut argument 
shows (or at least purports to show) that for any given set of indirect false-belief tests, there must 
be at least one behaviour rule that could be used to pass them.  
2.1.3 The Objection from Learning 
The shortcut argument has generated a good deal of discussion in the literature (Andrews, 
2005; Buckner, 2014; Butterfill & Apperly, 2013; Carruthers, 2013; Clatterbuck, 2015; Fitzpatrick, 
2009; Low & Wang, 2011; Lurz, 2011; Spaulding, 2011; Thompson, 2015) — too much discussion, 
in fact, for me to attempt to summarise it here. What I will do, instead, is focus on the most serious 
problem I take the shortcut argument to have; this is that infants may not be able to learn the 
required behaviour rules. 
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First of all, notice that the fact that a test could, in theory, be passed by certain means does 
not entail that it is plausible that a given category of participants pass it by those means. To illus-
trate, consider a math test in which one must add pairs of positive integers smaller than 1000, 
picked at random. In theory, one might pass such a test without knowing how to add. After all, the 
number of possible questions, though very large (106), is finite. Certainly, however, no one would 
seriously suggest that children would be able to pass it this way, since there is no way the average 
child (or, for that matter, the average adult) could memorise the answers to 106 questions!  
Going back to our matter, the shortcut argument simply shows that if infants knew the re-
quired behaviour rules, they could pass indirect mentalising tests without possessing any mentalis-
ing abilities. It is still an open question, however, whether infants can be expected to know the 
required behaviour rules, specifically whether they could learn them over the first few months of 
their life. Peter Carruthers has put this point in the form of a challenge to supporters of the behav-
iour-rule approach:  
[…] it is important to note that the behavior-rule and infant-mindreading hypothe-
ses assume very different explanatory burdens. This is easiest to see if it is assumed 
that behavior rules need to be learned over the course of the first few months of 
the infant’s life. The challenge, then, is to show, in respect of each proposed rule, 
that infants have adequate opportunities to learn it in the time available. This seems 
implausible with respect to a number of the behavior rules that would be needed to 
explain some of the more recent infancy results. But in any case it is a challenge that 
behavior-rule theorists have not yet taken up. (Carruthers, 2013, pp. 150-151). 
Why doubt whether infants could learn the required behaviour rules? Well, when one actually 
gets down to finding the behaviour rule that could be used to pass a given test, the result is often 
a very ad hoc rule – a rule so closely tailored to the particular experiment that it would be useless 
in any other situation. And if that is indeed the case, then it is hard to see how infants could have 
learned it, unless they had the opportunity to observe that specific situation, to which only the rule 
applies, enough times in the past. Given that some of the experiments depict fairly uncommon 
false-belief scenarios, there are legitimate grounds to doubt whether infants could have learned the 
corresponding behaviour rules. The same problem does not arise on the supposition that infants 
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rely on mentalistic generalisations, which are supposed to be very general and should thus apply 
across different situations7. 
It will help to consider a concrete case. Take the study by Scott et al. (2015). The experiment 
starts with several familiarisation trials, during which it is established that the target agent (call her 
E1) likes rattling toys: E1 shakes several objects, one after the other, storing those that rattle in a 
box and throwing the rest in a bin. In the test trial, E1 grabs a new toy and shakes it, noting that it 
rattles. Before either storing it or throwing it away, however, E1 is called away for a little while, 
leaving the toy on a table. Taking advantage of E1's absence, a second agent (E2), who was present 
throughout, picks from the bin one of the toys E1 had discarded during the familiarisation trials, 
which looks identical to the one E1 just shook but does not rattle, and puts it in its place, thus 
stealing the rattling toy. When E1 came back, the seventeen-month-old infants in this study ex-
pected her to store the non-rattling toy instead of putting it back in the bin, thus (apparently) 
understanding that E1 would be fooled by the fact that the two toys looked the same. 
Now, let us try to come up with a behaviour rule that could be used to pass this test. The 
action we want to predict is whether E1 will store the toy or throw it in the bin. What E1 will do 
depends on whether she takes the toy to be one that rattles when shaken or not. What E1 believes 
must be inferred, in turn, from what happened earlier in the experiment. If, for example, the toy 
rattled when E1 shook it, then E1 is likely to think the toy is a rattling one. As a first attempt, 
consider the following rule: 
BR2. If an agent has put all the objects that rattled when shook in one location, and 
all the objects that did not rattle when shook in another location, then she will 
continue to do so with the next toy she will shake. 
BR2 leaves room for improvement, since it predicts that, upon her return, E1 will throw the 
toy in the bin instead of storing it (since she shook it during the familiarisation trials and it did not 
                                                 
7 Can supporters of the behaviour-rule approach avoid the problem by maintaining that behaviour rules are 
innate? Not quite, for, as Carruthers (2013, p. 151) points out, if a rule is innate then it must have been selected, which, 
in turn, means that it must have posed an adaptive advantage for our ancestors. If, however, the rule at issue is so ad 
hoc that it only applies to a very uncommon situation, it is very unlikely that it could have improved the fitness of our 
ancestors. In comparison, it seems much easier to make a case for the adaptiveness of having folk psychological gen-
eralisations which apply across situations. 
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rattle). To fix this problem, we need to add to the rule a clause about what happens when a rattling 
toy is replaced with one that looks the same. Thus: 
BR2’. If an agent has put all the objects that rattled when shook in one location and 
all the objects that did not rattle when shook in another location, then she will 
continue to do so with the next object she will shake. If, however, the object the 
agent has shaken is replaced with one that looks the same while the agent is not 
present, then she will do with the replacement object what she would have done 
with the object she shook.  
BR2’ seems to make the right prediction: when E1 comes back, she will do with the replace-
ment toy what she would have done with the toy she shook, that is, storing it in the box. However, 
BR2’ is still less than perfect, since it contains some unnecessary details. An improved version 
might be:  
BR2’’. If an agent has performed action A1 with all the objects that turned out to 
have property P1 when tested, while performing action A2 with all the objects that 
turned out to have property P2 when tested, then she will continue to do so with 
the next object. If, however, an object the agent has already tested is replaced with 
one that looks the same while the agent is not present, then the agent will do with 
the replacement object what she would have done with the object she had already 
tested. 
BR2’’ seems to be about the best one can do without introducing mental states. One can 
argue about the details, of course, but it is hard to think of a behaviour rule that would be consid-
erably more general than BR2’’ and still make the correct prediction. It seems, for example, that 
any behaviour rule would have to specify that the replacement object must look the same as the 
object it replaces, for the agent would not conflate the two otherwise. Similarly, it is important that 
the replacement happens while the agent is not present, and after the agent has already tested the 
object; for, again, the agent would not be fooled otherwise. 
Now, if BR2’’ is indeed the behaviour rule that one must use to pass the test by Scott et al. 
(2015), then it is reasonable to doubt whether infants would ever be able to learn it. For it seems 
unlikely that the average infant will have opportunity to observe, during the first seventeen months 
of her life, the type of situation BR2’’ describes a sufficient number of times to memorise its out-
come. In fact, I am not sure whether I myself have ever observed an agent in this exact predicament! 
(Note that a slightly different situation would lead infants to learn a different rule; to learn BR2’’, 
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infants would have to have observed the specific sequence of events that satisfies the conditions 
of the rule, and this seems incredible.)  
2.2 The Affordance-based Account 
de Bruin et al. (2011) defend an affordance-based interpretation of indirect false-belief re-
sults. An affordance is what an object, or more generally an environment, affords to an agent. 
According to De Bruin and colleagues, infants understand that different objects afford different 
actions. For example, an infant might realise that a pacifier affords putting-it-in-the-mouth. After 
several failed attempts to fit a ball in her mouth, however, the infant might begrudgingly conclude 
that it does not afford the same action to her. Infants would also understand that an object may 
afford different actions to different agents. The infant in our example might realise that while the 
ball does not afford putting-it-in-the-mouth to her, it might afford putting-it-in-the-mouth to the 
dog, who has a bigger mouth. Furthermore, infants would be sensitive to the behavioural expres-
sions of goal-directedness and would exploit these behavioural cues in predicting whether agents 
will take advantage of the affordances available to them. For example, if big brother is wetting his 
lips looking at the cake, an infant might consider him acting on the corresponding affordances (e.g. 
stuffing a big slice of cake in his mouth) as more likely than if he had made a disgusted face. Finally, 
infants would know that “an observed change in affordance does (or does not) imply a change of 
the agent's future action if the change is (or is not) visually or otherwise accessible to the agent” 
(2011, p. 512). Two points are important here. First, infants would keep track not just of what 
actions are afforded to agents about also of which of these affordances are “visually or otherwise 
accessible to the agent”. This notion of accessibility is meant to play a role similar to that which 
perception plays in our folk psychology; instead of perceiving (or not perceiving) an object O at a 
location L, agents will access (or not access) the affordances provided by O-at-L. Infants will expect 
agents to act only on the affordances that have been accessible to them. If a ball is within the dog’s 
reach, our infant will be aware that it affords grasping-with-the-mouth to it; if, however, the dog 
does not have a direct line of sight to the ball, that affordance will not be accessible to it, and thus 
the infant will not expect the dog to act on it. Second, a change in affordances would only affect 
an agent's actions if it is accessible to the agent. Suppose our infant sees Mom put the cake in the 
fridge; then, while Mom is away, big brother eats the cake. Since the cake is no more, it does not 
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afford to Mom all the actions it used to afford to her, such as grasping, holding, eating and so on. 
Thus, there has been a change in the affordances available to Mom. However, Mom has had no 
way to access this change, since it happened while she was away. Thus, the fact that the affordances 
have changed should not lead infants to alter their expectations concerning Mom’s behaviour. It is 
just as likely now that Mom will go to take the cake out of the fridge, as it was before big brother 
ate it. The bottom line is that what matters in predicting behaviour are not the actual affordances, 
but the affordances agents have, or have had, access to. 
We can see how this would work for a standard false-belief test, like Onishi and Baillargeon 
(2005). Since E1 put the toy in the green box, not only will the toy-in-the-green-box afford several 
actions to her, like grasping and playing with, but these affordances will be accessible to E1. Thus, 
infants will consider it likely that she might act on them. When the watermelon slice moves to the 
yellow box, there is a change in affordances, but one E1 has no access to. While the toy-in-the-
yellow-box affords grasping to E1, E1 has no access to that affordance and thus infants will con-
sider it very unlikely that she will act on it. At the same time, infants will not alter the likelihood 
that E1 will (try to) reach for the toy in the green box. Thus, infants will be surprised when E1 
reaches for the yellow box as opposed to the green one. 
Notice, however, that this explanation works because it exploits the same weak spot as the 
search-where-last-seen rule considered in §2.1.1: in the study by Onishi and Baillargeon (2005), the 
location where E1 takes the object to be is the same location where the object was last on her line 
of sight — and thus, the same where the affordances related to the object were last accessible to 
her. We have seen in §2.1.1, however, that other indirect false-belief tests are not open to this type 
of interpretation.  For example, consider again the informative-intervention condition in Song et 
al. (2008), where infants expect E1 to look for the ball inside the mug, despite having last seen it in 
the box, because E2 told her that the ball was in the mug. That E2 tells E1 that the ball is in the 
cup should not change the fact that E1 last accessed ball-related affordances in the box; thus, in-
fants should expect E1 to reach for it there.  
How serious is this problem? It seems the issue could be fixed by tinkering with the condi-
tions on which agents can access affordances. Perhaps agents do not need a direct line of sight to 
O at L to access the affordances provided by that object at that location; perhaps, they could also 
access the affordances provided by O-at-L if they were told that O is at L. Fair enough. It seems, 
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however, that unless we grant infants an understanding of belief, some of the rules that govern 
accessibility of affordances will have to be quite ad hoc. This is the same problem that afflicts 
behaviour rules (discussed in §2.1.3). Since we have already discussed this issue there, I will not 
reiterate it here.   
2.3 The Enhanced Teleological-Reasoning Account 
The teleological reasoning account was put forward by Csibra, Gergely and colleagues 
(Csibra & Gergely, 1998; Gergely et al., 1995) as a possible interpretation of indirect goal-attribu-
tion studies (some of which were discussed in Chapter I, §2.2.1). Intentional actions, Csibra and 
colleagues argue, are caused by internal mental states, like intentions or desires, but justified by 
external goals. For example, what caused the chicken to cross the road is (say) the desire to cross 
the road, which is of course internal; what justifies it, however, is the goal of being on the other 
side of the road, which is just an external state of affairs. Csibra and colleagues argue that infants 
may rely on this non-mentalistic notion of goal as they try to predict what another agent will do. 
Specifically, infants may expect agents to choose means that are efficient to bring about their goals 
given the constraints of the situation. If, for example, infants have been habituated to a large ball 
jumping over a barrier to reach a smaller ball on the other side, they will expect the large ball follow 
a straight line when, in the test events, the barrier is removed (as in Gergely et al., 1995). 
Csibra and colleagues never suggested that infants could use teleological reasoning to pass 
indirect false-belief studies. There would seem to be an obvious obstacle to doing this, for on the 
teleological reasoning account infants expect agents to pursue their goals in the most efficient way 
given the way the world actually is, rather than the way the agent takes to world to be. Thus, in an 
unexpected-transfer type of scenario, the teleological reasoning account predicts that infants will 
expect the agent to look for the toy at its actual location.  
Despite this problem, Zawidzki (2011) has argued that an “enhanced” version of teleological 
reasoning, incorporating the notion of “information access”, can explain indirect false-belief re-
sults:  
Among the “situational constraints” … relative to which infants make judgments 
of means-ends rationality, older infants include information access. That is, using 
entirely behavioral cues, like gaze direction, older infants keep track of the 
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information to which their interpretive targets have access, and incorporate this 
information into the situational constraints on judgments of means-ends rationality. 
Zawidzki (2011, pp. 492-493).  
What Zawidzki seems to have in mind is that only the events that happened while the agent 
was present (and oriented in the right direction, etc.) should be included among the situational 
constraints. If, for example, big brother eats the cake while Mom is away, the fact that the cake has 
been eaten will not be included among the situational constraints to be taken into consideration in 
predicting (and/or evaluating for rationality) what Mom will do. Thus, the infants would still judge 
that going to the fridge would be a rational means for Mom to get the cake.  
Crucially, Zawidzki maintains that only the information an agent has had immediate access 
to would be included in the situational constraints. If big brother says, “I want some cake!”, the 
infant would only expect him to go get it from the fridge if he had immediate access to the infor-
mation that the cake was in the fridge. If Mom just told him there was cake in the fridge, that piece 
of information will be included in the situational constraints for big brother’s action; if Mom told 
him an hour ago, instead, that information will not be included in the situational constraints.  
This feature of Zawidzki’s account differentiates it from Perner’s (2010) behaviour-rule ac-
count, but it is not clear whether this improves the account or weakens it. Consider, for example, 
Onishi and Baillargeon (2005). In the FB-Green condition, E1 last saw the toy in the green box, 
but this happened during the familiarisation trials, several seconds before the test trial. If, as 
Zawidzki writes, infants “seem to take into account only information to which targets have access 
immediately before making their decisions”, (2011, p. 496) then they should not take into account 
the information that the toy was in the green box; at the same time, infants should not take into 
account the information that the toy is now in the yellow box either, for E1 was not present during 
the change of location. As a result, it seems infants should not expect E1 to reach for either of the 
boxes. 
At the same time, Zawidzki’s account still seems to inherit many of the problems that af-
flicted the behaviour-rule account. Thus, consider for example the study by Scott et al. (2015), 
where E2, taking advantage of E1’s momentary absence, replaces the rattling toy which E1 just 
shook with one that looks the same but does not rattle. Since, when E1 comes back, she can see 
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the non-rattling toy, that the toy is there should be something she has access to; in which case, the 
infants should expect E1 to discard the toy again, as she already did during the familiarisation trials8. 
2.4 The Association Account 
De Bruin and Newen (2012, 2014) claim that infants can create special representations of 
agents’ object-directed behaviours, which they (somewhat misleadingly) refer to as “associations”. 
Infants would be able to represent two main types of object-directed behaviours: handling the 
object (“motor-based associations”) and looking at it (“perception-based associations”). Let us see 
how this would work in practice. Consider Onishi and Baillargeon (2005). De Bruin and Newen 
(2012) argue that, as infants see E1 reaching for the green box, they would form a motor-based 
association of her reaching for the green box. Infants would deactivate this association while E1 is 
absent and reactivate it as E1 comes back. At this point, infants would expect E1 to re-enact the 
same behaviour captured in their association, namely reaching for the green box. Thus, when they 
see her reaching for the yellow box, their expectations will be violated (and/or they will have to 
create a new motor-based association of E1 reaching for the yellow box.) 
This explanation seems to be ruled out by the TB-Yellow condition, where E1 stays as toy 
moves from the green box to the yellow one. Infants now expect E1 to reach for the yellow box 
instead of the green box again. However, it is still true that, in the familiarisation trials, E1 reached 
for the green box and not for the yellow one. Thus, infants would still have that motor-based 
association of E1 reaching for the green box, and if that were what they based their expectations 
on, they should now look longer when E1 reached for the yellow box (which is the opposite of 
what Onishi and Baillargeon found). 
In response to this objection, de Bruin and Newen are likely to point out that infants would 
also create a perception-based association as they see E1 looking at the object going into the yellow 
box. Based on this, infants would then expect E1 to reach for it there. Two observations are in 
order. First, should infants not expect E1 to repeat the object-direct behaviour represented by the 
                                                 
8 Perhaps, Zawidzki may object, E1 has access to the information that a toy is there, but not to the information 
that it is one of the non-rattling toys she already discarded. Even granting this, however, the infants should not expect 
E1 to store the toy with the rattling ones — for E1 cannot have access to the information that the toy rattles, since 
the toy does not rattle. And yet, Scott and colleagues found that the infants in their study looked longer when E1 
discarded the toy compared to when she stored it. 
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perception-based association, namely looking at the toy in the yellow box? Why do they expect her 
to reach for it? (After all, they do not have a motor-based association of E1 reaching for the toy in 
the yellow box.) And second: infants should still have a motor-based association of E1 reaching 
for the green box; thus, should they not expect E1 to reach for the green box every bit as much as 
they expect her to reach for the yellow one? 
These objections may seem pedantic; perhaps, when infants create a perception-based asso-
ciation of E1 looking at the toy in the yellow box, they would erase the previous, motor-based 
association of E1 reaching for it in the green box; and, perhaps, when they have an association of 
E1 behaving towards an object in a certain location, infants would expect her to reach for it there, 
regardless of whether the association was motor-based or perception-based. Fair enough. Notice, 
however, that for all intents and purposes this is tantamount to claiming that infants expect agents 
to look for things where they last saw them. We have already considered (and rejected) this hy-
pothesis in §2.1.19. 
2.5 Summary 
As we have seen, the most promising behavioural proposals are those that try to exploit the 
fact that, in a typical unexpected-transfer task, the location where the target agent takes the desired 
object to be is the same where the object was last in her unobstructed line of sight. Several studies 
have, shown, however, that infants can predict what the agent will do even when this is not the 
case. It seems that providing a behavioural explanation of these other studies would require attrib-
uting to infants very ad hoc and tailor-made generalisations – generalisations that infants may not 
have occasion to learn. Thus, overall, while behavioural proposals cannot be ruled out as confi-
dently as low-level proposals can, the evidence still speaks against them. 
                                                 
9 And yet, De Bruin and Newen (2012) seem positive that their account can explain the study by Song and 
Baillargeon (2008). This is what they suggest: “the operating system only selects the visual information about the scene 
that the infant shares with the other agent (the tuft of blue hair on the plain box that belongs to the doll) and represents 
this information as an anticipation of the agent’s reaching behaviour” (p.11). It is difficult to make sense of this sug-
gestion. For one, the tuft of blue hair sticks out of the hair box, not the plain one, and it is not the doll’s, it simply 
looks like it. In any case: the information the infants share with the other agent is simply that there is a tuft of blue hair 
coming out of the hair box. Since E1 has never reached for that tuft of blue hair, why should infants expect her to 
reach for it now? Unless, of course, they understand that E1 takes that tuft to be the doll’s — but that would be 
tantamount to ascribing to her a false belief! 
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3. Mentalistic Proposals 
In this section we will discuss those alternative proposals that ascribe to infants at least some 
understanding of the mind (though not of beliefs as such, of course.) There are three mentalistic 
proposals that I know of: Henry Wellman’s desire-awareness account (discussed in §3.1), Joseph 
Hedger and William Fabricious’ perceptual-access reasoning account (§3.2) and Ian Apperly and 
Stephen Butterfill’s (§3.3) minimal theory of mind account. Together with Perner’s behaviour-rule 
account, Apperly and Butterfill’s has been among the most influential proposals in the field and 
will thus be discussed in more detail. 
3.1 The Desire-Awareness Account 
According to Henry Wellman (2010), indirect false-belief results do show that infants possess a relatively 
sophisticated understanding of the mind. Specifically, in his eyes, there is sufficient evidence to conclude that 
infants ascribe to other agents desires, emotions, perceptual experiences and even states of knowledge or igno-
rance. However, Wellman draws the line at false belief: 
[indirect false-belief results] help underwrite the description … that infants achieve 
a desire – emotion – perception understanding of persons that encompasses an 
initial sense of knowledge and ignorance (or more precisely, awareness and una-
wareness) … however, I do not believe the data demonstrate an infant recognition 
of false belief (and hence of an internal world of mental contents10. (Wellman, 2010, 
p. 267). 
Wellman further elaborates this interpretation of indirect false-belief studies in his recent book 
(Wellman, 2014, pp. 175-184). He provides several (putative) explanations of indirect false-belief studies in 
terms of his account. Consider, for example, Onishi and Baillargeon (2005). Since the infants in the study are 
aware that E1 did not see the move from one box to the other, Wellman maintains they will assume E1 does 
not know its current location — without, however, going so far as to ascribe a false belief to him. Furthermore, 
Wellman maintains that infants expect agents that are ignorant about the location of an object to search for it 
                                                 
10As this quotation suggests, Wellman seems to assume that, unless infants know that beliefs can be false, they 
cannot conceive of the mind as “an internal world of mental contents”. What should we make of this claim? It is not 
clear why desire, knowledge and the rest would not qualify as “mental contents”. All these types of mental states are 
typically taken both to be “internal” and to possess intentional content. What more could one need to see the mind as 
an “internal world of mental contents? 
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randomly (Wellman, 2014, p. 179). Thus, when infants see E1 reaching for the object in the correct location, 
infants would be surprised: was E1 just lucky, or did she know the toy was in there? 
There seems to be a problem with this interpretation: strictly speaking E1’s reaching for the 
correct location is consistent with a random search. That one is searching randomly does not nec-
essarily mean that they will look in the wrong place; it simply means that the probability that one 
will find what they are looking for on a first attempt is less than one. Given that there are two 
boxes, the probability that E1 will reach for either should be fifty-fifty. Thus, neither event should 
be more surprising than the other.  
One can wonder whether this rejoinder is fair, however. Intuitively, E1 reaching for the right location 
on a first attempt does seem more surprising than her reaching for the wrong location. True, when probability 
theory is taken into account, this intuition turns out to be misguided. Can we really expect infants to be skilled 
at probabilistic reasoning, however? Besides, even if we grant that infants can correctly rate the probability of 
the two events, the obstacle would appear to be easy to circumvent: Wellman could just claim that infants 
expect ignorant agents to search in the wrong location (a possibility that has been raised by several authors). 
The problem for Wellman goes deeper than this, however. Several indirect false-belief studies have in-
cluded controls to ensure infants are not simply ascribing ignorance (He et al., 2011; Knudsen & Liszkowski, 
2012a; Scott & Baillargeon, 2009; Scott et al., 2010; Southgate et al., 2007). Consider, for example, He et al. 
(2011). In this experiment, two agents (E1 and E2) are playing the following game: E2 hides a toy in one of 
two boxes and E1 must point to where it is. There were three conditions. In the knowledge condition, E1 is 
present as E2 hides the toy. In the ignorance condition, E1 is not present as E2 hides the toy. In the false-belief 
condition, E1 sees E2 hide the toy in one box, but E2 then moves it to the other box as E1 is absent. In the 
knowledge condition, He and colleagues found longer looking times when E1 pointed to the wrong box; in 
the false-belief condition, in contrast, they found looking times when E1 pointed to the correct box; and in the 
ignorance condition they found no significant difference in looking times. Thus, the two-year-olds in this study 
do seem to expect ignorant agents to search randomly, looking equally regardless of which box E1 points to. 
Crucially, however, they did not do this in the false-belief condition. The fact that there was a difference in 
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looking times between the ignorance condition and the false-belief condition is a problem for Wellman since, 
according to him, both should be ignorance conditions!11, 12 
3.2 The Perceptual Access Reasoning Account 
In contrast both with nativist accounts and with the received constructivist view, Hedger and Fabricius 
(2011) argue that children only acquire an understanding of false beliefs around the age of six. Up to that point, 
they rely on what the authors call perceptual access reasoning or PAR for short. Specifically, Hedger and Fab-
ricious argue that children base their expectations on two generalisations:  
 
(1) sees (didn’t see) -> knows (doesn’t know);  
(2) knows (doesn’t know) -> will get it right (wrong).  
 
In other terms, not perceiving leads to not knowing and not knowing leads to error. Infants, in contrast, 
would lack the concept of knowledge, and thus would not be able to rely on PAR. Instead, infants would use 
an abridged version, which Hedger and Fabricius call “Rule A”:  
 
(A) See/not see —> Get it right/ Get it wrong.  
 
Despite the difference in details, it should be clear that this proposal fails for the same reason Wellman’s 
does: experiments like He et al. (2011) show that infants expect that an agent who has not seen an object at its 
current location is equally likely to reach for either of two possible locations. Furthermore, experiments like 
                                                 
11 At one point in his book, Wellman suggests that infants may, in some cases, expect ignorant agents to look 
for toys where they last saw them (Wellman, 2014, p. 180). He does not clarify when infants would do this as opposed 
to expecting a random search; and he does not appeal to this explanation when interpreting Onishi and Baillargeon 
(2005). In any case, this is very similar to the search-where-last-seen rule we discussed in §2.1.1 and will thus inherit its 
problems. 
12 Oddly, when discussing the ignorance condition in Scott and Baillargeon (2009), Wellman (2014) claims that 
equal looking times are consistent with his account, since he maintains that infants expect ignorant agents to search 
randomly. Wellman does not seem to notice the inconsistency in his position. If his account predicts equal looking 
times, then it should do so across studies, and across both ignorance and false-belief conditions. However, Scott and 
Baillargeon (2009) did not find equal looking times in the false-belief condition, nor did Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) 
in their FB-Green and FB-Yellow conditions. To explain these results, Wellman must claim that ignorant agents will 
search in the wrong location, but if he does so then he cannot explain equal looking times in ignorance conditions. 
You can’t have it both ways! 
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Scott et al. (2015) show that infants do not expect agents who can see the object they are looking for to “get it 
right”.   
3.3 The Minimal Theory of Mind Account 
3.3.1 The mToM Account 
Apperly and Butterfill (2009) argue that infants have a simplified version of adult folk psychology. Cru-
cially, while infants’ “minimal theory of mind” (as the authors call it; mToM henceforth) would posit internal 
states that causally interact with each other, it would not posit any intentional/representational states. Thus, 
infants’ minimal theory of mind could not include any reference to beliefs, which are intentional states par 
excellence, nor in fact to any other type of propositional attitude. The minimal theory of mind would, however, 
posit a non-intentional type of state playing a belief-like causal role, guiding and informing action. Apperly and 
Butterfill refer to this non-intentional counterpart of belief as registration. The minimal theory of mind would 
also include a non-intentional counterpart to perception, which the authors refer to as encountering13. The 
differences between registering and encountering on the one hand and believing and perceiving on the other, 
concern not only the content of these states but also their causal role. Let us have a closer look. 
Contents. Both beliefs and perceptual experiences are intentional states, which can potentially take any 
proposition, no matter how complex, as their object. Registration and encountering, in contrast, possess no 
intentionality; they do not represent anything at all. Instead of putting agents in relation with propositions, as 
beliefs and perceptual experiences do, registration and encountering put them in a more direct, non-intentional 
connection with objects. One can only register and encounter objects and their locations; there is no such thing 
as registering or encountering that. This has two quite important implications that are worth spelling out. 
(a) Registrations and encounterings must always involve an agent, an object and a location. For example, 
Tom can register his mug on the table; he cannot, however, register his mug simpliciter, without registering its 
location; and he cannot register any of the mug's other properties, such as, for example, its size, shape or colour. 
                                                 
13 What about conative states like desire and intention? Does mToM include a counterpart to these states as 
well? Butterfill and Apperly (2013, pp. 613-614) argue that this would not be necessary. They do acknowledge that 
infants possess some understanding of goal-directedness, often being able to infer the goal an agent is trying to accom-
plish. However, they argue that this understanding need not be based on the ascription of conative states to the agent. 
To see a sequence of bodily movements as goal-directed infants only need to represent those movements as having 
the function of bringing about a certain outcome. 
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The upshot is that beliefs (/perceptions) that concern anything other than the location of an object will have 
no matching registration (/encountering). My seeing that the bird is in the tree, for example, will have as its 
counterpart an encountering of the bird in the tree; my belief that all bachelors are men, on the other hand, will 
have no corresponding registration. 
(b) Beliefs, like all other propositional attitudes, not only represent objects but seem to always represent 
them under some mode of presentation or other. Beliefs about identity are often taken to offer the clearest 
illustration of this fact. For example: how can Aunt May swear she would kill Spider-man next time she meets 
him, while at the same time resolving to bake a cherry pie for him? Has she gone senile? Not quite: she is simply 
thinking about him under two different modes of presentations, namely “Spider-man” in one case and “my 
nephew” in the other, all the while ignoring that, so to speak, one person wears both masks. In the following, 
I will refer to this feature of propositional attitudes as their intensionality, with an s. The reason this is important 
for us is that registrations and encounterings, not being intentional states, cannot be intensional either. Aunt 
May's registration (/encountering) of her nephew cannot represent him one way or the other, since, after all, it 
does not represent him at all. If Aunt May encounters Spider-man swinging over 5th Avenue, she must also 
encounter her nephew in the exact same location. It follows that, if an infant were keeping track of what Aunt 
May encounters and registers as opposed to what she sees and believes, the infant would be unable to under-
stand why Aunt May shouts angrily at Spider-man as he swings by above her, instead of, say, trying to feed him 
cherry pie.  
Causal role. Beliefs interact with other mental states, often in very complex ways. For example, beliefs 
ordinarily interact with other beliefs in inference, and with desires, intentions and emotions in decision-making. 
In contrast, registrations have a rather streamlined causal role; they do not take part in reasoning, either of the 
theoretical or of the practical kind. The only way one can register an object is by encountering it; more precisely, 
agents register objects in the location where they last encountered them. Thus, if John last encountered his car 
in the garage, he will register it there, and will continue to do so even upon hearing the alarm go off and despite 
his wife's attempts to inform him that the car has been stolen.  
In addition, beliefs are not just causes of action but also reasons for action, and thus possess a normative 
dimension, being subject to the norms of rationality and truth. For example, given the evidence one has, there 
are things one ought to believe and, generally speaking, one ought to believe the truth; furthermore, given what 
one believes and wants, there are things one ought to do.  In the case of registrations, this normative dimension 
would be completely absent. 
  
58 
 
 
Let us see an example of the mToM account in practice; consider (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005). The 
infants in this study expected E1 to reach for the green box, which is where she thought the toy was, instead 
of the yellow box, which is where the toy really was. Notice that E1’s belief concerns nothing more than the 
location of the toy and will thus have a matching registration. Furthermore, notice that the location where E1 
takes the toy to be is also the location where she last saw it; thus, that will also be the location where she last 
encountered it, and thus the location where she registers it. Notice, finally, that while E1's belief is intensional, 
its intensionality can be safely ignored in predicting her action. E1 must be thinking of the toy in some way; 
perhaps as “the thing I put in there” or as “my dearest possession.” How she thinks of it, however, is irrelevant; 
what matters is what she believes of it (“that it is in the green box”.) For all these reasons, ascribing to E1 a 
registration of the toy in the green box (together with the goal of retrieving it) will suffice for predicting her 
action.  
3.3.2 Problems 
On reflection, it should not be surprising that the mToM account can explain the results of Onishi and 
Baillargeon (2005), since it exploits the same vulnerability targeted by the behaviour-rule and affordance-based 
accounts (§2.1.1 and §2.2, respectively). Indeed, the location where one registers an object is the same where 
one last encountered it, which is the same location where the object was last in one’s unobstructed line of sight. 
Given this, we should expect the mToM account to face similar problems as Perner and Ruffman’s (2005) 
search-where-last-seen rule; problems that should by now be familiar. To repeat once again: not in all indirect 
false-belief studies the target agent believes the object to be where she last saw it. 
It may be argued, however, that this does not speak against the hypothesis that infants reason about 
simplified, belief-like states. Perhaps, infants do not reason about a type of state as simple as Apperly and 
Butterfill originally suggest, but this falls short of showing that they reason about belief. The question we need 
to address, then, is: can the mToM account be expanded so as to explain all indirect false-belief results, while 
still remaining sufficiently distinct from the face-value interpretation?  
Consider again the study by Scott et al. (2015). While E1 is away, E2 replaces the rattling toy which 
E1 just shook with one that looks the same but does not rattle. When E1 comes back, will she put 
the toy in the bin (where she has been putting all the non-rattling toys), or in the box (where she 
has stored all the rattling ones so far)? We immediately stumble upon an obstacle: to predict what E1 will 
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do with the toy, infants would have to ascribe to her a registration of the toy on the table as one that rattles 
when shaken. That is, after all, what determines what E1 will do with the toy: whether she takes it to be one 
that rattles or one that doesn't. The problem, however, is that according to the mToM account agents can only 
register objects and their locations; their other properties, such as, for example, whether they rattle when 
shaken, cannot be registered. E1 can register the toy on the table, but she cannot register that it rattles when 
shaken. Ascribing the first registration without the second will not suffice, however, to figure out whether E1 
will keep the toy or throw it away. Lacking such a crucial piece of information, infants should be unable to 
predict E1's action. Thus, based on mToM, one would expect infants to judge both possible outcomes as 
equally likely14.  
Suppose, now, that we modify mToM by allowing properties other than location to be registered. Call 
this revised version of the account mToM*. With this change in place, it is now possible for E1 to register the 
toy as one that rattles when shaken. Remember, however, that registrations must always be caused by a corre-
sponding encountering. The only way E1 could register the toy as rattling is if she encountered it as rattling; 
and since the toy in question does not rattle, she could not possibly have encountered it as rattling. In fact, E1's 
belief that the toy on the table is one that rattles when shaken is based on her assumption that that is the toy 
she previously shook. In other words, the belief in question is formed as the result of an inference from some 
of E1's other beliefs. So, again, we face a serious obstacle: infants would still be unable to ascribe to E1 a 
registration of the toy as a rattling one because E1 has never heard that toy rattle, and that is the only way she 
could form such a registration according to mToM*. 
Suppose, now, that we modify mToM* even further, to allow registrations to interact with other regis-
trations in something analogous to inference; call this mToM**. We would still not be out of the woods. E1's 
belief that the toy on the table is a rattling one isn't inferred from any old belief; it is inferred from the belief 
that that is the toy she previously shook; in other words, from a belief about the identity of the toy15. This is 
important because beliefs about identity are paradigmatically intensional. The belief that  
                                                 
14 In fact, since E2 took the non-rattling toy from the bin containing the toys E1 had already discarded, infants 
might expect him to put it back there.  
15 Commenting on other studies which seem to show that infants can ascribe false beliefs about identity (Scott 
& Baillargeon, 2009), Butterfill and Apperly (2013) suggest that these studies can be explained on the assumption that 
infants ascribe registrations about types, as opposed to identity (2013, p. 626). Thus, instead of ascribing to E1 the 
belief that the toy on the table is the one that rattles (a belief stating the identity of two token objects), infants could 
ascribe the belief that the toy on the table is one that rattles (a belief about the type instantiated by the token object). 
Notice, however, that this does solve the problem in the case at hand. This is because, as explained above, the reason 
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(1) the toy on the table is the toy on the table  
 
is not nearly as informative as the belief that  
 
(2) the toy on the table is the one E1 previously shook, 
 
even though both claim that one and the same object is identical to itself (the difference is in the way 
the object is represented: as the toy on the table, or as the toy E1 previously shook.) Notice that (2), but not 
(1), would allow E1 to infer that the toy on the table is one that rattles when shaken, given that the toy she 
previously shook did in fact rattle. As we have seen, however, there is no way of translating beliefs like (2) in 
registration-speak. The closest one can get is the registration of the toy as identical to itself, and this clearly will 
not do. Thus, even on mToM**, infants would still be unable to ascribe to E1 a registration of the toy as one 
that rattles. Even though registrations can now be “inferred” from other registrations, we still lack a suitable 
registration from which E1 could infer that the toy on the table is one that rattles when shaken. 
It seems the only way to solve this third problem would be to concede that registrations, like beliefs, are 
intensional (and thus, intentional)16; call this mToM***. It would now be possible for E1 to register that the 
toy on the table is the same she previously shook, from which she could then infer that the toy on the table 
rattles when shaken. Notice, however, that in this way we would have effectively erased, one by one, all the 
main differences between registration and belief. Like belief, “registration” is now an intentional mental state 
that can take part in inference and is imbued with intensionality. In our attempts to explain Scott and colleagues' 
finding, we seem to have ended up turning mToM into the face-value interpretation it was supposed to replace! 
3.4 Summary 
The fact that infants expect agents that do not know the location of an object to behave differently from 
agents that have a false belief about its location rules out both the desire-awareness account and the perceptual-
                                                 
E1 believes that the toy is a rattling one is that she thinks that that is the same toy she previously shook. It seems that 
this second belief cannot be replaced by one about types of objects. 
16 There is a couple of studies suggesting, instead, that infants possess no understanding of intensionality (Low, 
Drummond, Walmsley, & Wang, 2014; Low & Watts, 2013). These studies will be discussed in Chapter V, §2.3. 
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access reasoning account. On the other hand, the fact that infants can predict what an agent will do even when 
the agent does not take the object to be where she last saw it speaks against the mToM account. In principle, 
the mToM account can be modified and expanded to account for this fact. I have argued, however, that this 
would bring the mToM account dangerously close to the face-value interpretation, erasing the main differences 
between the two. 
4. Conclusions 
None of the alternative interpretations that we have considered in this chapter offer a satis-
factory account of indirect false-belief results. This provides evidence that the face-value, early-
emergentist interpretation may be on the right track. Of course, the evidence is less than conclusive 
but, arguably, it is strong enough to take the early-emergence approach on as a working hypothesis. 
The question that we need to address, now, is whether the early-emergence approach can explain 
why young children tend to fail direct false-belief tests. This will be taken up in the next chapter.   
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III 
ALTERNATIVE 
INTERPRETATIONS OF DIRECT 
FALSE-BELIEF TESTS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this chapter, we are going to discuss whether early-emergence accounts can explain the 
evidence that, prima-facie, appears to support late-emergence accounts. The main piece of evidence 
supporting late-emergence accounts is, of course, the finding that most children under four years 
of age fail direct false-belief tests. There is, however, a good deal of additional evidence supporting 
late-emergence accounts, which must be taken into account too. We will thus start in §1 by briefly 
reviewing these additional findings. Then, in §2, we will discuss the main proposals early-emer-
gentists have defended in their attempts to explain away the evidence for the late-emergence posi-
tion. 
  
63 
 
1. Additional Evidence for Late-Emergence Ac-
counts 
1.1 Developmental Progression 
As mentioned in Chapter I, studies employing the ToM scale have shown that most children 
pass the following direct mentalising tests in a specific order: diverse-desire test first, then diverse-
belief test, then knowledge-access test, then false-belief test, then finally the hidden-emotion test 
(Wellman et al., 2011; Wellman & Liu, 2004). Interestingly, Iranian and Chinese children have been 
found to follow a slightly different progression, passing the knowledge-access test before the di-
verse-belief test (Shahaeian, Peterson, Slaughter, & Wellman, 2011; Wellman, Fang, Liu, Zhu, & 
Liu, 2006). Wellman and colleagues (2011) argue that this developmental progression reflects a 
process of “conceptual change,” where children revise their theories of mind based on the evidence 
they are exposed to, including both their first-hand observations and what adults say about the 
mind. On this type of account, the fact that Iranian and Chinese children follow a slightly different 
progression from Western children is simply a reflection of the differences between the respective 
cultural environments. Iranian and Chinese cultures, being more collectivist, are likely to put more 
stress on common knowledge as opposed to the individuality of beliefs, explaining why the 
knowledge-access test is passed before the diverse-belief test.  
1.2 Executive Functioning 
Executive functioning is an umbrella term grouping those higher cognitive processes that are 
involved in managing, supervising and overriding other cognitive processes. Among the processes 
that psychologists typically include in the “executive” category, inhibitory control, working memory 
and cognitive flexibility are perhaps the main ones (Diamond, 2013). Inhibitory control is the ability 
to inhibit impulses and automatic responses and resist temptations; working memory is the ability 
to hold information in mind and manipulate it; cognitive flexibility is the ability to shift between 
different mental sets or consider different aspects of a problem.  
Several studies show that performance on direct false-belief tests correlates positively with 
performance on tests of inhibitory control and working memory (Carlson & Moses, 2001; Carlson, 
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Moses, & Breton, 2002; Davis & Pratt, 1995; Duh et al., 2016; Gordon & Olson, 1998; Keenan, 
Olson, & Marini, 1998). Carlson and Moses (2001), for example, tested a group of three- and four-
year-olds using an inhibitory-control battery, a mentalising battery, and a test of language ability. 
The authors found that mentalising tests, including direct false-belief tests, were robustly correlated 
with tests of inhibitory control; after age and language ability were controlled for, there was still a 
significant correlation between the mentalising aggregate and the inhibitory control aggregate, of 
moderate size (r=.41). A recent meta-analysis by Devine and Hughes (2014), which looked at over 
a hundred studies, confirms that the correlation with executive functioning is robust, although it 
suggests it may be weaker than initially assumed: for studies that controlled for age and verbal 
ability, the correlation coefficient was only .22.1  
What explains this correlation? Typically, two types of explanation are taken into account. 
According to “expression” accounts, performance on executive functioning and direct false-belief 
tests correlates because executive functioning is required to express or display one's belief-reason-
ing abilities. According to “emergence” accounts, in contrast, the two correlate because executive 
functioning is required to learn about the mind and about beliefs specifically, which in turn is re-
quired for passing false-belief tests. Notice that these two types of account are not mutually exclu-
sive: it is possible that executive functioning plays both roles, and that both contribute to the cor-
relation.  
A recent experiment by Lindsey Powell and Susan Carey (2017) provides some of the best 
evidence for expression accounts so far. Powell and Carey took advantage of the phenomenon of 
ego depletion: tasks that are taxing on executive functioning can lead to its depletion, leading to 
poor performance in any subsequent tasks that also rely on this cognitive function. If executive 
functioning is required to express one's mentalising abilities, as expression accounts maintain, then 
performing an executive functioning task before a false-belief test should negatively affect perfor-
mance on the latter. To test this hypothesis, Powell and Carey gave four and five-year-olds either 
                                                 
1 Devine and Hughes point out that the studies that report larger effect sizes are those that use aggregate ToM 
and EF scores, as opposed to focusing on the relation between specific tests. The explanation Devine and Hughes 
provide is that using aggregate scores enhances variance, which can lead to larger effect sizes. This is important because 
it suggests that the small effect size found is not due to a lack of specificity in the analysis; in fact, the effect would 
have been smaller had Devine and Hughes restricted their analysis to studies that focused on the relation between (say) 
DFB and IC tests. 
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an executive functioning task (experimental condition) or a “filler” control task (control condition) 
immediately before a false-belief test. They found that, as predicted by expression accounts, per-
formance on the false-belief test was significantly better in the latter (control) condition compared 
to the former (experimental) condition. 
Other findings speak against a pure expression account and in favour of an expression-emer-
gence hybrid, however (Benson, Sabbagh, Carlson, & Zelazo, 2013; Carlson, Claxton, & Moses, 
2015; Sabbagh, Xu, Carlson, Moses, & Lee, 2006). Let us take a quick look at these studies.  
• The study by Mark Sabbagh and colleagues (2006) shows that although Chinese preschool-
ers perform significantly better than age-matched American children on an executive-func-
tioning battery, they do not perform significantly better on a direct false-belief battery, 
even though the two variables correlate within each group. That is: Chinese children who 
score higher on tests of executive functioning compared to their Chinese peers tend to 
also score higher on direct false-belief tests, and the same is true for American children of 
the same age; however, when the two groups are pooled, the correlation disappears, since 
Chinese children score higher than their American peers on executive-functioning tests 
but not on direct false-belief tests. This suggests that there is some other variable besides 
executive functioning that is negatively affecting Chinese children's performance on direct 
false-belief tests. Sabbagh and colleagues point to the fact that Chinese children are much 
less likely to have siblings and will thus have less opportunities to engage in conversations 
about the mind (the evidence on siblings and mental-state talk will be discussed in §1.4). 
On the assumption that engaging in this type of social interaction helps children learn that 
beliefs can be false, the fact that Chinese children are less exposed to this type of stimulus 
could balance out the beneficial effect of their superior executive abilities. At the same 
time, since inhibitory control is also required to learn that beliefs can be false, performance 
on tests of inhibitory control correlates with performance on false-belief tests within each 
group, where exposure to mental state talk is kept constant or at least varies to a lesser 
degree. 
• The study by Stephanie Carlson and colleagues (2015) shows that performance on tests of 
inhibitory control correlates with performance on two mentalising tests that do not appear 
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to make demands on executive functioning, namely the think-know17 task (Moore, Pure, 
& Furrow, 1990) and the sources of knowledge18 task (O'Neill & Gopnik, 1991). The rea-
son Carlson and colleagues are confident that these mentalising tests are not taxing on 
inhibitory control is that young children tend to answer randomly in these tests, which 
suggests that their poor performance is not the result of a failure to inhibit a prepotent 
response (in which case one would expect them to consistently give the wrong answer, as 
it happens in direct false-belief tests.) Notably, these direct mentalising tests were found 
to correlate with tests of inhibitory control as strongly as a direct false-belief test. As the 
authors point out, this is consistent with emergence accounts but not with (pure) expres-
sion accounts. If the reason performance on false-belief tests correlates with performance 
on inhibitory-control tests is that false-belief tests load heavily on inhibitory control, as 
expression accounts suggest, one would not expect the correlation to hold for mentalising 
tests that do not load on inhibitory control. On the other hand, if the reason the correlation 
exists is that inhibitory control is required to learn about the mind, as emergence accounts 
maintain, then it is not surprising that the correlation extends to all mentalising tests inde-
pendently of their task demands.   
• The study by Jeannette Benson and colleagues (2013) shows that three-year-olds score on 
a battery of executive-functioning tests predicts how much they will benefit from subse-
quent training on a direct false-belief test. This is just as emergence accounts predicts: 
having better executive functioning helps children acquire the relevant folk psychological 
generalisations during training, which then results in better direct false-belief performance 
in the post-test.  
                                                 
17 “Two identical monkey puppets provided information regarding the location of a sticker hidden in one of 
two boxes (blue and red). The experimenter wore one puppet on each hand and animated the puppets with identical 
voices. For four trials, monkeys alternately used low certainty (think) or high certainty (know) terms. For example, 
Monkey A said, ‘‘I think the sticker is in the red box,’’ and Monkey B said, ‘‘I know the sticker is in the blue box.’’ […] 
Children received a point each time they chose the box indicated by the ‘‘know’’ monkey…” (Carlson et al., 2015, p. 
189). 
18 “Children were shown a red cardboard tunnel with a green cloth flap covering the openings at both ends. 
They were told that different objects would be placed inside the tunnel and that they would learn the identity of the 
object by looking inside and seeing it, putting their hands inside and feeling it, or being told what was inside. […] After 
learning the identity, children were then asked how they knew the identity of the object” (Carlson et al., 2015, p. 189). 
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1.3 Language Ability 
Many studies show that children's direct false-belief performance correlates positively with 
their language abilities (e.g., Astington & Jenkins, 1999; Hughes, 2005; Ruffman, Slade, 
Rowlandson, Rumsey, & Garnham, 2003). To illustrate, Astington and Jennifer Jenkins (1999) car-
ried out a longitudinal study where they tested a group of three-year-olds three times over a period 
of a few months, using both a mentalising battery (which included an unexpected-transfer task, an 
unexpected-contents task and an appearance-reality task, all direct) and a test of general language 
ability (which assessed both semantics and syntax, both receptive and expressive.) Astington and 
Jenkins found that children's early language ability predicted their later mentalising score, even after 
controlling for their age and earlier mentalising score (the correlation coefficient was in the order 
of .3, indicating a weak to moderate correlation.) A meta-analysis by Karen Milligan, Astington and 
Lisa Dack (2007), which looked at more than a hundred studies, found that, after controlling for 
age, language ability was still significantly correlated with performance on mentalising tests, includ-
ing false-belief tests, again with a correlation coefficient in the order of .3. Notably, all aspects of 
language ability covered in the meta-analysis (general language, semantics, syntax, receptive vocab-
ulary and memory for complements) were found to correlate with mentalising, and while these 
individual correlations differed in strength, the differences were mostly non-significant.  
Two training studies provide further evidence that improving children's language ability 
brings about a corresponding improvement in their performance on direct mentalising tasks, as 
opposed to merely correlating with it (C. Hale & Tager-Flusberg, 2003; Lohmann & Tomasello, 
2003). Courtney Hale and Helen Tager-Flusberg (2003), for example, trained a group of three and 
four-year-olds either on a direct false-belief test, or on a sentential complement test,2 or on a rela-
tive-clause control. While children in the false-belief training group only improved their direct false-
belief performance, and children in the relative-clause group only improved their performance on 
the relative-clause control, children in the sentential-complement training group improved both 
their direct false-belief performance and their sentential-complement performance. Notably, 
                                                 
2 The sentential complement test, based on Jill de Villiers and Jennie Pyers  (2002), consisted of telling a story 
about a character who said she was doing something while she was doing something else, and then asking children 
what the character said. This type of test is meant to assess children's facility with verbs that take complement clauses 
(e.g., believe that, say that, etc.) which are supposed to correspond to reality but not always do. 
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sentential-complement training was found to be as effective as false-belief training in improving 
children's direct false-belief performance.  
Late-emergentists have defended two types of explanations for this correlation, which closely 
map the “expression” and “emergence” accounts considered for the correlation with executive 
functioning in the last section (§1.2). The first maintains that natural language provides the required 
representational medium for mentalising (P. A. de Villiers & de Villiers, 2012). The second main-
tains that participating in conversations about mental states allows children to learn about the mind, 
and that children's ability to take part in or follow such conversations is mediated by their language 
abilities (Milligan et al., 2007). 
1.4 Experiential Factors 
There is evidence that being exposed to the type of stimuli that would allow one to learn 
about the mind does improve children's performance on direct false-belief tests. The stimuli in 
question include participating in training sessions on false-belief scenarios, being exposed to con-
versations about the mind and interacting with a sibling or friend. 
1.4.1 Training 
Several studies show that children's direct false-belief performance can be improved through 
training (Clements, Rustin, & Mccallum, 2000; Hofmann et al., 2016; Lecce, Bianco, Demicheli, & 
Cavallini, 2014; Melot & Angeard, 2003; Perner & Kloo, 2003; Rhodes & Wellman, 2013; Slaughter 
& Gopnik, 1996). Virginia Slaughter and Gopnik (1996), for example, gave three- and four-year-
olds two training sessions over a period of two weeks. Children were divided in three conditions: 
a false-belief condition, a coherence condition, and a control condition. Children in the false-belief 
condition were trained on a false-belief task with feedback; children in the coherence condition 
were trained on tasks that involved ascribing desires or perceptual experiences different from their 
own; finally, children in the control condition were trained on control tasks that involved reasoning 
about the contents of a bag or a Tupperware container. In the retest after training, children were 
also given the appearance-reality, think-know and sources-of-knowledge tests, plus a number con-
servation task that was used as a further control. Slaughter and Gopnik found that the false-belief 
and coherence training improved children's performance on the false-belief, appearance-reality, 
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think-know and sources-of-knowledge tests, and did so more than the control training. In contrast, 
false-belief and coherence training did not improve children's performance on the number conser-
vation task. Accordingly, Slaughter and Gopnik take their finding to show that false-belief and 
coherence training both helped children construct a better theory of mind. 
1.4.2 Mental-state Talk 
There is evidence that being exposed to conversations about mental states can also lead to 
an improvement in direct false-belief performance (Adrian, Clemente, & Villanueva, 2007; Adrian, 
Clemente, Villanueva, & Rieffe, 2005; Guajardo & Watson, 2002; Ruffman, Slade, & Crowe, 2002; 
Slaughter, Peterson, & Mackintosh, 2007). For example, Ted Ruffman, Lance Slade, and Elena 
Crowe (2002) conducted a longitudinal study with a group of three- and four-year-olds that were 
tested at three points in time, roughly six months apart. At each time-point, the testing comprised 
a mentalising battery (which included a false-belief test), a test of language ability, and a “picture 
test” where mothers were asked to describe pictures of people engaging in varying activities to their 
children. Ruffman and colleagues coded the language both mothers and children used in the picture 
test, noting in particular the amount of references they made to thoughts, feelings and desires. They 
found that the frequency with which mothers referenced mental states predicted children's perfor-
mance on mentalising tests at later times; this remained true even after controlling for a number of 
potential mediators, such as children's performance on both mentalising and language tests and the 
frequency with which they talked about mental states at earlier time points.  In contrast, children's 
earlier mentalising performance did not predict their mothers' mental state utterances at later times. 
1.4.3 Siblings 
There is evidence that children with at least one sibling tend to perform better on direct false-
belief tests, compared to those with no siblings (Hughes & Ensor, 2005; McAlister & Peterson, 
2006, 2007, 2013; Perner, Ruffman, & Leekam, 1994; Peterson, 2000; Ruffman, Perner, Naito, 
Parkin, & Clements, 1998). For example, Anna McAlister and Candida Peterson(2006) tested one-
hundred-twenty-four children between the ages of three and five using a mentalising battery, which 
included two direct false-belief tests. Children with at least one “child” sibling (operationalised as 
a sibling between the ages of one and twelve) tended to score higher than those with no child 
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siblings on both mentalising and executive functioning tests; in both cases, the correlation coeffi-
cients were weak (in the order of .2) but significant. 
The standard, late-emergentist explanation for this correlation is that having a sibling pro-
vides children with more opportunities for social interaction, which in turn provides them with 
more evidence that people can have false beliefs (Perner et al., 1994). Consistent with this interpre-
tation, other variables that are likely to enhance opportunity for social interaction have also been 
found to correlate with direct false-belief performance, including the number of older children and 
adults children interact with daily (Lewis, Freeman, Kyriakidou, Maridaki-Kassotaki, & Berridge, 
1996), the number of days children spend playing with peers (Shahaeian, Henry, Razmjoee, 
Teymoori, & Wang, 2015) and whether children have classmates of different ages (Wang & Su, 
2009). It is possible, as well, that having a sibling gives children more opportunities to engage in 
conversations about the mind. Supporting this hypothesis, Jane Brown, Nancy Donelan-McCall 
and Judy Dunn (1996), after analysing a sample of four-year-olds' conversations recorded at home, 
found that four-year-olds were more likely to talk about their own or someone else's mental states 
when they interacted with their friends and siblings as opposed to their mothers, while a study by 
Jenkins, Sheri Turrell, Yuiko Kogushi and colleagues (2003), which looked at how parents inter-
acted with their children at home, found that four-year-olds with an older sibling were more ex-
posed to mental-state talk than children without an older sibling. 
1.5 Deaf Children 
Deaf children are known to perform much worse on direct false-belief tests than typically 
developing children. For example, Peterson and Michael Siegal (1995) report that the deaf children 
in their study, with ages ranging between eight and thirteen, were 17% correct on a standard unex-
pected-transfer task. In a follow-up study, Peterson and Siegal (1999) found that deaf children's 
direct false-belief performance was highly dependent on whether their parents were also deaf; spe-
cifically, deaf children of deaf parents performed like typically developing children, while deaf chil-
dren of hearing parents were severely impaired, as Peterson and Siegal (1995) had found. A study 
by Russell et al. (1998), which looked at deaf children aged from four up to sixteen years, found 
that their direct false-belief performance improved with age, suggesting that deaf children are not 
irreversibly impaired in mentalising but simply exhibit a developmental delay. Later studies 
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confirmed this finding and extended it to other direct mentalising tests. Specifically, studies em-
ploying the ToM scale (discussed in Chapter 1, §2.2.4 and in this chapter, §1.1) show that deaf 
children of hearing parents follow a similar developmental progression though the five items of 
the ToM scale as typically developing children and deaf children of deaf parents, but on a timetable 
delayed by several years (Peterson, Wellman, & Liu, 2005; Peterson, Wellman, & Slaughter, 2012). 
Notably, an intervention study by Wellman and Peterson (2013) shows that this delay can be alle-
viated through training on a direct false-belief task, which was found to improve deaf children's 
performance not just on direct false-belief tests but across the ToM scale. 
What is the reason deaf children of hearing parents have poorer direct false-belief perfor-
mance than deaf children of deaf parents? Parents of deaf children are unlikely to be proficient in 
sign language unless they are themselves deaf; as a result, deaf children of hearing parents typically 
do not acquire sign language at home and, as a result, are delayed in their language development. 
As discussed in §1.3, some late-emergentists have argued that language is required for representing 
beliefs and other propositional attitudes; since deaf children of hearing parents typically have lan-
guage delays, it makes sense that they should be correspondingly delayed in their mentalising abil-
ities (P. A. de Villiers & de Villiers, 2012). In addition, especially during the first years of life, deaf 
children will have a much harder time communicating with their parents when their parents have 
normal hearing as opposed to being deaf, and this can be expected to be all the more likely when 
abstract topics, like thoughts and feelings, are concerned. As discussed in §1.4, some late-emer-
gentists have argued that participating in conversations about mental states helps children learn 
that people can have false beliefs. Since deaf children of hearing parents are deprived of this op-
portunity for learning, it should take them longer to learn that beliefs can be false (Peterson & 
Siegal, 1995, 1999).  
1.6 Social Competence 
There is robust evidence that children’s performance on direct false-belief tests correlates 
with their performance on several tests of social competence. In particular, preschoolers who per-
form better on direct false-belief tests are more likely to tell a lie to conceal a transgression (Talwar 
& Lee, 2008), are better at keeping a secret and at playing hide-and-seek (Ding, Wellman, Wang, 
Fu, & Lee, 2015; Peskin & Ardino, 2003), score higher on social competence tests (Razza & Blair, 
  
72 
 
2009), tend to be more popular in the classroom and have more friends (Cassidy, Werner, Rourke, 
Zubernis, & Balaraman, 2003; Fink, Begeer, Peterson, Slaughter, & De Rosnay, 2015; Slaughter, 
Imuta, Peterson, & Henry, 2015), are better at producing persuasive arguments (Kołodziejczyk & 
Bosacki, 2015; Peterson, Slaughter, & Wellman, 2017; Slaughter, Peterson, & Moore, 2013) and 
more likely to engage in pro-social behaviour (Imuta, Henry, Slaughter, Selcuk, & Ruffman, 2016). 
Not surprisingly, such  findings are taken to support a late-emergence account: children who pass 
direct false-belief tests know that beliefs can be false and can exploit this knowledge in their social 
interactions, while children who fail direct false-belief tests, not knowing that beliefs can be false, 
cannot (Sabbagh et al., 2013; Wellman, 2014). Let us zoom in on some of these findings.  
• Joan Peskin and Vittoria Ardino (2003) investigated the relationship between three- to 
five-year-olds' ability to keep a secret and play hide-and-seek and their mentalising skills. 
Mentalising was measured using two direct false-belief tests. In the hide-and-seek task, 
participants had to play two rounds of hide-and-seek with an experimenter. In the keeping-
a-secret task, participants had to keep from spoiling a surprise (i.e., keep from telling the 
experimenter that someone had bought a birthday cake for her.) The correlation coeffi-
cient between the mentalising aggregate and the social (hide-and-seek + keeping-a-secret) 
aggregate was .42 once age was partialled out.  
• Peterson, Slaughter and Wellman (2017) investigated the link between mentalising and 
persuasion skill in a large sample of children ranging from three to twelve years of age, 
which included typically developing children, deaf children of hearing parents and children 
with autism spectrum disorder. Mentalising was measured using the ToM Scale plus an 
additional battery of direct false-belief tests, while persuasion skill was measured using 
several peer persuasion tasks. To illustrate, one of these tasks involved convincing a pup-
pet (“Matty”) to do something he was not inclined to do, like brushing his teeth or eating 
broccoli. Matty would resist children's persuasion attempt, at which point children were 
encouraged to try again; the whole procedure was repeated three times. Children received 
one point for each “high-level” argument they used, which the authors define as arguments 
that “had to supply new substantive information aimed at shifting Matty's initial mental 
state of resistance”. Peterson and colleagues found that, in all three groups (typically de-
veloping, deaf and autistic) children's performance on direct mentalising tasks was 
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correlated with their performance on peer persuasion tasks. In typically developing chil-
dren, for example, direct mentalising performance independently predicted 16% of the 
variance in peer-persuasion performance, over and above age and language. 
• Rachel Razza and Clancy Blair (2009) conducted a longitudinal study of the relationship 
between mentalising and social competence. In the initial testing (T1), the mean age was 5 
years and two months; the second testing (T2) was a year later. Mentalising was measured 
using a battery of direct false-belief tasks, while social competence was measured using the 
Preeschool and Kindergarten Behavioural Scales, which is a standardised report compiled 
by teachers, which is meant to provide an assessment of children's typical class behaviours; 
it includes items pertaining to social cooperation and social interaction. Razza and Blair 
found a bidirectional link between direct false-belief performance and the social compe-
tence score: direct false-belief performance at T1 was correlated positively with social com-
petence at T2, and social competence at T1 was correlated positively with direct false-
belief performance at T2. 
1.7 Brain Maturation 
Neuroscientific investigations suggest that several cortical areas are involved in mentalising, 
including the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), the precune-
ous (PC) and the superior temporal sulcus (STS) (Koster-Hale & Saxe, 2013). The TPJ, in particu-
lar, has been argued to be a core component of the mentalising network (e.g., Saxe and Kanwisher, 
2003; Samson et al., 2004). A couple of very suggestive studies have found that children's perfor-
mance on direct false-belief tests correlates with the maturation of their mentalising network, in-
cluding the TPJ (Sabbagh, Bowman, Evraire, & Ito, 2009; Wiesmann, Schreiber, Singer, Steinbeis, 
& Friederici, 2017). This seems to be an important finding, since it provides independent evidence 
that whether children pass or fail a direct false-belief test depends, at least in part, on their mental-
ising abilities. Let us take a look at these studies. 
• Sabbagh and colleagues (2009) tested a group of four-year-olds using electroencephalo-
gram (EEG). The premise of the study was that resting alpha activity increases in ampli-
tude and coherence over the preschool years, due to maturational changes that take place 
in the brain. The increase in alpha coherence, in particular, is thought to reflect the extent 
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to which the neurons in a given region are organised, thus firing in a more synchronous 
manner. Sabbagh and colleagues recorded alpha rhythm while children were at rest, and 
then analysed their data (using a technique called sLORETA) to estimate current density 
(which can be taken as a measure of alpha coherence) over different cortical regions. Sab-
bagh and colleagues found that current density over the right TPJ and the dorsal mPFC 
was moderately correlated with performance on direct mentalising tasks, including two 
direct false-belief tests. The authors suggest a late-emergentist interpretation of this find-
ing: the right TPJ and dorsal MPFC become more functionally organised as children ac-
quire a “representational” theory of mind. 
• Charlotte Wiesman and colleagues (2017) used diffusion-weighted magnetic resonance im-
aging (dMRI) to investigate white matter maturation in a group of three- and four-year-
olds. White matter is made up of axons connecting the neurons in the cortex (the “grey” 
matter). Diffusion-weighted MRI can be used to compute fractional anisotropy, an index 
that is used to estimate how water molecules are diffused in biological tissue; a value of 0 
corresponds to equal diffusion in every direction while a value of 1 corresponds to diffu-
sion along just one dimension. Given that white matter is made up of bundles of axons 
disposed in parallel fashion, it is expected to exhibit relatively high levels of fractional 
anisotropy. Notably, as the brain matures the axons that make up white matter grow and 
get more myelinated (essentially, more insulated), leading to increases in fractional anisot-
ropy during childhood. Now, Wiesmann and colleagues found that children who had 
higher levels of fractional anisotropy in the white matter surrounding some of their men-
talising areas (including, among others, the right TPJ and PC) tended to perform better on 
direct false-belief tests. Notably, like Sabbagh and colleagues, Wiesmann and colleagues 
also suggest a late-emergentist interpretation of their finding, according to which changes 
in white matter maturation correspond to the acquisition of a representational theory of 
mind. 
2. Performance Accounts 
Early-emergentists argue that young children, despite possessing belief-reasoning abilities, 
fail to display them in the context of direct false-belief tests because of performance difficulties. So 
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far, early-emergentists have pointed to two types of factors that could be negatively affecting young 
children's performance in direct false-belief tests. The first is a limitation in the processing resources 
young children have at their disposal. Several authors have argued that direct false-belief tests make 
high demands on processing resources, such as executive functioning, that are especially poor in 
young children (Baillargeon et al., 2010; Carruthers, 2013; Leslie et al., 2005; Setoh et al., 2016). Call 
this a processing-load type of account. The second type of performance-limiting factor early-emer-
gentists have appealed to has to do with children's capacity to correctly interpret the linguistic 
stimuli used in the test. Specifically, children are argued to have difficulties with the process of 
pragmatic interpretation, having to do not with decoding the literal meaning of an utterance but 
with figuring out what the speaker means by it (Helming, Strickland, & Jacob, 2014; Helming et al., 
2016; Westra, 2016; Westra & Carruthers, 2017). Call this a pragmatic type of account. In the fol-
lowing, we will discuss five main proposals, the first three of which fall into the processing-load 
category while the last two belong to the pragmatic category.  
2.1 The ToMM/SP Account 
As mentioned in Chapter I, §3.2.1, Alan Leslie was among the first to defend an early-emer-
gence account; he argued that the cognitive mechanism underlying the capacity to represent mental 
states, which he called ToMM (short for “Theory of Mind Mechanism”), was innate and would 
typically be up and running by the second year of life, if not earlier. To explain why most two and 
three-year-olds had trouble with direct false-belief tests, Leslie and some of his colleagues devel-
oped the ToMM/SP account, according to which ascribing false beliefs requires the contribution of 
a further cognitive mechanism besides ToMM, called selection processor or SP for short (Friedman 
& Leslie, 2004; Leslie, 2000b; Leslie, Friedman, & German, 2004; Leslie & Polizzi, 1998; Leslie & 
Thaiss, 1991; Roth & Leslie, 1991, 1998). On this account, the reason SP is required is that ToMM 
is likely to have a true-belief bias, ascribing true beliefs by default. In order to ascribe a false belief, 
then, one would first need to override the default attribution, and this is where SP comes in. SP is 
supposed to be a domain-general process playing an “executive” role, having to do with managing 
other cognitive processes and overriding their responses when needed. Now, if SP is not strong 
enough to carry out the override, the true-belief default will prevail, resulting in the ascription of a 
true belief. This, according to the ToMM/SP account, is precisely what happens in young children: 
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even though both their ToMM and their SP are already functioning, their SP is still too weak to 
override the true-belief bias, thus leading them to failure.  
2.1.1 Indirect false-belief tests  
While the results of indirect false-belief studies support Leslie's claim that ToMM is innate 
and early-emerging, they are also in clear tension with his ToMM/SP account. This is because these 
studies show that even infants can ascribe false beliefs, which suggests one of two things: either SP 
is not required to ascribe a false belief, or SP is required but already sufficiently developed in in-
fancy. 
Could it not be, however, that some feature of direct false-belief tests makes the true content 
more salient, thus making it more difficult to inhibit? An early study by Clements and Perner (1994), 
which combines direct and indirect methodologies, seems to rule out this possibility. Clements and 
Perner essentially carried out an anticipatory-looking unexpected-transfer task with the typical di-
rect question added at the end. Clements and Perner found that many of the children who had just 
looked at one location in anticipation of the agent's return tended to point to the other location 
when asked where the agent would go, thus displaying both responses in short succession.  
2.1.2 Executive functioning  
In discussing evidence that children's performance on direct false-belief tests correlates with 
their performance on tests of inhibitory control, (Friedman & Leslie, 2004; Leslie, 2000b) suggests 
that 'SP' and 'inhibitory control' may refer to the same cognitive mechanism/capacity. On this 
assumption, the ToMM/SP account would be consistent with an expression account of the corre-
lation, which maintains that inhibitory control and direct false-belief performance correlate because 
inhibitory control is required to express one's belief-reasoning abilities. So far, so good; however, 
there are two considerations that speak against this explanation of the correlation.  
• First, remember that the meta-analysis by Devine and Hughes (2014) found the correlation 
between performance on direct false-belief tests and performance on executive function-
ing tests (including tests of inhibitory control) to be quite low for studies that controlled 
for language ability and age (r=.22, which corresponds to about 5% of the variance.) Since 
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on the ToMM/SP account a lack of inhibitory control is the main reason young children 
fail direct false-belief tests, one would expect the correlation to be much stronger. 
• Second, the ToMM/SP account cannot explain the evidence for emergence accounts of 
the correlation (discussed in §1.2), according to which inhibitory control and direct false-
belief performance correlate because inhibitory control helps children learn that beliefs 
can be false. Consider, for example, the study by Sabbagh and colleagues (2006), which 
found that Chinese children did not perform better than American children on a direct 
false-belief test despite outperforming them on a test of inhibitory control. This is prob-
lematic if we assume (as the ToMM/SP account does) that a lack of inhibitory control is 
the main factor holding back young children's direct false-belief performance, since in this 
case one would expect an improvement in the former to result in an improvement in the 
latter. Or consider the study by Carlson et al. (2015), which found that children's perfor-
mance on the think-know and sources-of-knowledge tests correlated with an inhibitory-
control test as strongly as their performance on a direct false-belief test. This is problematic 
because neither the think-know test nor the sources-of-knowledge test requires ascription 
of false beliefs; as a result, on the ToMM/SP account, one would not expect SP to be 
recruited in these tests.  
2.1.3 Language Ability 
We have said that, on the ToMM/SP account, children's inhibitory control is the main factor 
determining failure or success on a direct false-belief test. This, however, presupposes that children 
correctly understand the linguistic stimuli in the test. If there is a sizable portion of two-, three- and 
four-year-olds for which these linguistic stimuli are still somewhat challenging, then language ability 
should also be acknowledged as an important factor in predicting failure or success. Thus, a possi-
ble explanation for why children's performance on tests of language ability correlates with their 
direct false-belief performance is that children with better language ability are less likely to misin-
terpret the linguistic stimuli in direct false-belief tests. Several considerations speak against this type 
of explanation, however. 
• First, it is worth noting that some two-and-a-half-year-olds can pass pass indirect false-
belief tests that involve linguistic stimuli comparable to those used in direct false-belief 
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tests. In the first experiment reported by Scott et al. (2012), for example, children were 
narrated an unexpected-transfer type of story as they looked at a picture book illustrating 
the events in the narration, and their looking behaviour suggested they predicted where 
the character in the story would look (this experiment was described in Chapter I, §1.2.2). 
In a second experiment, children watched as an experimenter was given a direct, unex-
pected-transfer task, and looked longer when the experimenter answered incorrectly. 
While the unexpected-transfer task was enacted by two other experimenters instead of 
narrated, the test question was similar to that typically used in direct false-belief tests (i.e., 
“When Sally comes back, she is going to need her toy again. Where will she think it is?”) 
Thus, the first experiment suggests that, by two years and a half, most children are able to 
understand the narration used in direct expected-transfer tasks, while the second experi-
ment suggests that they are also able to interpret the test question used in those tasks. 
• Language and direct false-belief performance are found to correlate not just in younger 
children (two- and three-year-olds) but also in older ones, up to seven years of age at least 
(Milligan et al., 2007). Given that, as we have just seen, even the youngest children seem 
already capable of interpreting the linguistic stimuli in direct false-belief tests, it seems 
unlikely that some four- or five-year-olds would still be unable to do so, in a way that leads 
them to failure. (This last qualification is important: to fail, it is not sufficient that children 
misinterpret some of the linguistic stimuli in the test -- they must do so in a way that causes 
them to miss some of the critical bits, such as, for example, where the agent put the mar-
ble.) 
• If the correlation with language is simply a result of the language demands made by direct 
false-belief tests, one would expect the correlation to be stronger for those tests that in-
volve more (or more complex) linguistic stimuli. Milligan and colleagues, however, found 
that the four direct mentalising tasks they took into account in their meta-analysis (unex-
pected-transfer false-belief task, unexpected-content false-belief task, deception task, and 
belief-emotion task) all correlated with language ability to a similar extent (i.e., no signifi-
cant difference was found). Nonetheless, as the authors note, these tasks vary considerably 
in their language demands. For example, the unexpected-transfer task includes a narrative, 
while the unexpected-content task does not. According to Milligan and colleagues, the fact 
  
79 
 
that all these tasks correlate with language ability to a similar extent suggests that task-
dependent language demands do not fully explain the correlation (Milligan et al., 2007, p. 
637). 
2.1.4 Developmental Progression 
On the ToMM/SP account, the fact that some direct mentalising tasks are passed earlier than 
others must be a reflection of the extent to which these tasks recruit SP. This seems to work well 
for the first two steps in the ToM scale, the diverse-desire test and the diverse-belief test.  
In the diverse-desire task, the experimenter introduces children to a toy figurine called “Mr. 
Jones”, who wants something to eat. Then children are asked, we have a carrot and a cookie, which 
one do you like best? After children answer, the experimenter says that Mr. Jones likes the other 
type of food best and asks children which one Mr. Jones will pick. Now, to pass this type of test, 
children must ascribe to Mr. Jones a preference different from their own. On the ToMM/SP ac-
count, this does not require SP, since there is no “own-preference or own-desire bias” parallel to 
the true-belief bias. Furthermore, the test clearly does not involve ascribing a false belief. Thus, the 
diverse-desire test should be much easier than typical false-belief tests. 
In the diverse-belief task, instead, children are introduced a toy figurine called “Linda” and 
are told that she is looking for something (e.g., her cat), which may be in either of two locations 
(the bushes or the garage). Children are then asked to guess where Linda's cat is. Whatever children 
say, the experimenter will then say that Linda thinks the cat is in the other location and will ask 
them where she will look for it. Now, this test requires children to ascribe a belief that, from their 
point of view, is false, and thus requires them to use their SP to inhibit the true-belief bias. It thus 
makes sense that children should pass the diverse-belief test after the diverse-desire test. At the 
same time, since children simply guessed the location of the cat, their belief about its location 
should be less salient, making it easier to inhibit it, compared to typical direct false-belief tests. 
Thus, it makes sense that children should pass the diverse-belief test before they pass false-belief 
tests.  
While the ToMM/SP account works well for these two tasks, explaining the rest of the de-
velopmental progression presents some serious obstacles.  
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• First, the ToM scale has a third step, between the diverse-belief test and the false-belief 
test: the knowledge-access test. In this task, children are shown the contents of a container 
(e.g., a toy dog in a drawer) and asked whether someone who has not looked inside it (e.g., 
“Polly”) knows what's in it. The problem is that passing this task does not require ascribing 
a false belief to Polly; a state of ignorance (i.e., lack of knowledge) will suffice. Thus, it is 
not clear why this test is passed after the diverse-belief test. 
• Second, remember that cross-cultural studies have found that children in collectivist soci-
eties, such as China and Iran, pass the knowledge access test before the diverse-belief test. 
This cross-cultural variation is difficult to account for on the ToMM/SP account. It is 
possible, of course, that Iranian and Chinese children differ in their executive skill com-
pared to children in Western countries (indeed, see Sabbagh et al. 2009 concerning Chinese 
children), but, as argued by Wellman et al. (2011), this would simply change how fast chil-
dren progress through each of the steps, not the trajectory of their progression. 
• Third, a recent study by Ceymi Doenyas, Melis Yavuz and Bilge Selcuk (2018) looked at 
longitudinal correlations between children's performance on the ToM scale and their per-
formance on tests of inhibitory control. The study had two main findings. First, when 
examined cross-sectionally, only the knowledge-access test and the false-belief test corre-
lated with inhibitory-control performance. Thus, while on the ToMM/SP account one 
would expect children's performance on the diverse-belief test to also correlate with in-
hibitory control (although to a smaller degree) no significant correlation was found in this 
study. Second, at T2, once age and language ability were controlled for, only direct false-
belief performance was predicted by inhibitory-control performance at T1. This suggests 
that the raw cross-sectional correlation between children's knowledge-access performance 
and their inhibitory-control performance is not due to the inhibitory demands of the 
knowledge-access test. To sum up: while on the ToMM/SP account one would expect 
children's diverse-belief and knowledge-access performance to correlate with their inhibi-
tory-control performance even after potential mediators were controlled for, this study 
found the opposite result. 
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2.1.5 Deaf children  
The ToMM/SP account has a few potential explanations for the fact that deaf children of 
hearing parents tend to score significantly lower on direct false-belief tests than both typically de-
veloping children and deaf children of deaf parents. However, none of these potential explanations 
is supported by the evidence. 
• The first and most obvious explanation is that deaf children of hearing parents may have 
poor inhibitory control, in which case they would not be able to resist the true-belief bias. 
The studies by Woolfe, Want, and Siegal (2002) and P. A. de Villiers and de Villiers (2012) 
allow us to rule out this possibility. Woolfe and colleagues (2002) found that deaf children 
of hearing parents did not perform significantly worse than deaf children of deaf parents 
on a test of executive functioning, while having significantly worse direct false-belief per-
formance. De Villiers and De Villiers (2012) found that the younger group of deaf children 
in their study (aged 4-6) did not perform significantly worse than a group of typically de-
veloping children of the same age, while the older group (aged 6-8) did, although both 
groups had much poorer direct false-belief performance than typically developing chil-
dren. Thus, although some deaf children of hearing parents appear to have impaired (or 
delayed) executive functioning, it seems this is not the reason why they tend to have worse 
direct false-belief performance.  
• The second potential explanation is that the poor direct false-belief performance of deaf 
children of hearing parents is a consequence of their language delay. Two lines of evidence 
speak against this possibility, however. First, deaf children of hearing parents perform well 
on the false-photograph task, which makes similar language demands compared to typical 
direct false-belief tests (Peterson & Siegal, 1999; Woolfe et al., 2002). Second, deaf children 
of hearing parents perform just as poorly on direct false-belief tests with reduced language 
demands as they do on typical direct false-belief tests (P. A. de Villiers & de Villiers, 2012; 
Woolfe et al., 2002). 
• The third and last possibility is that, in deaf children of hearing parents, ToMM takes 
longer to mature and come on-line. It may be suggested, for example, that the maturation 
of ToMM requires, in order to be triggered, exposure to certain social stimuli. The finding 
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that deaf children still follow the same developmental progression as other children speaks 
against this hypothesis, however. Remember that, on the ToMM/SP account, the devel-
opmental progression revealed by the ToM scale is to be explained by concurrent devel-
opments in inhibitory control. Furthermore, remember that, as noted above, many deaf 
children of hearing parents do not appear to be delayed in their inhibitory control. Ac-
cordingly, one would expect that deaf children of hearing parents, instead of following the 
same developmental progression as typically developing children, would start passing all 
the tasks in the ToM scale at the same time, as soon as their ToMM reaches the required 
level of maturation. 
2.1.6 Training 
On the ToMM/SP account, false-belief training cannot help by improving young children's 
belief-reasoning abilities, since these abilities are supposed to be already sufficiently developed to 
allow them to pass a direct false-belief test. There is two possible alternative explanations, however. 
• First, training on a direct false-belief task may help children by giving them opportunity to 
practice inhibiting the true-belief bias. I know of only one study that has tested this hy-
pothesis (Benson et al., 2013). Benson and colleagues report that, while children did have 
better inhibitory control in a post-test after undergoing false-belief training, how much 
children's inhibitory control improved did not predict how much their direct false-belief 
performance improved, which speaks against the hypothesis under consideration.  
• Second, training on a direct false-belief task may have helped children by giving them 
practice interpreting the linguistic stimuli in the test. To the best of my knowledge, only 
one study speaks to this hypothesis (C. Hale & Tager-Flusberg, 2003). Hale and Tager-
Flusberg report that training on a direct false-belief task did not improve children's per-
formance on a sentential complements task. This does not completely rule out the hypoth-
esis under consideration, however, since it is possible that training improved other aspects 
of children's language abilities, aspects that were not controlled for. 
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2.1.7 Mental-state talk  
A potential explanation of the finding that children whose parents are more likely to talk 
about the mind tend to have better direct false-belief performance is that these children also have 
better inhibitory control. To the best of my knowledge, no study has investigated this possibility. 
Thus, this hypothesis cannot be completely ruled out. Still, why should children's inhibitory skill 
correlate with their parent's propensity to talk about the mind? There seems to be no obvious 
connection between the two, which may very well be why the hypothesis has not been tested.  
2.1.8 Siblings  
On the ToMM/SP account, the fact that children with siblings have better direct false-belief 
performance than children without siblings has two potential explanations, similar to those taken 
into account for deaf children: having a sibling may lead children to develop either better inhibitory 
control or better language ability or both, which then leads to better direct false-belief performance. 
Since many studies controlled for the potential mediation of these two factors, however, this pos-
sibility can be ruled out with some confidence. For example, McAlister and Peterson (2006), who 
included tests of language ability and executive functioning in their study, found that children's 
language ability, their executive functioning and whether they had at least on child sibling all made 
independent contributions to explaining variability in children's performance on a mentalising bat-
tery.  
2.1.9 Social Competence  
On the ToMM/SP account, a possible explanation of the finding that children who have 
better performance on direct false-belief tests tend to be more socially competent is that inhibitory 
control may be the mediating factor between these two variables. In other words, if inhibitory 
control is required to pass both direct false-belief tests and tests of social competence, then children 
who have better inhibitory control should perform better on both types of test, explaining why the 
two correlate.  
Some of the studies mentioned §1.7 controlled for executive functioning, however, and their 
results speak against this hypothesis. For example, Peskin and Ardino (2003) included in their in-
vestigation two executive functioning tests, both of which are thought to measure children's 
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inhibitory control. Once age was partialled out, the executive functioning aggregate turned out to 
be significantly correlated with the mentalising aggregate, but not with the social aggregate. Fur-
thermore, once both age and executive functioning were controlled for, the correlation between 
the mentalising and social aggregates remained significant (r=.38). Similarly, Razza and Blair (2009) 
included two executive functioning tests in their study, measuring inhibitory control, working 
memory and cognitive flexibility; they report that the bidirectional relationship found between di-
rect false-belief and PKBS scores was independent of executive functioning.  
2.1.10 Brain Maturation  
Finally, the finding that children's performance on direct false-belief tests correlates with the 
level of maturation of their mentalising network is difficult to square with the ToMM/SP account. 
By two years of age, ToMM should already be sufficiently mature to allow children to pass a direct 
false-belief test; what two-year-olds would be lacking is a sufficiently developed SP. Consequently, 
the ToMM/SP account predicts that only the maturation of the neural areas implementing SP 
should correlate with children's direct false-belief performance. Both Sabbagh et al. (2009) and 
Wiesmann et al. (2017) included executive functioning tests in their studies, however, and found 
that maturation in the mentalising network predicted direct false-belief performance over and 
above executive-functioning. Wiesmann and colleauges also included a test of language ability, 
again finding that children's language ability did not account for the correlation. In addition, while 
some of the areas in the mentalising network may be argued to sub-serve inhibitory functions (e.g., 
see Frith & Frith, 2003) it is implausible to suggest that all of them do. 
2.1.11 Summary  
While being very influential, the ToMM/SP can explain almost none of the findings dis-
cussed in this or previous chapters. Let us consider, see now, whether any of the more recent 
proposals fare any better (see table 1). 
2.2 The Expanded Processing Demands Account 
Renée Baillargeon and her colleagues have developed their own processing-load account, 
which has kept evolving through the years (Baillargeon et al., 2013; Baillargeon et al., 2010; 
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Baillargeon et al., 2015; Setoh, Scott, & Baillargeon, 2016). To keep the exposition as simple as 
possible, I will be focusing here on their most recent proposal, advanced by Peipei Setoh, Rose 
Scott and Renée Baillargeon (2016) and known as the Expanded Processing-Demands (EPD for short) 
account. 
Setoh and colleagues argue that direct false-belief tests recruit two additional processes com-
pared to indirect false-belief tests: a response-generation process, which involves interpreting the 
question and holding the interpretation in mind while selecting a response, and inhibitory control, 
required to resist the temptation to point to the actual location of the object (reality bias). Notably, 
Setoh and colleagues maintain that the reality bias, instead of being intrinsic to belief-reasoning per 
se as Leslie and colleagues claim, would be triggered by the test question used in direct false-belief 
tests. Furthermore, Setoh and colleagues argue that response-generation processes are also likely 
to load on other executive resources, like working memory, adding to young children's difficulties. 
Thus, on the EPD account, inhibitory control is an important factor at play but is not the only one; 
children with good inhibitory control may still fail the test if they lack other executive resources. 
2.2.1 Indirect false-belief tests  
The claim that the reality bias is triggered by the test question allows Setoh and colleagues to 
solve one of the most pressing problems of the ToMM/SP account, namely its inability to explain 
how young children can simultaneously pass indirect false-belief tests and fail direct false-belief 
tests. Since a test question is present in direct false-belief tests but not in indirect false-belief tests, 
the reality bias, is triggered in the former case but not in the latter. Thus, consider again the exper-
iment by Clements and Perner (1994), where children were first given an anticipatory-looking un-
expected-transfer task and then, after their first looks were recorded, were asked the standard test 
question. Here, Setoh and colleagues can argue that up until the question is asked, no reality bias is 
triggered; thus, children can exercise their mentalising abilities unhindered and, having predicted 
that the character will look for the object where she left it, children will make their anticipatory 
looks toward that location. However, the test question then triggers the reality bias, which many 
young children will fail to inhibit, resulting in reality-based responses.  
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2.2.2 Executive functioning 
The fact that inhibitory control is not the only factor at play allows Setoh and colleagues to 
explain another result that was puzzling for the ToMM/SP account, namely that by Sabbagh and 
colleagues (2006). This study found that Chinese children, despite outperforming American chil-
dren on a test of inhibitory control, did not perform any better on a battery of direct false-belief 
tests. Setoh and colleagues argue that Chinese children may lack some other critical processing 
resource tapped by response-generation processes, thus balancing out their better inhibitory skill; 
indeed, they suggest that the processing resource in question may be working memory. 
Despite this, other findings concerning the relationship between executive functioning and 
direct false-belief performance are just as puzzling for the EPD account as they were for the 
ToMM/SP account. 
● First, on the EPD account, one would still expect to see a strong correlation between 
executive functioning and direct false-belief performance; instead, the meta-analysis by Devine 
and Hughes (2014) shows that the correlation is only weak. 
● Second, while the EPD account can explain one of the studies supporting an emer-
gence account of the correlation (i.e., the study by Sabbagh and colleagues mentioned above) 
it does not seem able to have an explanation for the other two (Carlson et al., 2015; Benson 
and colleagues, 2013). For example, the fact that young children tend to answer randomly on 
the think-know and sources-of-knowledge tests, instead of consistently giving the wrong re-
sponse as they do in direct false-belief tests, suggests that no reality bias is present in these 
tests. Thus, on the EPD account, one would not expect to see children's performance on these 
tests correlate with their performance on tests of inhibitory control; and yet, this exactly what 
Carlson and colleagues found. 
2.2.3 Other findings 
In respect to the rest of the evidence we have been discussing in this chapter, the EPD 
account does not seem to have a better explanation than the ToMM/SP account; this should not 
be surprising given that the two accounts are, after all, very similar. Thus, for example, since lan-
guage ability plays a similar role on both accounts (that of allowing children to interpret the linguis-
tic stimuli in the test) the EPD account should not fare any better than the ToMM/SP account in 
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explaining the relationship between language ability and direct false-belief performance. Or, to 
consider another example, since on both accounts young children already possess the mentalising 
abilities that are required for passing direct false-belief tests, the finding that children's performance 
on these tests correlates with the maturation of their mentalising network should be just as puzzling 
for one account as it is for the other. 
2.2.4 Summary  
The EPD account marks an improved compared to the ToMM/SP account, since it can at 
least explain why young children pass indirect false-belief tests while failing direct false-belief tests. 
Nonetheless, it fares no better than the ToMM/SP account with most of the other findings (see 
table 1). 
2.3 The Triple-Load Account  
Yet another processing-load account, known as the triple-load account, has been defended by 
Peter Carruthers (2013, 2016). Carruthers maintains that direct false-belief tests recruit the mental-
ising system more extensively than indirect false-belief tests do. The reason for this is, Carruthers 
argues, is that indirect false-belief tests only involve one mentalising process, namely that of infer-
ring what the target agent thinks and wants and of predicting her action. In contrast, direct false-
belief tests would involve two additional mentalising processes besides the one just mentioned: 
first, inferring the communicative intentions of the experimenter in order to correctly interpret her 
utterances; and second, calculating how the experimenter will interpret possible responses to the 
test question, in order to select a communicative act appropriate to convey the intended answer 
(This presupposes a neo-Gricean view of pragmatic processing, such as relevance theory; see for 
example Sperber & Wilson, 1986; Sperber & Wilson, 2002) The fact that direct false-belief tests 
involve three mentalising processes will result in a triple processing-load on executive functioning 
compared to indirect false-belief tests, which involve only one mentalising process. Thus, Car-
ruthers suggests that two- and three-year-old children, who pass indirect false-belief tests while 
failing direct false-belief tests, do so because they possess enough executive resources to carry out 
one or two mentalising process, but not three. As children grow older, either mentalising processes 
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become more efficient (and thus less resource-consuming), or the processing resource available to 
them increase, or a combination of both.  
2.3.1 Experiential factors and deaf children 
It is possible that mentalising processes become more efficient with practice. If this is correct, 
then experiential factors like receiving training on direct mentalising tests, having parents that are 
more likely to talk about the mind, and having a sibling would help young children not because 
they allow them to learn that beliefs can be false, but because they increase the efficiency of their 
mentalising processes through practice, thus reducing the processing load children must sustain to 
pass direct false-belief tests. It would then make sense that deaf children of hearing parents, who, 
during their first years of life, are all but deprived of opportunities to engage in conversations about 
the mind, should pass direct mentalising tests later than typically developing children. 
2.3.2 Brain Maturation 
It is possible that the processes of brain maturation tracked by estimated regional current-
density (Sabbagh et al., 2009) and fractional anisotropy (Wiesmann et al., 2017) lead to, or correlate 
with, an increase in the efficiency of mentalising processes. If this hypothesis is on the right track, 
then the triple-load account should be able to explain why children who exhibit a higher level of 
maturation in their mentalising network tend to have better direct false-belief performance, since 
these children will require less executive resources to pass a direct false-belief test. 
2.3.3 Executive functioning 
Like the EPD account, the triple-load account maintains that children's inhibitory control is 
only one of the factors determining whether they will pass or fail a direct false-belief test. Thus, 
like the EPD account, the triple-load account can explain the results of the study by Sabbagh and 
colleagues (2006), who found that Chinese children outperformed their American peers on a bat-
tery of executive functioning tasks but not on a battery of direct false-belief test. In fact, the triple-
load account is consistent with Sabbagh and colleagues' own suggestion that Chinese children's 
better inhibitory control may be balanced out by the fact that Chinese children do not have siblings, 
for having a sibling, as mentioned above, is likely to result in more mentalising practice. 
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The fact that the efficiency of mentalising processes also plays a role in determining whether 
children pass or fail a direct false-belief test may allow the triple-load account to explain a finding 
that was problematic for the EPD account, namely that the correlation between executive func-
tioning and direct false-belief performance is relatively weak (Devine and Hughes, 2014). For ex-
ample, some children may pass despite their relatively poor executive skill because, having had 
more opportunities to practice their mentalising skills, they possess more efficient mentalising pro-
cesses.  
Even so, the triple-load still seems to leave some of the findings in this area unexplained. 
Consider, for example the study by Carlson and colleagues (2015), showing that children's perfor-
mance on the think-know and sources-of-knowledge test also correlate with their inhibitory con-
trol, and did so as strongly as their direct false-belief performance. (This finding is still problematic 
because Carruthers, like Leslie, maintains that inhibitory control would be recruited to ascribe a 
false belief; thus, it is surprising that tasks that do not require ascribing false beliefs correlate with 
inhibitory control as strongly as direct false-belief tests.) 
2.3.4 Language Ability 
While inferring speakers meaning may seem to fit the intuitive definition of “language abil-
ity”, tests of language ability typically only measure children's understanding of the vocabulary and 
grammar of their language (Milligan et al., 2007). Still, children with better language ability (in this 
restricted sense) may be in a better position to infer what the experimenter wants to know. This is 
because the literal meaning of a sentence is clearly an important datum in working out what the 
speaker meant to convey by uttering it. (Thus, for example, to recognise that by uttering “I am 
stuffed!” in response “do you want another slice of cake?” I implied “No” you must understand 
what “stuffed” means; if you think it means empty, then you might conclude that I implied “Yes”). 
Thus, we can expect that not being able to decode the literal meaning of the test question will make 
it more difficult for children to infer what the experimenter wants to know, possibly resulting in 
increased processing demands.  
This type of explanation for the relationship between language ability and direct false-belief 
performance, while not being identical to the one considered in §2.1, where we discussed the 
ToMM/SP account, seems to suffer from similar problems. Thus, for example, it seems to clash 
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with the finding that different false-belief tasks, using test questions of varying degrees of com-
plexity, all correlate with language ability to the same extent (Milligan et al., 2007). 
The triple-load account can also provide a different account of the relationship between lan-
guage ability and direct false-belief performance, however. Children’s language abilities may affect 
the extent to which they benefit from exposure to mental-state talk and training. As mentioned in 
§2.3.1, by participating in conversations about the mind with their parents, children can get more 
practice at mentalising, and this can be expected to result in increased efficiency of their mentalising 
processes. Patently, however, this is only true so long as children understand what their parents are 
saying. Since language ability can mediate the beneficial effect of experiential factors independently 
of the language demands made by direct false-belief tests, this type of explanation is compatible 
with the finding that language correlates to similar extents with false-belief tasks that have different 
language demands (Milligan et al, 2007). Notice, however, that this type of explanation has a dif-
ferent problem: it cannot explain why receiving training on sentential complements improves chil-
dren’s direct false-belief performance.  
To sum up, then, the triple-load offers two explanations: either language ability helps children 
in inferring what the experimenter wants to know, or it helps them by mediating the effect of 
practice. While each can explain some of the evidence, neither can explain all of it. 
2.3.5 Social Competence 
Like direct false-belief tests, many tests of social competence may involve predicting what 
other people will do while also processing linguistic stimuli. Accordingly, one can expect that pass-
ing these tests will also require carrying out several mentalising processes in a short amount of time, 
imposing a multiple processing load on executive functioning. It makes sense, then, that children 
who fail direct false-belief tests should also fail these social competence tests. On the other hand, 
some social-competence tests may be more frugal, involving one or two mentalising processes at 
most. The triple-load account predicts that children's direct false-belief performance should not 
correlate with this latter type of test. 
The evidence seems to speak against this hypothesis. Playing hide-and-seek with an experi-
menter, for example, seems to only involve one mentalising process: anticipating where the other 
will look, or figuring out where the other may have hidden. In particular, since the game is supposed 
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to be played in silence, there will be no linguistic stimuli to process. The fact that children's direct 
false-belief performance correlates with their ability to play hide-and-seek should thus be puzzling 
for the triple-load account. 
2.3.6 Developmental Progression 
The triple-load account seems to have trouble explaining why children follow the develop-
mental progression revealed by the ToM Scale. Notice that all the tests in the ToM Scale seem to 
involve three mentalising processes, no differently from direct false-belief tests. This is because 
they all require ascribing mental states to the target agent while interpreting the experimenter's 
question and selecting a response. Thus, the hypothesis that children pass the diverse-desire, di-
verse-belief and knowledge-access tests before the false-belief test because they involve fewer men-
talising processes is not tenable.3  
2.3.7 Summary  
The triple-load account can explain several findings that were puzzling for the ToMM/SP 
and EPD accounts. These include those suggesting that experiential factors (exposure to mental-
state talk, training etc.) can affect children’s direct false-belief performance. Nonetheless, other 
findings remain puzzling, including most notably the correlation between direct false-belief perfor-
mance and social competence, and the developmental progression revealed by the ToM Scale (see 
table 1). 
2.4 The Pragmatic Perspectives Account 
In contrast with all the early-emergentists discussed so far, Katharina Helming, Brent Strick-
land and Pierre Jacob (2014, 2016) defend a pragmatic type of account. (The authors do not name 
their account; let us call it the Pragmatic Perspectives Account). The key idea behind pragmatic accounts 
                                                 
3 It is true, of course, that the fact that all these direct mentalising tasks involve three mentalising processes 
does not entail that these processes must be equally taxing in each case. For example, participants' own belief seems 
to be less salient in diverse-belief test compared to the false-belief test, and may thus be easier to inhibit, resulting in a 
smaller load being placed on inhibitory control. The suggestion that the tasks in the ToM scale differ in their demands 
on executive functioning has already been discussed in section §2.1, however, and was found to face several problems; 
nothing Carruthers says suggests a possible solution to those problems.  
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is that young children answer incorrectly because they misunderstand what the experimenter is 
asking. According to Helming and colleagues, the reason this happens is that young children cannot 
take a third-person perspective on the target agent's action while maintaining a second-person per-
spective on the experimenter's question. Taking a third-person perspective on an action means 
observing it unfold in a detached way, without being invested in its outcome; taking a second-
person perspective on an action, in contrast, means having a stake in its outcome and contributing 
to it, by either helping or hindering the agent. Young children, Helming and colleagues argue, are 
likely to find it difficult to assume and maintain both types of perspective at the same time. This, 
in turn, would make two possible misinterpretations of the test question very tempting for young 
children. The cooperative misinterpretation takes the test question to be about what the target 
agent should do as opposed to what she will do; the referential misinterpretation, in contrast, takes 
the test question to be about where the object actually is. Importantly, in both cases the correct 
response is the reality-based one. 
2.4.1 Experiential factors  
By participating in training sessions targeted at a direct false-belief tests, children may practice 
taking different types of perspectives at the same time, which will then improve their direct false-
belief performance. That fact that training helps is thus consistent with the pragmatic perspectives 
account.  
Participating in conversations about the mind may also involve taking both a third-person 
and a second-person perspective, at least in some cases. Accordingly, it is possible that children 
whose parents are more likely to discuss mental states will get more practice at taking different 
types of perspectives at the same time, which will then help them pass direct false-belief tests. The 
pragmatic perspectives account may thus be able to explain why these children tend to have better 
direct false-belief performance. Finally, if having a sibling leads to more mental-state talk within 
the family, then the pragmatic perspectives account can also explain why children who have a sib-
ling should have better direct false-belief performance.   
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2.4.2 Deaf children  
Since the pragmatic perspectives account can explain why participating in conversations 
about the mind helps, it can also explain why deaf children of hearing parents, who will have trouble 
participating in such conversations over their first years of life, tend to have very poor direct false-
belief performance. In addition, given that deaf children are less exposed to linguistic stimuli, it is 
not implausible to suggest that they should also have relatively poor pragmatic understanding.  
2.4.3 Brain Maturation 
It is unclear how the pragmatic perspectives account could explain the finding that children 
with better direct false-belief performance tend to have a more mature mentalising network. This 
is because Helming and colleagues do not tell us why young children have trouble taking a second-
person perspective on the target agent's action (e.g. Sally's looking for the marble) while maintaining 
a third-person perspective on the experimenter's question. Perhaps, it may be suggested, as chil-
dren's mentalising abilities improve due to the maturation of their mentalising areas, maintaining 
those two perspectives should become easier.  
2.4.4 Executive functioning 
Since the pragmatic-perspectives account does not assign any role to executive functioning, 
it does not predict the correlation between executive functioning and direct false-belief perfor-
mance. This problem may be fixed by maintaining that, in order to select the correct interpretation 
of the test question, children must first inhibit the cooperative and referential interpretations, which 
may initially be more salient. In other words, having good inhibitory control might facilitate prag-
matic understanding. With this modification in place, the pragmatic-perspectives account may also 
be able to explain why the correlation with executive functioning is relatively weak. After all, inhib-
itory control would only help those children which entertain, as a possible interpretation, the one 
that happens to be correct; inhibiting the wrong interpretation is not enough; one must also select 
the correct interpretation. Perhaps, for most young children, the correct interpretation does not 
even come to mind as a potential candidate, in which case having food inhibitory control would be 
of little use. Notably, however, even this modified version of the account cannot explain the evi-
dence for emergence accounts. 
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2.4.5 Language Ability 
The pragmatic development account can provide essentially the same type of explanation(s) 
provided by the triple-load account: having better language ability may facilitate pragmatic inter-
pretation, while also allowing children to benefit more from exposure to mental-state talk and 
training.  
2.4.6 Developmental Progression 
All the direct mentalising tests in the ToM scale seem to require taking both a third-person 
and a second-person perspective, at the same time. As a result, the pragmatic perspectives account 
predicts a different developmental progression than that which is typically observed in studies using 
the ToM Scale. For example, on the pragmatic perspectives account, the diverse-belief test should 
be as difficult as the false-belief test. Not only both tests require children to take a second-person 
perspective on the experimenter's communicative action and a third-person perspective on the 
agent's endeavour to find the object, but the referential and cooperative misinterpretation are pos-
sible in both cases and will lead to the same result – a reality-based response. The results obtained 
with the ToM Scale are thus difficult to square with the pragmatic perspectives account.  
2.4.7 Social Competence 
According to the pragmatic perspectives account, the children who have better direct false-
belief performance are those that are better at simultaneously assuming both a third-person and a 
second-person perspective. Accordingly, the finding that children who have better direct false-
belief performance tend to also score higher on many tests of social ability may be explained if 
these other tests also require children to assume inconsistent perspectives. This does not seem to 
be the case, however. Consider for example the ability to play hide-and-seek task without betraying 
one's hiding location, which has been found to correlate with direct false-belief performance (Ding 
et al., 2015; Peskin & Ardino, 2003). In playing hide-and-seek, children only need to take one per-
spective, namely a second-person perspective on the experimenter's action, who is looking for 
them; there is no need to also take a third-person perspective on anything else. Thus, on the prag-
matic perspectives account, there seems to be no reason for children's performance on this test to 
correlate with their performance on direct false-belief tests.  
  
95 
 
2.4.8 Summary 
 The findings that were problematic for the triple-load account are just as problematic for 
the pragmatic-perspectives account. Furthermore, the triple-load account arguably provides a bet-
ter account of many of the findings, including, for example, why children with better direct false-
belief performance tend to have a more mature mentalising network (see table 1).  
2.5 The Pragmatic Development Account 
A second pragmatic account, called the pragmatic development account, is defended by Evan Wes-
tra (2016a). Westra maintains that the complex pragmatics of belief discourse make it difficult for 
young children to tell when adults are talking about beliefs; he discusses two types of considerations 
that support this claim. First, he argues that adults frequently leave beliefs implicit in their explana-
tions and descriptions of behaviour. For example, suppose I showed you a picture of a person 
cracking a bottle of beer open, and asked you to explain this piece of behaviour; “she wanted to 
have a drink” would be a perfectly good answer. Of course, this explanation assumes that the 
person in the picture thought there was beer inside the bottle; but mentioning this would be odd 
from a pragmatic point of view. As this example illustrates, beliefs are often left implicit in conver-
sation, and what beliefs the speaker takes the target agent to have is left for the audience to figure 
out. It is possible that young children simply fail to recognise that what someone believes is often 
taken for granted, which may in turn lead them to underestimate the frequency with which adults 
talk about beliefs. Second, Westra points out that the verb “think” is often used in an indirect 
manner, to convey not what someone believes but rather what is the case (as when one responds 
with “I think they are over there” to “I can't find the keys!”). Young children, Westra argues, may 
have a hard time telling literal, attributive uses apart from indirect ones, and may initially take every 
use of “think” to be indirect; this would in turn reinforce the (misguided) impression that beliefs 
are rarely talked about. 
This type of account has a straightforward explanation for direct unexpected-contents tasks, 
where children are asked what someone who has not looked inside a container (e.g., a Smarties 
tube with crayons inside) will think is inside it. Since the question uses the verb “think”, if children 
take the indirect reading they will think the experimenter is asking what is inside the box, not what 
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the other person thinks is inside it. This would explain why young children tend to provide reality-
based answers (e.g., “crayons!”).  
This explanation does not extend to direct unexpected-transfer tasks, however, where chil-
dren are typically asked where the target agent will look for an object, as opposed to where she 
thinks the object is. Here, Westra presents a slightly different explanation: he argues that, since 
children think that people rarely talk about beliefs, the possibility that the experimenter may want 
them to exhibit their awareness of the agent's belief will not be very salient to them. This, in turn, 
will lead them to prefer a different interpretation of the question; they might, for example, take it 
to concern what the agent should do or where the object is (similar to what Helming and colleagues 
propose). 
2.5.1 Experiential factors and deaf children  
One of the main motivations behind the pragmatic-development account is that of providing 
a better explanation of the evidence concerning training, mental-state talk, siblings and deaf chil-
dren, which is problematic for the ToMM/SP and EPD accounts (as argued in §2.1-2). According 
to Westra, being exposed to conversations about the mind improves children's direct false-belief 
performance not because it allows them to learn that beliefs can be false, as late-emergentists sug-
gest, but because it allows them to gain a better grasp of the types of situation where adults are 
likely to be talking about beliefs. This, in turn, should make children better able to interpret the test 
question in direct false-belief tests, thus improving their chances of answering correctly. Similarly, 
false-belief training that includes feedback improves children's direct false-belief performance not 
because it allows them to learn that beliefs can be false, as suggested by late-emergentists, but 
because it helps children recognise what the experimenter wants to know. In a nutshell, these fac-
tors help because they allow children to better understand the pragmatics of belief discourse 
(Westra, 2016a, p. 248). In light of this, we can then explain why deaf children of hearing parents 
tend to have poor direct false-belief performance: since they have trouble communicating during 
their first years of life, deaf children of hearing parents will be less exposed to conversations about 
the mind and will thus have a much harder time interpreting the question used in direct false-belief 
tests. Finally, having two or more children may induce parents to talk about the mind more often, 
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for example in settling disputes, which will then help their children acquire facility with the prag-
matics of belief discourse (Westra & Carruthers, 2017, p. 171). 
2.5.2 Developmental progression 
Westra and Carruthers (2017) argue that the pragmatic-development account can explain the 
developmental progression revealed in the ToM scale. The reason the diverse-desire test is passed 
before the others, they argue, is that it does not involve beliefs, and thus it does not present the 
same difficulties of pragmatic interpretation as direct false-belief tests. After all, desire-talk is not 
nearly as infrequent as belief-talk, and while “want” can also be used in an indirect way, this indirect 
use is much less common than with “think”. We can thus expect that it should be much easier for 
children to recognise that the experimenter is asking about the agent's behaviour because she wants 
the child to show that she is aware of the agent's desires (Westra & Carruthers, 2017, p. 172). 
The second step in the progression is the diverse-belief test. In this task, children are told 
that a person (e.g. Linda) is looking for something (e.g., her cat), which may be in either of two 
locations (the bushes or the garage) and are then asked to guess where the thing is. Whatever 
children say, the experimenter will then say that Linda thinks the cat is in the other location and 
will ask them where she will look for it. Here, children are likely to assume that “think” (in “Linda 
thinks the cat is in the other location”) is being used in an indirect manner, in which case they will 
take the utterance to state the actual location of the cat. If children think the cat is in the bushes, 
they will of course say that Linda will look there, regardless of whether they recognise that the 
experimenter is asking that question because she wants children to show that they are aware of 
Linda's beliefs. The reason this test is passed later than the diverse-desire test is that some children 
may go on believing their own guess about the location of the object, ignoring the experimenter's 
utterance about what Linda believes. Still, children can pass the test even if they do not correctly 
interpret the question, and this makes the diverse-belief test significantly easier than the false-belief 
test (Westra and Carruthers, 2017: 171-2).   
The third step in the progression, which is the last before the explicit false-belief test, is the 
knowledge-access test. In this task, children are shown the contents of a container (e.g., a toy dog 
in a drawer) and asked whether someone who has not looked inside it (e.g., “Polly”) knows what's 
in it. Here Westra and Carruthers (2017: 172-3) present two complementary explanations. The first 
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is that since Polly does not have the goal of finding the toy dog, a cooperative interpretation of the 
question (i.e., “the experimenter wants me to help Polly find the object”) is ruled out; this should 
make the knowledge-access test easier than the false-belief test. At the same time, the factual inter-
pretation (i.e., “the experimenter wants me to show that I am aware of the location of the object”) 
is still possible, and the correct interpretation should still seem unlikely to young children since it 
concerns what the agent thinks. Thus, the knowledge-access test should be more difficult than the 
diverse-belief test. The second explanation, instead, suggests that children's difficulties may be 
partly due to an experimental artefact. This is because young children are biased to answer all 
yes/no questions positively (Okanda & Itakura, 2008), and in this case the correct answer is nega-
tive (since Polly does not know what is inside the drawer.) 
If this type of account is on the right track, how do we explain the fact that Iranian and 
Chinese children, differently from their Western peers, pass the knowledge-access access test be-
fore the diverse-belief test? Westra and Carruthers point out that resisting the temptation to pro-
vide a positive answer is likely to require inhibitory control (Moriguchi, Okanda, & Itakura, 2008) 
and that Chinese children have been found to have better inhibitory control than their American 
peers (Sabbagh et al., 2006). Furthermore, they argue, Wellman's own proposal can be given a 
pragmatic twist: since collectivist societies, like Iran and China, put more emphasis on common 
knowledge than they put on diversity of opinion, children in these societies will be more likely to 
recognise that the experimenter is interested in Polly's lack of knowledge as opposed to Linda's 
diverse belief (Westra and Carruthers, 2017). 
2.5.3 Social Competence  
While the pragmatic development account seems to fare well with the evidence discussed so 
far, it does not seem to be able to explain why children who have better direct false-belief perfor-
mance should be more socially competent. This is because the ability to recognise when people are 
talking about beliefs appears to be irrelevant to many tests of social competence. Consider for 
example the study by Peskin and Ardino (2003), which found that children's performance on a 
direct false-belief test correlated with their performance on a hide-and-seek test. Children with 
better direct false-belief performance were found to be less likely to betray their location while 
playing the hider (e.g., less likely to make noise while hidden, less likely to hide while the 
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experimenter was still looking, and so on). Now, in a game where one is not supposed to speak, 
what use could the ability to navigate the pragmatics of belief talk possibly be? Or consider, as a 
second example, the study by Peterson et al. (2017), which found that three- to twelve-year-olds 
who scored higher on a battery of direct false-belief tests were more likely to produce high level 
arguments in trying to convince a puppet (e.g., Matty) to do something it was not inclined to do 
(e.g., eating broccoli). Again, what use could being able to tell when people are talking about beliefs 
be, in trying to convince Matty to eat his broccoli? 
2.5.4 Brain Maturation  
In theory, at least, it is possible that having better mentalising skills may help children recog-
nise when adults are talking about beliefs. If this assumption is correct, then the pragmatic per-
spectives account may be able to explain why children with a more mature mentalising network 
tend to have better direct false-belief performance.  
2.5.5 Other Findings 
On the pragmatic development account, language ability and executive functioning play es-
sentially the same role as on the pragmatic perspectives account (discussed in §2.4.4–5). 
2.5.6 Summary 
The pragmatic development account is the only proposal, among the one we have considered 
so far, that provides an explanation of why children follow the developmental progression revealed 
in the ToM Scale. In this respect, the pragmatic development account certainly marks an improve-
ment on the other proposals. Nonetheless, the account still cannot explain why children with better 
direct false-belief performance tend to be more socially competent. Furthermore, like all other  
Table 1. Summary of Chapter III. PP=Pragmatic Perspectives Account; PD= Pragmatic Development Account. 
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accounts considered so far, the pragmatic development account leaves some of the evidence con-
cerning executive functioning and language ability unexplained. Finally, its explanation of why these 
children tend to have a more mature mentalising network seems less plausible than that provided 
by the triple-load account (see table 1 for a visual summary). 
3. Conclusions 
In this chapter, we have considered whether early-emergentists can explain away the evidence 
that is often claimed to support late-emergence accounts. We have considered five proposals: the 
ToMM/SP account (§2.1), the expanded processing demands account (§2.2), the triple-load ac-
count (§2.3), the pragmatic perspectives account (§2.4) and the pragmatic development account 
(§2.5). I argued that, while some of these proposals fare better than others, all leave important 
pieces of evidence unaccounted for. In the next chapter, I will try to fix this problem by putting 
forward my own proposal, the processing-time account. 
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IV 
THE PROCESSING-TIME 
ACCOUNT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this chapter, I am going to put forward my own performance account, called the pro-
cessing-time account. This builds on, and incorporates, many of the ideas other early-emergentists 
have put forward and defended but combines them in a novel way. As we are about to see, this 
allows the processing-time account to explain all the evidence that, in the last chapter, was found 
to give trouble to other performance accounts. 
The processing-time account will be introduced in §1. Then, in §2, it will be argued that the 
processing-time account can explain the evidence that is typically claimed to support other perfor-
mance accounts. Finally, in §3, it will be argued that the processing-time account can also explain 
all the evidence discussed in Chapter III. 
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1. The Account 
1.1 Processing Time 
The processing-time account moves from the observation that children have a limited 
amount of time to carry out the cognitive processes required to pass a direct false-belief test. These 
processes may include (i) figuring out what the experimenter is asking, (ii) thinking about the an-
swer and (iii) planning and executing the response. The suggestion at hand is that, by and large, 
children who fail direct false-belief tests do so because they have a hard time carrying out all these 
processes in the time available. 
If this suggestion is on the right track, then mainly two factors are likely to affect children’s 
direct false-belief performance. The first relates to how long it takes them to carry out the pro-
cessing required to answer correctly. (It will be handy to have a term that refers to this variable; call 
it required processing-time, or RPT for short). The lower children’s RPT is, the more likely will they be 
to complete their processing in the time available. The second variable is how much time children 
have at their disposal to carry out their processing (call it time available for processing or TAP for short). 
In some cases, the time constraints may be imposed by the experimenter who is administering the 
test. Thus, some experimenters, underestimating the time it takes children to complete their pro-
cessing, may move on or re-prompt too soon, not leaving their participants enough time to think. 
More often, however, the time constraints will be self-imposed. Even when experimenters are will-
ing to give their participants all the time they need, many children will still rush to answer, cutting 
their processing short. Importantly, there are likely to be both individual differences and age-related 
changes in the time children are either willing or able to wait before responding. Other things being 
equal, children who wait longer before responding will have more time to complete their pro-
cessing, which will give them a better chance of answering correctly. With these two variables in 
place, the processing-time can be schematically represented with the following formulae: 
RPT > TAP → Failure 
RPT ≤ TAP → Success    
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When applied to development, the processing-time account maintains that the reason older 
children tend to have better direct false-belief performance than younger ones is that older children 
tend to have either lower RPTs, or higher TAPs, or both. 
Now, we know that three-year-olds tend to give reality-based answers in direct false-belief 
tests; thus, for example, when asked where Sally will look for the marble, they will tend to point to 
the box where the marble is, and when asked what someone who has not looked in the Smarties 
tube will think is inside it, they will tend to answer crayons. On the processing-time account, this 
is to be explained by appealing to the tendency people have to substitute demanding tasks for ones 
that are related but much easier (known as attribute-substitution). Several authors have argued that 
this is a pervasive phenomenon, potentially underlying many of the cognitive biases observed in 
reasoning and decision-making (e.g., Daniel Kahneman, 2011; D. Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; 
Shah & Oppenheimer, 2008). It is thus reasonable to assume that, when children realise that the 
task at hand requires considerable time and mental effort, they will feel the temptation to replace 
it with an easier one. What attribute children will substitute for the original one depends on how 
far they have gone with their processing, but reality-based answers, being both readily accessible 
and highly salient, are likely candidates. Suppose, for example, that a child is still trying to figure 
out what the character in the story will do when she realises it is taking too long. This task could 
be swapped with a related but easier one, namely that of figuring out where the object the character 
is looking for is. This second problem is easier because it can be solved simply by recalling what 
happened in the story, something our child would have to do anyway to solve the original task. 
Thus, the information about the current location of the object will be both readily accessible in her 
mind and highly related to the question she is trying to answer, making it the perfect candidate for 
attribute substitution. Alternatively, suppose that the child in our example is still processing the test 
question as she notices that the process is taking too long; in this case, she may be tempted to jump 
to the conclusion that, since the question contains the words “where” and “marble”, it must be 
about the location of the marble, without taking time to check whether this interpretation is con-
sistent with the overall syntactic structure of the sentence or the meaning of the other words in it. 
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1.2 Factors Affecting RTP 
1.2.1 Processing Speed 
One factor that is likely to lead to a reduction in required processing-time is the well-docu-
mented, age-related increase in children’s processing-speed. Reaction times across a variety of per-
ceptual, motor and cognitive tasks are known to decrease during childhood, up until young adult-
hood, and to start increasing again slowly thereafter, thus following a u-shaped trajectory (Cerella 
& Hale, 1994; S. Hale & Jansen, 1994; Kail, 1991; Miller & Vernon, 1997). Consider for example 
the study by Sandra Hale (1990), which used four reaction-time tasks (a choice reaction-time task, 
a letter-matching task, an abstract-matching task and a mental-rotation task.) Hale found that, while 
there were no significant differences in error rates across different age groups, in each task ten-
year-olds were slower than twelve-year-olds, who were themselves slower than fifteen-year-olds. 
This type of finding is typically taken to show that processing speed increases globally with age, 
leading to a reduction in reaction times across the board (Cerella & Hale, 1994; Kail, 1991). Based 
on this, Robert Kail and Timothy Salthouse (1994) argue that a domain-general processing speed 
parameter should be recognised as an important architectural component of the mind, comparable 
to the clock speed of the central processing unit (CPU) of a computer. Now, if the increase in 
processes speed does indeed apply to all cognitive processes across the board, then there can be 
little doubt that it will also apply to the cognitive processes recruited in direct false-belief tests. 
Since the relation between children’s processing speed and their direct false-belief perfor-
mance has not been investigated, there is no direct evidence that children with higher processing 
speed have better direct false-belief performance. Nonetheless, two sets of findings support this 
hypothesis. 
• The study by Tamsin German and Jessica Hehman (2006) investigated the relationships 
between mentalising, processing speed, working memory and inhibitory control in young 
adults (between eight-teen and twenty-six years of age) and elderly adults (between sixty-
two and and ninety years of age). German and Hehman found that processing speed 
(measured using the digit-symbol task) was highly correlated with direct false-belief per-
formance, explaining about 35% of the variance in accuracy of responses. This suggests 
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that the decrease in direct false-belief performance observed in elderly adults is due at least 
in part to their lower processing speed. 
• The increase in processing-speed observed during childhood may be a result of the matu-
rational processes affecting the brain. Indeed, many recent studies report that reaction 
times correlate with parameters like myelination, axonal growth, white matter volume, fi-
bre density and white matter integrity, all factors that are likely to affect the speed at which 
neural impulses propagate in the brain (Chopra et al., 2018; Kerchner et al., 2012; Penke 
et al., 2010; Turken et al., 2008). Now remember that Wiesmann et al. (2017) found that 
direct false-belief performance correlated with fractional anisotropy in the white matter 
around the right TPJ and other key mentalising areas (this study was discussed in Chapter 
III, §1.7). During development, increases in the fractional anisotropy of white matter are 
known to depend mainly on maturational processes of axonal growth and fibre mye-
lination, both of which are likely to enable faster propagation of electrical impulses; and 
indeed, several studies have found correlations between fractional anisotropy and reaction 
times (Borghesani et al., 2013; Burgmans et al., 2011; Karbasforoushan, Duffy, Blackford, 
& Woodward, 2015; Kerchner et al., 2012; Kochunov et al., 2010; Kochunov et al., 2016; 
Turken et al., 2008). In light of this, it is reasonable to interpret the study by Wiesmann 
and colleagues as showing that children who have higher processing speed are more likely 
to pass direct false-belief tests. 
1.2.2 Efficiency of processing 
Although processing speed is one of the main factors affecting processing time, it is not the 
only one. The time it takes one to get from A to B can be reduced either by increasing average 
speed or by taking a shorter route. Applying this analogy to the psychological domain, processing 
time can be reduced either by increasing processing speed (=the speed at which basic computa-
tional operations can be carried out), or by adopting more efficient algorithms (=algorithms that 
require a smaller number of computational steps to carry out the same task). Thus, so far as pro-
cessing time is concerned, efficiency of processing is just as important of processing speed.  
Consider, for example, the effect of practice: it has long been known that practising a task 
reduces one’s reaction times on that task (e.g., Newell & Rosenbloom, 1981). While in theory this 
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could be due to an increase in processing speed, it is more likely that practice leads to the adoption 
of more efficient computational strategies (Kail, 1991). For example, practice may lead to the au-
tomatization of the processes recruited in the task, reducing the need for executive direction and 
supervision; it may also lead to the formation of task-specific mental shortcuts and heuristics that 
reduce the amount of processing required. Either way, the processing-time account predicts that 
children who have had more opportunities to practice the processes recruited in direct false-belief 
tasks should have a better chance of passing, on account of having a shorter required processing-
time. The evidence largely corroborates this prediction. Consider, for example, the finding that 
children whose parents are more likely to talk about the mind tend to have better direct false-belief 
performance. Every time a parent discusses what someone thinks, wants or feels, she is encourag-
ing her child to follow suit, essentially engaging in a tutored exercise of mentalising. Furthermore, 
given children’s propensity for imitation, we can expect that children who are more exposed to 
mentalistic talk will be more disposed to think about the mind all around, even in the absence of 
parental prompt. Thus, more exposure to mental-state talk is likely to lead children to spend more 
time mentalising, which will in turn increase the efficiency of their mentalising processes, leading 
to a reduction in required processing-time. The processing-time account thus predicts that children 
who are more exposed to mental-state talk may have better direct false-belief performance, just like 
the evidence suggests.  
Setting practice aside, another factor that is likely to affect efficiency of processing is working 
memory capacity (i.e., the amount of information that can be held in mind at any given moment.) 
Note that the information that is held in working memory is readily available for further processing, 
while the information that is stored in long-term memory would first need to be retrieved. Thus, 
keeping information active in working memory is a way to avoid the processing costs associated 
with retrieving information from long-term memory. At the same time, working memory capacity 
is known to be extremely limited even in adults, and to develop rapidly during childhood. It is thus 
possible that young children will be unable to hold all the information they need in working 
memory, in which case some of that information will have to be either stored in long-term memory 
or discarded, to be later retrieved or re-calculated, thus leading to increased processing times. For 
example, suppose that a child realises that Sally thinks the marble is in the basket as she listens to 
the story. Then, the experimenter asks the question, “Where will Sally look for her marble?”, which 
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the child will have to process. Now, ideally, the child should be able to hold all the potentially 
relevant information in working memory: this will include where Sally put marble, where the marble 
is now, where Sally thinks the marble is, what the experimenter wants to know and so on. Let us 
suppose, however, that the child has very limited working memory capacity, and as such, to process 
the question, she is forced to either store or discard some of the information she is currently hold-
ing in working memory. Thus, for example, the information that the marble is in the box may be 
stored in long-term memory, while the information that Sally thinks the marble is in the basket may 
be discarded. Once she has figured out that the experimenter wants to know where Sally will look 
for the marble, the information that was stored will have to be retrieved and that that which was 
discarded will have to be recalculated, leading to a considerable increase in processing times. Given 
the close connection between working memory and efficiency of processing, the processing-time 
account predicts that children with better working memory capacity should have better direct false-
belief performance; and indeed, several studies corroborate this prediction (Carlson et al., 2002; 
Davis & Pratt, 1995; Duh et al., 2016; Gordon & Olson, 1998; Keenan et al., 1998). 
It is worth noting that low processing-speed can also affect children’s ability to hold infor-
mation in working memory, leading to re-calculation. This is because the contents of working 
memory tend to decay with time; thus, low processing speed increases the likelihood that, by the 
time a process has been completed, the outputs of earlier processes will have been lost (Salthouse, 
1996). To see this, consider a case similar to the one discussed above, where the child has sufficient 
working memory capacity but low processing speed. Thus, even though the child can keep the 
information about Sally’s belief in working memory as she processes the question, by the time her 
processing is complete that information may have been lost due to decay, leading to the same result: 
recalculation. This type of phenomenon may explain why measures of processing speed and work-
ing memory are highly associated (Fry & Hale, 1996; Kail, 2007). 
1.3 Factors Affecting TAP 
1.3.1 Inhibitory Control 
Let us focus, now, on the factors that are likely to affect the second main variable in the 
processing-time account, namely the time available for processing (TAP). On the assumption that 
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the experimenters leave children sufficient time to think (an assumption that may not always be 
satisfied) any time constraints in the test will be self-imposed. In particular, children who are more 
impulsive (=who possess less inhibitory control) are likely to respond more quickly. This is because 
we are operating under the assumption that if a solution to the problem children are considering 
(e.g. what does Sally think? What does the experimenter want to know?) does not immediately 
come to mind, they will be tempted to substitute the current task with an easier one. Resisting this 
temptation and delaying the response will thus require inhibitory control. Thus, children with poor 
inhibitory control may immediately give in and go with whatever response is considered first, while 
children with good inhibitory control may be able to wait until a better response is entertained. 
Furthermore, since inhibitory control develops rapidly during the preschool years, we can expect 
older children to be better able to resist than younger children, which may then result in them 
having better direct false-belief performance. The evidence supports this prediction: as discussed 
in Chapter III, §1.2, children with better inhibitory control tend to score higher on direct false-
belief tests (Carlson et al., 2015; Carlson, Mandell, & Williams, 2004; Carlson & Moses, 2001; 
Carlson et al., 2002; Carlson, Moses, & Claxton, 2004; Sabbagh et al., 2006). 
1.3.2 Motivational factors 
While inhibitory control is certainly an important factor in determining how long children 
wait before responding, it is not the only one. How motivated children are to answer correctly is 
likely to be another important factor. Some children, for example, may have the ability to delay 
their response but lack sufficient motivation to do so. After all, from the child’s point of view, not 
much hangs on answering correctly (there is no promised reward.) Notably, to the best of my 
knowledge, no study has investigated whether introducing a reward for correct answers (e.g. a piece 
of candy or a sticker) could lead to improvements in children’s direct false-belief performance. 
Thus, at the moment, this prediction of the processing-time account is largely untested. 
2. Evidence for Performance Accounts 
Several studies show that relatively simple changes to the procedure in direct false-belief tests 
can significantly improve young children’s performance. These findings provide crucial evidence 
in support of performance accounts. In this section, I discuss the main findings and argue that the 
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processing-time account can explain how each of these task manipulations helps young children 
pass direct false-belief tests. This will also allow us to further flesh out the processing-time account.  
2.1 Executive Functioning 
Processing-load accounts maintain that direct false-belief tests place a heavier load on exec-
utive functioning compared to indirect false-belief tests, a load that young children cannot sustain, 
and which thus causes them to fail. The processing-time account agrees that poor executive skill is 
part of the reason young children fail. Thus, on both types of account, task manipulations that 
reduce the load on executive functioning should improve children’s chances of passing a direct 
false-belief test. A few studies suggest that this is indeed the case; these include the undisclosed-
location tasks, the Duplo task, and false-beliefs tasks using temporal marking. The latter will be 
discussed in section §2.3, while the first two will be discussed presently. 
2.1.1 The Undisclosed-Location Task  
The undisclosed-location task is a variation of the unexpected-transfer task, where the target 
object is either taken to an undisclosed location, or disappears, or was never present to begin with. 
Thus, for example, Anne might take the marble away with her instead of moving it from the basket 
to the box. Alternatively, children may be shown that both the box and the basket are empty but 
told that Sally thinks her marble is in the basket. Three-year-olds have been shown to perform 
better on direct undisclosed-location tasks compared to standard unexpected-transfer tasks 
(Bartsch, 1996; Kikuno, Mitchell, & Ziegler, 2007; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001; Wimmer & 
Perner, 1983). Karen Bartsch (1996), for example, reports that the three-year-olds in her study, 
who were below chance on a typical unexpected-transfer task, were at-chance on a undisclosed-
location task, with the difference between the two conditions being significant.  
On processing-load accounts, the fact that the object is in neither of the two locations should 
either reduce or eliminate the load on inhibitory control: even if the child wanted to ascribe to Sally 
a true belief about the location of the marble, she could not do that since she herself does not know 
where the marble is. Thus, in undisclosed-location tasks, the strength of the true-belief bias should 
be significantly reduced, making it considerably easier to override, and allowing a higher portion of 
three-year-olds to pass.  
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The processing-time account suggests a different interpretation, which is also consistent with 
the data. Remember that on the processing-time account, inhibitory control is required to delay the 
response and resist the temptation to substitute an easier task for the current one (as explained in 
§1.4). Now, in typical unexpected-transfer tasks, one likely candidate for substitution is that of 
figuring out where the object the agent is looking for is. In undisclosed-location tasks, however, 
pointing to where the marble is, is harder than pointing to where Sally will look, since children do 
not know where the marble is. Other possible substitute tasks, like pointing to where Sally should 
look or to where she will end up looking, are also ruled out, for the same reason. Since all the main 
candidates for substitution are removed, either of two things may happen, both of which may result 
in improved performance. (1) The first possibility is that since there are no easy tasks that could be 
substituted for the present one, children are less tempted to substitute, and can do a better job at 
delaying their response, resulting in improved performance. (2) The second possibility is that chil-
dren will still be tempted to respond, this time simply pointing at random. Thus, while in the stand-
ard unexpected-transfer task, a child with poor inhibitory control will point to where the marble is 
(the box), in the undisclosed-location task she will point at random, resulting in an overall improve-
ment in performance.  
2.1.2 The Duplo Task 
 Paula Rubio-Fernández and Bart Geurts (2013, 2016) argue that the reason three-year-olds 
children fail direct false-belief tests is that these tests tend to contain elements that are likely to 
draw children’s attention away from the target agent, thus disrupting their perspective-taking pro-
cess. The authors suggest that two features are likely to be particularly disruptive. First, the target 
agent typically disappears at some point during the task. Second, either the test question or the 
narration that immediately precedes it (or both) mention the object, which may direct children’s 
attention onto the object and away from the character. To test their hypothesis, Rubio-Fernández 
and Geurts (2013) carried out a modified unexpected-transfer task (which they call the Duplo Task) 
with two important task manipulations: (1) the target agent (“Lola”), instead of disappearing during 
the change of location, remained in sight, although at some distance from, and giving her back to,  
the location of the object (“bananas”); (2) an open-ended question was used, which did not mention 
the object (e.g., “What is Lola going to do now?”). The three-year-olds in this study passed when 
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both task manipulations where in place but failed when only one of the two was implemented. In 
a follow-up study, Rubio-Fernández and Geurts (2016) show that even with both task manipula-
tions in place, three-and-a-half-year-olds can still fail if, right before the test question, the experi-
menter either asks a control question mentioning the object (“Where are the bananas now?”) or 
states the protagonist’s desire for the object (“Now Lola is very hungry and wants a banana”). 
The processing-time account is in line with Rubio-Fernández and Geurts’ own proposal, 
although (arguably) it provides more details concerning the mechanisms that disrupt children’s 
perspective taking. Now, remember that we are working under the assumption that children will 
be tempted to swap the task at hand with an easier one. It seems reasonable to assume that increas-
ing the saliency of a potential candidate for substitution will make the temptation to substitute 
correspondingly stronger. This is likely to be why Rubio-Fernández and Geurts found that men-
tioning the object had a detrimental effect, since, as they themselves suggest, mentioning the object 
is likely to draw children’s attention to its location. Thus, as children interpret the question, they 
will be more tempted to cut their processing short, jumping to the conclusion that the experimenter 
wants to know where the bananas are; as they predict where Lola will go, they will be more tempted 
to conclude that she will reach for the bananas at their current location; and, finally, as children 
select their response, they will be more tempted to point to the bananas. This means, notice, that 
children will have to endure the temptation to substitute three times in short succession and giving 
in just once is sufficient to ensure failure. In contrast, if the bananas are not mentioned, the temp-
tation to substitute may not arise until later in their processing (for example, it may only arise when 
they recall the events in the story as they try to predict what Lola will do.) 
What about the second task manipulation? Whether Lola stays in sight or disappears is likely 
to affect children’s ability to hold in mind the information that relates to her. Since three-year-olds 
tend to have very limited working memory capacity, the information concerning what Lola believes 
may be deleted after she leaves the scene; after all, children do not know that she is coming back, 
which means that, from their point of view, what Lola believes is not so important after all. In 
other words, the information about what Lola thinks may be assigned “low priority,” making it a 
likely candidate for elimination in case working memory were close to full. Another (potentially 
complementary) mechanism at play may be that of refreshing. Many models of working memory 
assume that, to prevent the contents of working memory from decaying, one must refresh them 
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every few seconds by briefly focusing one’s attention on them (e.g., Baddeley, 1986; Barrouillet, 
Bernandin, & Camos, 2004). It is possible that, by staying in sight, Lola caught children’s attention 
more, thus leading them to refresh the information about her beliefs, preventing it from decaying. 
Either way, if the information about Lola’s belief is lost, children will then have to recalculate it 
after they process the question which may well bring their processing time above threshold.  
It is worth noting that whether the target agent remains in sight throughout the test should 
be irrelevant from the point of view of pragmatic accounts, for this is unlikely to affect how chil-
dren interpret the test question. Thus, the fact that the processing-time account can explain why 
this task manipulation helps provides one reason to prefer it to pragmatic alternatives (more rea-
sons will be given below). 
2.2 Response-Generation Processes 
On the EPD account, the demands imposed by response-generation processes play an im-
portant role in explaining why young children have trouble passing direct false-belief tests. Re-
sponse-generation processes, remember, are supposed to be those involved in “interpret[ing] the 
question, hold[ing] it in mind, and generat[ing] a response” (Setoh et al., 2016). These processes 
play an important role on the processing-time account too, although they do so because they in-
crease processing time and not because of the processing demands they impose. As a result, the 
processing-time account is consistent with the evidence supporting the EPD account, including 
the study by Setoh et al. (2016). This is worth of notice given that Setoh and colleagues have ob-
tained success on a direct false-belief test with remarkably young children, providing some of the 
best evidence for performance accounts to date. Let us take a look at their study. 
2.2.1 The Emma Task 
To test their account, Setoh and colleagues (2016) carried out an undisclosed-location task 
which included response-generation practice trials. The guiding hypothesis was that the two prac-
tice trials, allowing children to practice their response-generation processes, might reduce the load 
imposed by these processes during the test phase. The story was narrated with the help of a large 
picture book depicting key events and objects in the story. The story begins with a girl (Emma) 
who finds an apple in one of two containers (a bowl and a yellow box.) Next, children were shown 
  
113 
 
pictures of an apple and a banana side by side, and asked, “where is the apple?” (this was the first 
practice trial.) Then, the story reprised: Emma puts her apple in the box and goes out to play with 
the ball. Children were then shown two pictures side by side, one of a Frisbee and one of a ball, 
and asked, “where is the ball?” Finally, children were told the last part of the story: while Emma is 
out playing, her brother Ethan finds the apple and takes it away. Emma comes in looking for her 
apple; where will Emma look for her apple?” Setoh and colleagues found that a group of two-year-
olds (mean age two years and eight months) were above-chance on this task.  
Can the processing-time account explain Setoh and colleagues’ remarkable finding? Yes. Al-
lowing children to practice their response-generation processes is just as likely to reduce the time 
it takes children to carry out these processes as it is likely to reduce the processing demands they 
impose. In fact, the two effects are likely to be related; for example, practising a task is sometimes 
argued to result in automatisation, and automatic processes are both faster and less cognitively 
demanding.  
Again, it is worth noticing that this finding is not easily explained on pragmatic accounts. If 
the reason young children fail is that they think adults are unlikely to talk about beliefs, it is unclear 
why the practice trials should help them, given that they consisted in pointing at objects. Similarly, 
if the reason young children fail is that they cannot take a second-person perspective on the exper-
imenter while taking a third-person perspective on the target agent, it is again unclear why the 
practice trials should help. Thus, the fact that the processing-time account can explain this finding 
provides further reason to prefer it to pragmatic accounts. 
2.3 Pragmatic Interpretation 
Pragmatic accounts maintain that children have difficulties interpreting the test question, 
difficulties that concern, specifically, the pragmatics of the question rather than its semantics or 
syntax. As a result, children misunderstand what the experimenter wants to know. Now, on the 
processing-time account, pragmatic interpretation contributes to creating children’s difficulties by 
increasing the overall processing time. Furthermore, being under time pressure, children may be 
tempted to cut their processing short, which in some cases may result in a misinterpretation of the 
question. Still, on the processing-time account, pragmatic interpretation is only part of the problem; 
in fact, in contrast with pragmatic accounts, the processing-time account is consistent with children 
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being perfectly able to interpret the question when not under time pressure. Still, as we are about 
to see, the processing-time account is similar enough to pragmatic accounts to explain the evidence 
that is often adduced in their support.  
2.3.1 Temporally-marked tasks  
Michael Siegal and Karen Beattie (1991) defend an early pragmatic account of false-belief 
failure. On their account, the reason most three-year-olds point to the actual location of the toy is 
that they think the experimenter wants to know where the character will have to look to find the 
object, as opposed to where she will look first; and, of course, where she will have to look is where 
the object actually is. To test this hypothesis, the authors carried out an explicit false-belief task 
adding a condition with a modified question, which included the temporal marker “first” (as in: 
“where will Sally look first for her marble?”). They found that the modified question was sufficient 
to bring the three-year-olds in their study from significantly below-chance to significantly above-
chance. In a second experiment, they also included two control conditions, namely a true-belief 
condition with the standard question and one with the modified question. This was to rule-out the 
possibility that, upon hearing the words “first” and “marble”, children simply pointed to the first 
location of the marble, regardless of what the character believed. Just as predicted by their prag-
matic account, Siegal and Beattie found that, in the true-belief condition, the modified question 
had no significant impact on children’s performance. 
A similar result was obtained by Charlie Lewis and Amanda Osborne (1990) with an unex-
pected-content task. Lewis and Osborne included both a standard condition with the typical ques-
tion and a condition with a modified question that included the temporal marker “before” (“What 
will … think is in the box before I take the top off?”). In the standard conditions three-year-olds 
were below chance, whereas in the “before” condition they were above chance.  
The processing-time account has an easy explanation for these results: the temporal markers, 
by making what the experimenter wants to know more explicit, are likely to significantly cut down 
the time it takes children to process the question. In other words, temporal markers contribute to 
ruling out some possible interpretations of the question. For example, the temporal marker “first” 
implies a contrast between the location where the character will look first and the location where 
she will end up looking or will have to look; thus, these otherwise plausible interpretations are ruled 
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out. Since children have a smaller number of interpretations to consider, they should be able to 
complete their processing in a smaller amount of time. In addition, the absence of likely candidates 
for substitution may reduce the temptation to cut their processing short.  
2.3.2 The Elmo Task  
Mikkel Hansen (2010) argues that children are likely to interpret the question “where does 
Sally think the marble is?” as concerning the location of the marble rather than Sally’s belief about 
it, thus assuming that “think” is being used indirectly. To test this hypothesis, Hanses carried out 
three false-belief tasks with three-year-olds, each of which included both a standard condition with 
a typical “think” question (e.g., “where does Elmo think the marble is?”) and an emphasized-con-
text condition with modified question aimed at discouraging the parenthetical reading (e.g. “You 
and I know that the ball is in the red cup, where does Elmo think it is?”). On all the tasks, children 
performance was significantly better in the emphasized-context condition compared to the stand-
ard condition, although only in two tasks out of three was performance on the emphasized-context 
condition above-chance. 
The emphasized-context question is likely to help for the same reason temporally-marked 
questions help: it rules out potential (but incorrect) interpretations of the question, making the 
process of pragmatic processing easier, and thus allowing children to more quickly settle on the 
correct interpretation.  
2.3.3 Deceptive false-belief tasks  
A few studies have found that actively involving three-year-olds in the manipulation that 
leads to the target agent holding a false belief significantly improves their performance. Kate Sulli-
van and Ellen Winner (1993) for example, carried out an unexpected-contents task with an added 
“trick” condition where the child helped a confederate replace the contents of a box, so as to 
deceive a second confederate. The authors found that three-year-olds were below-chance in the 
standard condition, but above-chance in the trick condition. 
Helming et al. (2016) argue that the fact that the experimenter encourages children to trick 
the target agent helps by making a normative interpretation of the question (what should … think 
is inside the box?) less likely. This interpretation is consistent with the processing-time account, 
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since having one less interpretation to consider will reduce the time it takes children to process the 
question. There is also another possible explanation, however. Since in the trick condition the child 
has the goal of leading the agent to believe that the tube contains Smarties, that this is what the 
agent is likely to believe will be a most salient piece of information, one that will be assigned the 
highest priority (or that will be more frequently refreshed) and will thus be unlikely to be deleted 
were working memory to get full (or to decay due to lack of refreshing). In the standard condition, 
instead, children could not calculate the target agent’s belief until after the experimenter asked the 
question, since the target agent was not present and had not been mentioned before. Thus, the 
difference between the two conditions may be due to the fact that in the trick condition, children 
are very likely to have carried out an important part of the processing before the test phase, leading 
to a significant reduction of processing time.   
2.4 Summary 
To sum up the discussion in this section, the fact that processing-time account acknowledges 
the importance of executive functioning, pragmatic-interpretation and response-generation pro-
cesses in determining whether children pass or fail a direct false-belief tasks allows it to explain all 
the main findings supporting performance accounts. Notably, we have seen that this is not true of 
other performance accounts, including most notably pragmatic accounts. I will now argue that the 
processing-time can also explain all the evidence for late-emergence accounts discussed in Chapter 
III.  
3. Explaining Away Evidence for Late-Emergence 
Accounts 
3.1 Brain Maturation 
Among the performance accounts we discussed in Chapter III, Carruthers’ (2013) triple-load 
account was the one that, arguably, had the best explanation for why children who perform better 
on direct false-belief tests should have a more mature mentalising network. The explanation in 
question relied on the hypothesis that a more mature mentalising network would be able to operate 
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more efficiently, consuming fewer executive resources, thus resulting in children having to sustain 
a smaller processing load. It is worth noting that this explanation is consistent with the processing-
load account, since processes that are more efficient tend to be faster as well (think of how your 
laptop or smartphone is slower to respond when rapid access memory is running low.) 
While the processing-time account is consistent with this type of explanation, it can also 
provide one that is arguably better supported by the evidence. As mentioned in §1.2.1, Wiesmann 
and colleagues found that children’s direct false-belief performance correlated with the degree of 
fractional anisotropy in the white matter surrounding several of their mentalising areas; and many 
studies have found fractional anisotropy to correlate with processing speed. This also makes sense 
on theoretical grounds, since (as Wiesmann and colleagues themselves note) increases in fractional 
anisotropy during childhood may reflect processes of myelination and axonal growth, both of 
which can be expected to lead to faster propagation of neural impulses. In turn, faster propagation 
of neural impulses may lead to the neurons in a region firing in a more synchronous manner, re-
sulting in higher regional current density, which would explain the finding by Sabbagh and col-
leagues as well. In brief: there is both solid evidence and theoretical grounds to expect that higher 
levels of fractional anisotropy in the white matter surrounding the mentalising areas should corre-
spond to faster mentalising processes. In contrast, I know of no evidence suggesting that an in-
crease in fractional anisotropy may reflect an increase in efficiency. This means that the triple-load 
account is forced to rely on a very speculative hypothesis, while the explanation provided by the 
processing-time account has good evidence in its support. Overall, then, the processing-time ac-
count comes out on top so far as brain maturation is concerned. 
3.2 Executive Functioning  
Like processing-load accounts, the processing-time account predicts that children with better 
executive functioning will have a better chance of passing direct false-belief. This, for mainly two 
reasons: first, having better working memory may decrease processing time by increasing pro-
cessing efficiency (as argued in §1.2.2); second, having better inhibitory control may increase time 
available for processing by allowing children to delay their response for longer (as argued in §1.3.1). 
The fact that both working memory and inhibitory control have been found to correlate with direct 
false-belief performance is thus just as the processing-time predicts.  
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As I have argued in §2.1, the processing-time account is close enough to processing-load 
accounts that it can explain the evidence typically adduced in favour of the latter. On the other 
hand, the two types of account are not the same, and the differences between the two are important 
because they allow the processing-time account to explain evidence that processing-load accounts 
cannot explain.  
3.3.1 Executive functioning is not the only factor at play 
 The processing-time account differs from both the ToMM/SP and the EPD accounts in 
that it maintains that executive functioning is only one of the factors determining whether young 
children pass or fail a direct false-belief test. Remember, for example, that the time available for 
processing is determined by the interaction of inhibitory control with motivation. Having more 
inhibitory control will make children better able to delay their response; however, a child that is 
able to wait may still not wait if she is not sufficiently motivated to do so. Thus, individual differ-
ences in motivation may well reduce the correlation between inhibitory control and direct false-
belief performance. Similarly, having more working memory capacity will allow children to keep 
the information about the character’s belief in working memory while processing the question; 
however, that information may still be lost due to decay if children, having low processing speed, 
take too long to process the question. Thus, individual differences in processing speed may well 
reduce the association between working memory and direct false-belief performance. Accordingly, 
while the ToMM/SP and EPD accounts predict that executive functioning and direct false-belief 
performance should be strongly associated, the processing-time account is consistent with there 
being only a weak association, and thus with the results of the meta-analysis by Devine and Hughes 
(2014).  
The fact that, on the processing-time account, executive functioning is only one of the factors 
at play also allows it to account for the results of the study by Sabbagh et al. (2006), who found 
that Chinese children, despite performing better than American children on tests of inhibitory con-
trol, did not perform better on direct false-belief tests. As mentioned in Chapter III, §1.2, the 
authors take this finding to support an emergence account of the association, where the two vari-
ables correlate because inhibitory control facilitates learning that beliefs can be false which in turn 
results in better direct false-belief performance. Since, Sabbagh and colleagues suggest, Chinese 
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children do not have siblings, they have less opportunities to learn about the mind, which will then 
balance out the beneficial effect of having better inhibitory control. Notice, however, that the find-
ing is also consistent with the processing-time account, since on this account, as well, inhibitory 
control is not the only factor at play, and may thus be balanced out by other factors. In particular, 
given that the processing-time account is consistent with exposure to mental-state talk having a 
beneficial effect on direct false-belief performance (as argued in §1.3), it is consistent with Sabbagh 
and colleagues’ suggestion that between-group differences in exposure to mental-state talk are what 
cancels out between-group differences in inhibitory control. 
 The interaction between the effect of executive functioning and that of practice on pro-
cessing time may also explain the study by Benson et al. (2013), showing that children’s perfor-
mance on executive functioning tests predicted the extent to which their direct false-belief perfor-
mance would improve after training. Children with better inhibitory control, being able to delay 
their response for longer, will have a higher TAP; consequently, on average, they will require a 
smaller reduction in their RPT to go below threshold. Thus, it is possible that while both groups 
experienced a similar reduction in RPT due to the practice effect of training, only in children with 
good inhibitory control was this reduction sufficient to bring RPT below threshold. 
3.3.2 There is No Specific Prepotent Response that Requires Inhibition 
Another important difference between the processing-time account and processing-load ac-
counts is that the former predicts that inhibitory control should be recruited even in the absence 
of a specific prepotent response that must be inhibited. This is because, on the processing-time 
account, what must be inhibited is not just the temptation to provide a specific response but the 
temptation to provide a response (any response) within a few seconds. Making an incorrect re-
sponse less salient will not be sufficient to remove children’s temptation to answer quickly, since 
children may still point randomly; this, I have argued in § 2.1.1, may be what happens in undis-
closed-location tasks, where children do not know where the object is. At the same time, the pres-
ence of a very salient and “easy” response may well increase the temptation to answer quickly: this, 
I have argued in §2.1.2, is why mentioning the object in the test question has a detrimental effect 
on children’s performance. Now, this difference between the processing-time account and pro-
cessing-load accounts may appear subtle, but it does result in different predictions. Most notably, 
  
120 
 
differently from processing-load accounts, the processing time accounts predicts that children’s 
performance on tasks where no specific prepotent response is available should still correlate with 
their inhibitory control. As it happens, this prediction holds up. 
Consider, for example, false-belief explanation tasks, where children are asked to explain the 
behaviour of an agent with a false belief; for example, children may be asked why Sally went to 
look for the marble in the basket instead of the box, where the marble really was. It is not clear 
what the prepotent response would be in this task, and indeed, children tend to provide a wide 
range of responses: some mention what the character thinks (“she thinks it’s there”), some mention 
what she wants (“she wants it”), some mention previous events (“she put it there”) some mention 
current facts (“because the marble is there”) some profess ignorance (“I don’t know”), with no 
explanation type being predominant. Nonetheless, Josef Perner, Birgit Lang and Daniela Kloo 
(2002) found that children did not perform better on this type of task compared to a standard, 
“prediction” false-belief belief task. In addition, children’s performance on both tasks was found 
to correlate, to a similar extent, with performance on an executive functioning task. In addition, 
the study by Powell and Carey (2017) (discussed in Chapter III, 1.2) found that if children were 
given a task aimed at depleting their inhibitory control immediately before either a prediction or an 
explanation false belief task, their performance on both false-belief tasks was negatively affected, 
thus showing that both recruited inhibitory control. The processing-time account is consistent with 
this result, since even in explanation tasks children will be tempted to answer quickly instead of 
waiting to complete their processing, thus mentioning any fact that comes to mind or simply pro-
fessing ignorance.  
This feature allows the processing-time account to account for another finding that is prob-
lematic for processing-load accounts. Carlson et al. (2015) found that the think-know and source-
of-knowledge tasks, which, they argue, do not make demands on inhibitory control, correlated with 
a test of inhibitory control as strongly as a direct false-belief task. Notably, the claim that the think-
know and source-of-knowledge tasks do not make demands on inhibitory control is based on the 
consideration that young children, instead of being consistently incorrect, are at-chance on these 
tests. While this does show that there was no specific prepotent response, however, it does not 
show that children were not tempted to answer prematurely. If children are tempted to respond 
quickly, they will do so even if they are not biased towards a specific answer; they might answer at 
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random or profess ignorance (“I don’t know”). On the processing-time account, there is thus no 
reason to expect that children’s performance on these tests should not correlate with inhibitory 
control. That the processing-time can explain this type of result is especially notable since, as argued 
in Chapter III, no other performance account can explain it. 
3.2.3 Summary 
In conclusion, the processing-time can explain all the evidence on the relationship between 
executive functioning and direct false-belief performance that was discussed in the last chapter; this 
sets the processing-time account apart from the all the other performance account considered in 
Chapter III. 
3.3 Language Ability 
The processing-time account gives us a few options in explaining the relationship between 
language ability and direct false-belief performance. These options are detailed below.  
3.3.1 Better Language Ability Leads to Faster Processing of Linguistic Stimuli  
Children with better language abilities should be faster at processing the linguistic stimuli in 
direct false-belief tests, including both the narrative elements, where present, and the question (or 
questions). Other things being equal, children with more language ability will have a better chance 
of completing their computations in the time available. Notice that this is true even though, as 
argued in Chapter III, §2.1.3, most children above the age of three are likely to possess sufficient 
language proficiency to correctly decode the literal meaning of the linguistic stimuli present in direct 
false-belief tests. In contrast with all other performance accounts, then, the processing-time ac-
count is consistent with evidence showing that two-year-olds pass verbal indirect false-belief tasks 
(Scott et al., 2012) and that language ability and direct false-belief performance continue to correlate 
at least up to the age of seven (Milligan et al., 2007).  
3.3.2 Language Ability Mediates the Effect of Experiential Factors 
Children’s language abilities may also affect the extent to which they benefit from exposure 
to mental-state talk. On the processing-time account, participating in conversations about the mind 
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with their parents helps to the extent that it encourages children to more frequently engage in 
mentalising; however, patently, this is only true so long as children understand what their parents 
are saying. Notice that this type of explanation is compatible with the finding that language corre-
lates to similar extents with false-belief tasks that have different language demands (Milligan et al., 
2007).  
3.3.3 Language Ability Facilitates Mentalising 
Another possibility is that natural language provides children with a medium for representing 
mental states, as Jill and Peter de Villiers suggest (J. G. de Villiers, 2005; J. G. de Villiers & Pyers, 
2002; P. A. de Villiers, 2005; P. A. de Villiers & de Villiers, 2012). Of course, from an early-emer-
gence perspective, we cannot agree with the contention that natural language is necessary for repre-
senting mental states; after all, we are committed to the claim that largely non-verbal infants can 
already ascribe false beliefs. Notice, however, that just because natural language is not necessary for 
representing mental states does not entail that it is never used to represent mental states. All we 
need to get this type of explanation going is the claim that a sizable portion of children will think 
in language when prompted linguistically. In other words, the hypothesis under consideration is 
that, when asked where Sally will look for her marble, a sizable portion of children will engage in 
inner speech, using natural language to reason about what Sally thinks (“uh-oh…where does Sally 
think the marble is? Well, she put it in that box…uhm..she wasn’t there while the other one moved 
it…does she still think it’s there?”). Children’s language ability will of course facilitate these epi-
sodes of inner speech, affecting the ease and speed at which they unfold. Thus, children with better 
language ability can be expected to have a lower RPT, and thus a better chance of passing the test.  
In addition, language may also be instrumental for holding information about mental states 
in working memory. Carruthers (2014), for example, argues that purely amodal, non-sensory rep-
resentations cannot be held in working memory, since working memory relies on the sensory cir-
cuitry in the brain. To illustrate, keeping a phone number in mind seems to always rely on some 
type of imagery, like imagining seeing the corresponding digits, or imagining hearing the corre-
sponding numerals, and so on. If this hypothesis is correct, then language may provide the neces-
sary medium in which information about other people’s beliefs can be held in working memory. 
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Thus, it is possible that children’s language abilities also mediate their ability to hold in mind infor-
mation about mental states. 
Notice that both these hypotheses are consistent both with the finding that language training 
improves direct false-belief performance (C. Hale & Tager-Flusberg, 2003; Lohmann & Tomasello, 
2003) and that language correlates to the same extent with direct false-belief tasks with varying 
language demands (Milligan et al., 2007). This is worth mentioning given that, to the best of my 
knowledge, no other performance account can explain this evidence.  
3.3.4 Summary 
The processing-time account is the only performance account that can explain all the evi-
dence on the relationship between language ability and direct false-belief performance that was 
discussed in Chapter III. This provides reason to prefer it to the alternatives. 
3.4 Social Competence 
The processing-time account maintains that those children who are quicker at interpreting 
linguistic stimuli, predicting or explaining behaviour, and planning and executing their response, 
and/or those children who are both better able and more motivated to delay their response, should 
have a better chance of passing direct false-belief tests. These same children should also have a 
better chance of passing many tests of social competence, and for similar reasons. Many of tests of 
social competence are likely to recruit similar processes: language comprehension and production, 
pragmatic interpretation, executive functioning and mentalising. Furthermore, tests of social com-
petence often put children under time pressure. Consequently, it makes sense that children who 
are above threshold in direct false-belief tests should also tend to be above thresh-old in tests of 
social competence. To bring this point home, let us consider two examples. 
3.4.1 The Peer-Persuasion task 
Consider now the peer-persuasion task used by Peterson et al. (2017). The task involved 
convincing a puppet (“Matty”) to do something he was not inclined to do, like brushing his teeth 
or eating broccoli. Children received one point for each “high-level” argument they used, which 
the authors define as arguments that “had to supply new substantive information aimed at shifting 
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Matty’s initial mental state of resistance”. In contrast, “[e]mpty, unelaborated denials, queries, com-
mands, and requests that included no new substantive information” (2017, p. 5) would not award 
them any points. Now, just as in a direct false-belief test, children are likely to feel the clock ticking. 
Furthermore, depending on how fast their mentalising is, coming up with a convincing argument 
may take several seconds and a good deal of effort. In addition, low-level alternatives (like respond-
ing with “It’s not yucky!” when Matty says “It’s yucky!”) will be readily available and the temptation 
to use them will be difficult to resist. Finally, children will also have to process what Matty says and 
produce their own utterances. Thus, in terms of processing, the test has a very similar structure to 
direct false-belief tests; it only makes sense, then, that the two should correlate. 
3.4.2 Playing hide and seek and keeping a secret 
Peskin and Ardino (2003) tested children on a playing-hide-and-seek test and on a keeping-
a-secret test. In the hide-and-seek test simply consisted in playing two rounds of hide and seek (one 
as the hider and one as the seeker) with the experimenter; children were scored as failing if they 
made any of the following mistakes: “When hiding, if the child told E where he or she was going 
to hide; did not attempt to hide from view; hid before E’s vision was blocked; or did not remain 
physically hidden and quiet. When playing the role of the seeker, if the child told E where to hide; 
or if the child did not turn around and/or cover his or her eyes; or if the child peeked” (2003, p. 
500). In contrast, the keeping-a-secret test consisted in refraining from telling a hungry confederate 
that there was a cake in the fridge; children were told that the cake was a surprise for the confed-
erate’s birthday. 
Now notice that, with respect to both tests, how fast children can predict the effect of their 
actions on the other people’s mental states seems to be a critical variable. Consider the hide-and-
seek task. A child may be able to figure out that, if the experimenter hears her giggle, she will be 
able to tell where she is hidden; however, to be of any use, this thought will have to occur to her 
before she starts giggling. Whether this is the case will, of course, depend on how fast the child can 
mentalise. Consider now the keeping-a-secret task. Suppose the child hears the confederate com-
plaining that she is hungry. Given that children are typically very eager to help other people, the 
child might ask herself if there is any food available. The thought that there is cake in the fridge 
will of course occur to her, at which point the child will be tempted to inform the confederate and, 
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unless a good reason against doing this comes to her mind, she will initiate the response. Thus, the 
crucial variable is whether the realisation that telling the confederate about the cake will ultimately 
make her unhappy will come quick enough to inhibit the response. 
3.4.3 Summary 
The processing-time account offers an intuitive explanation of why children’s performance 
on tests of social competence tests correlate with their performance on direct false-belief tests. 
Notably, among the performance accounts we have considered, the processing-time account is the 
only one that can explain this finding. 
3.5 Developmental Progression 
In explaining the developmental progression revealed by the ToM Scale, the processing-time 
account provides a couple of options, which are detailed below.  
3.5.1 The “Pragmatics” Option 
 The explanation of the developmental progression put forward by Westra and Carruthers 
(2017) (discussed in §2.5.2) is largely consistent with the processing-time account. For the diverse 
belief task, Westra and Carruthers’ suggestion is that young children, being accustomed to indirect 
uses of “think”, may take “Linda thinks the cat is in the bushes” (say) to imply “the cat is in the 
bushes”. As they infer that the experimenter is implying that the cat is in the bushes, many children 
will revise their original belief (e.g. that the cat was in the garage), eliminating the disagreement 
between them and Linda; in which case, even if they fall prey to a referential or cooperative mis-
understanding of the test question, they will still provide the correct answer (the bushes). The only 
way for children to fail, then, would be if they persevere in their belief that the cat is in the garage. 
This is what, according to Westra and Carruthers makes the diverse-belief test harder than the 
diverse-desire test but easier than the explicit false-belief test. There is nothing here that conflicts 
with the processing-time account. The processing-time account maintains, remember, that young 
children tend to fail direct false-belief tasks because they give in to the temptation to answer before 
they have completed their processing. Notice, however, that if children think that the cat is in the 
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bushes then there is no reason for them to answer that Linda will look in the garage, regardless of 
whether they give in to attribute-substitution or not.  
As for the knowledge-access test, Westra and Carruthers present two complementary expla-
nations. The first is that the knowledge-access task is easier than the explicit false-belief task be-
cause in this case there are only two salient candidate interpretations (correct and referential) in-
stead of three (correct, referential and cooperative). At the same time, the knowledge-access task 
is harder than the diverse-belief task because the referential interpretation, if taken, will lead chil-
dren to the wrong response. This is compatible with the processing-time account: in our case, the 
fact that there are fewer salient candidate interpretations is important because it means that children 
will need less time to decide which interpretation is correct and will be less tempted to substitute 
an easier task. The second explanation is that the test question in the knowledge-access task is of 
the “yes-no” type, which young children are biased to answer positively. Thus, children must resist 
this bias to answer correctly. This fits nicely with the processing-time account: children must resist 
the temptation to answer “yes” in order to delay their response and complete the processing re-
quired to answer correctly. Thus, the processing-time account is also consistent with Westra and 
Carruthers (2017) suggestion that the reason Chinese children pass the knowledge access test be-
fore the diverse-belief test is that Chinese children have better inhibitory control. 
3.5.2 The “Practice” Option 
 The processing-time account has also the option of staying closer to Wellman and col-
leagues’ (2011) own account of this finding. Wellman and colleagues argue that parents in collective 
societies like China and Iran are more likely to emphasise the importance of knowledge, while 
Western parents are more likely to stress diversity of opinion and belief, thus leading children to 
follow slightly different progressions as they build their theories of mind. On the processing-time 
account, these cultural differences may affect children by leading them to rehearse certain types of 
mentalising tasks more than others. If their parents are more likely to comment on what other 
people know or do not know, children will get more practice at ascribing states of knowledge or 
lack thereof, and will thus get quicker at doing this, either through automatisation or by forming 
mental shortcuts or schemata. If, on the other hand, their parents are more likely to comment on 
differences of opinion, contrasting discordant beliefs, children will get more practice at ascribing 
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diverse belief and will thus become able to do this faster. Either way, if given time, children would 
be perfectly able to ascribe all these mental states (knowledge, ignorance, false beliefs); the claim is 
simply that they will be quicker at ascribing certain states compared to others depending on what 
they get to practice more.  
3.5.3 Summary 
In conclusion, not only the processing-time is largely compatible with the explanation pro-
vided by the pragmatic development account; it can also provide its own explanation. This is no-
table given that the pragmatic development account is the only other performance account that 
can explain this finding. 
3.6 Experiential factors 
 As explained in §1.2.2, having a parent that is more likely to talk about mental states is likely 
to improve children’s direct false-belief performance by giving them more opportunities to practice 
their mentalising abilities, which will then decrease the time it takes them to solve mentalising tasks, 
reducing their RPT. Similarly, receiving training on a direct false-belief task, or even on other direct 
mentalising tasks, would allow children to get more mentalising practice. Finally, having a sibling 
with whom to interact with daily should give children more incentive and more opportunities to 
mentalise, and may also elicit more mental-state talk within the family; either way, children with a 
sibling are likely to get more mentalising practice. 
This account of how experiential factors can help children pass direct false-belief tests is 
arguably at least as good as (if not better than) those provided by the triple-load, pragmatic per-
spectives and pragmatic development accounts. In fact, it is very similar to the one offered by the 
triple-load account: on both accounts, these types of stimuli help children by allowing them to 
practice their mentalising abilities.  
3.7 Deaf Children 
In respect to deaf children, the processing-time account is consistent with two types of ex-
planation. First, I have argued in §3.3 that there are several ways in which better language ability 
can lead to lower RPTs, thus potentially resulting in better direct false-belief performance. Now, 
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since deaf children of hearing are exposed to impoverished linguistic stimuli during their first years 
of life and exhibit language delays as a result, we can expect that their performance on direct false-
belief tests will be correspondingly poor. Second, we have seen in §1.2.2 and §3.4 that participating 
in conversations about the mind gives children an opportunity to practice their mentalising abilities, 
again leading to shorter RPTs. Since deaf children of hearing parents have a much harder time 
participating in these types of conversation, they are likely to get much less practice at predicting 
and explaining behaviour. The effect of practice also allows the processing-time account to explain 
how false-belief training allows deaf children of hearing parents to improve their direct false-belief 
performance.  
Overall, the combined effect of these two factors (i.e., worse language ability and less oppor-
tunities to practice mentalising abilities) should put deaf children of hearing parents at a serious 
disadvantage in direct false-belief tests and direct mentalising tasks more generally. Arguably, this 
account of deaf children’s mentalising delays is at least as good as those provided by other perfor-
mance accounts. In fact, since the processing-time is the only performance account that can explain 
all the data on the relationship between language ability and direct false-belief performance, it may 
be argued to offer a better account of why deaf children of hearing parents have poor direct false-
belief performance. 
3.8 Summary 
To the best of my knowledge, the processing-time account is the only performance account 
that can explain all the evidence discussed in Chapter III. (See Table 2 for a visual summary.) 
Table 2. Summary of Chapters III and IV. TL=Triple-Load Account; PP=Pragmatic Perspectives Account; PD= Pragmatic 
Development Account; PT=Processing-Time Account.   
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4. Conclusions 
In this chapter, I have presented a new performance account (§1) and argued that it can 
explain away all the evidence, seemingly supporting late-emergence accounts, that was discussed in 
Chapter III (§3), while also explaining most of the findings that have been claimed to support other 
performance accounts (§2).  
Overall, all the evidence discussed so far seems to point to the early-emergence approach as 
the best way of dealing with the discrepancy in the results of direct and indirect false-belief tests. 
We have seen in Chapter III that late-emergence accounts have trouble explaining the results of 
indirect false-belief tests. On the other hand, I have argued in this chapter that endorsing the pro-
cessing-time account would allow early-emergentists to account for the results of direct false-belief 
tests plus the rest of the evidence that is typically adduced in support of late-emergence accounts 
(which was discussed in Chapter III). There thus seems to be no reason to opt for a late-emergence 
account.  
In the next chapter, I am going to introduce a third way of dealing with our puzzle, one that 
has so far not been considered in the debate. Importantly, this alternative approach is also com-
mitted to the claim that infants can reason about beliefs but provides a different explanation for 
the data discussed in this chapter and in Chapter III, one that is closer to the one late-emergentists 
defend. 
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V 
THE HYBRID APPROACH 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this chapter, I explore an alternative solution to the developmental puzzle of belief-rea-
soning. I put forward and defend a new type of approach, which I call the hybrid approach. Like the 
late-emergence approach, the hybrid approach maintains that the mentalising system recruited in di-
rect false-belief tests would typically not allow children under four years of age to ascribe false be-
liefs. Like the early-emergence approach, however, the hybrid approach also maintains that the men-
talising system recruited in indirect false-belief tests would already allow infants to do so. Contradic-
tion can be avoided, I will argue, if we reject the assumption that these two types of test must be re-
cruiting the same system, instead of recruiting distinct belief-reasoning systems. 
An important theoretical commitment of the hybrid approach is to the claim that humans 
possess two mentalising systems. Thus, after introducing the hybrid approach in §1, in §2 I will con-
tinue to defend it by comparing it with another two-systems proposal, which has been very influen-
tial and has generated a good deal of research; this is the account put forward by Apperly and But-
terfill (2009). Apperly and Butterfill argue that their two-systems account can explain otherwise puz-
zling data; they also argue, however, that doing so requires embracing a late-emergence account. I 
will argue that they are wrong about this: the hybrid approach can also explain the evidence and, ar-
guably, can do so better than any late-emergence account, including theirs. 
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1. The Hybrid Approach 
1.1 A New Approach 
Let us start by recapitulating the debate so far, in broad strokes. The results of direct false-
belief tests suggest that children under four cannot ascribe false beliefs, while the results of indirect 
false-belief tests suggest that infants can already do it. The two sets of findings thus seem to point in 
opposite directions, with the implication that one cannot take both at face value. Consistently with 
this interpretation, both the approaches we have discussed so far consist in taking one set of find-
ings at face-value while trying to explain away the other. Thus, early-emergentists accept the face-
value interpretation of indirect false-belief results but defend an alternative interpretation of direct 
false-belief results (discussed in chapter III and IV), while late-emergentists accept the face-value in-
terpretation of direct false-belief results but defend an alternative interpretation of indirect false-be-
lief results (discussed in chapter II).  
The reason the results of direct and indirect false-belief tests are in conflict seems to lie, 
however, in the tacit assumption that both types of test recruit the same mentalising system. So long 
as we stick with this same-system view, we are forced to choose: either the belief-reasoning abilities 
grounded in this system emerge early, as the results of indirect false-belief tests suggest, or they 
emerge later on, as the results of direct false-belief tests suggest – both cannot be true. Notice, how-
ever, that the conflict disappears if we reject the same-system view. For if direct and indirect false-
belief recruit distinct belief-reasoning systems, it becomes possible to argue that each would follow 
its own developmental trajectory. Thus, the belief-reasoning abilities grounded in the system that is 
recruited in indirect false-belief tests (call it the indirect-FB system) would develop early on, as the re-
sults of those studies indeed suggest; the belief-reasoning abilities grounded in the system recruited 
in direct false-belief tests (call it the direct-FB system), in contrast, would only develop around the age 
of four, as the results of these other studies suggest. This is the gist of the hybrid approach. 
Suppose that this type of account is on the right track; then, both the early-emergence and 
the late-emergence approaches would be right about some things but wrong about others. If we re-
strict our focus to the indirect-FB system, then the early-emergence approach appears to be correct, 
for the belief-reasoning abilities grounded in this system do arise early on, and it is these abilities that 
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allow infants to pass indirect false-belief tests. If we restrict our focus to the direct-FB system, in-
stead, it is the late-emergence approach that appears to be correct, for the belief-reasoning abilities 
grounded in this system do arise later on, and the fact that these abilities are typically not present in 
children younger than four explains why most of these children fail direct false-belief tests. When we 
broaden our focus to include both systems, however, it becomes clear that neither approach is ulti-
mately correct. Early-emergentists go wrong when they assume that direct and indirect false-belief 
tests must recruit the same belief-reasoning system. The case of late-emergentists is a bit more com-
plicated, since, as we will see in the next section, many of them do accept that direct and indirect 
false-belief tests recruit distinct cognitive systems. Even so, all late-emergentists maintain that infants 
cannot ascribe false-beliefs, and thus would deny that the indirect-FB system is a genuine belief-rea-
soning system. As a result, neither early-emergentists nor late-emergentists recognise that direct and 
indirect false-belief tests recruit distinct belief-reasoning systems.  
1.2 The Late-Emergence Approach and the Distinct-System 
View 
As we have seen in Chapter II, late-emergentists have put forward many different proposals 
concerning what may allow infants to pass indirect false-belief studies. The ones we discussed ap-
pealed, for example, to such diverse cognitive phenomena as associations, affordances, behaviour 
rules and several types of mentalising generalisations, just to mention a few. Despite the variety in 
approach, none of these alternative interpretations was found to offer a satisfactory account of indi-
rect false-belief results. There is one important question that was not addressed in Chapter II, how-
ever, and which must be addressed now. The question concerns how the abilities that, according to 
late-emergentists, allow infants to pass indirect false-belief tests (whatever those may be) relate to 
the mentalising abilities that underlie performance on direct false-belief tests. Specifically: does the 
system that underlies infants' performance in indirect false-belief tests gradually transform itself into 
the system that underlies performance in direct false-belief tests? Or are these distinct systems, coex-
isting in parallel, one next to the other? The first type of answer is committed to the same-system 
view: indirect false-belief tests recruit the same system that is recruited by direct false-belief tests, alt-
hough at an earlier stage of development. In contrast, the second type of answer is committed to the 
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distinct-system view: direct and indirect false-belief simply recruit distinct cognitive systems. To 
make this more concrete, let us see some examples.  
Same-system view. First, take the late-emergence account defended by Gopnik and Wellman 
(1992), according to which children are equipped with an innate, “starting state” theory of mind, 
plus a domain-general learning mechanism which they can use to revise and improve upon that the-
ory. The starting state theory, despite being mentalistic, would not yet contemplate representational 
states like belief; it is only around the age of four or five that this shift would take place, according to 
Gopnik and Wellman. Thus, two- and three-year-olds, lacking the notion that beliefs can misrepre-
sent reality, would be unable to pass a false-belief test. Second, take Perner’s (2010) proposal that 
infants pass indirect false-belief tests by relying on superficial non-mentalistic generalisations (called 
behaviour rules) such as, for example, that people look for things where they last were in their line of 
sight. When applied to these two proposals, the question at hand would take the following form: 
how do the behaviour rules that, according to Perner (2010), allow infants to pass indirect false-be-
lief tests relate to the non-representational theory of mind that, according to Gopnik and Wellman 
(1992), causes two and three-year-olds to fail direct false-belief tests? The same-system view main-
tains that the two simply represent different developmental snapshots of the same, developing cog-
nitive system. In other words, the same-system view requires us to make a relatively minor revision 
to Gopnik and Wellman's account: the innate “theory” children start with, instead of being mental-
istic, would have to be behaviouristic, comprising one or more behaviour rules; this behaviouristic 
theory, which allows infants to pass indirect false-belief tests, would then get replaced by a mental-
istic (but not yet representational) theory shortly after the second birthday. The account just 
sketched is, of course, just an example, and many of the details are inessential. In particular, behav-
iour rules can be replaced with associations, affordances or whatever other alternative account of in-
direct false-belief performance one favours. The crucial idea is that the capacities that allow infants 
to pass indirect false-belief tests, whatever those may be, represent an earlier stage of development 
compared to two- and three-year-olds' understanding of the mind, and eventually get replaced by, or 
transformed into, it. 
Distinct-systems view. Consider again the same two accounts as above, namely Gopnik and 
Wellman (1992) and Perner (2010). Each of these two accounts now applies a distinct system, and 
each system will now follow its own developmental trajectory. The direct-FB system would be the 
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domain-general learning system that Gopnik and Wellman (1992) describe, containing a starting-
state theory that is mentalistic but not representational, just as the authors originally suggested. On 
the other hand, the indirect-FB system would be the one described by Perner (2010); thus, it would 
contain one or more behaviour rules, plus any cognitive machinery required to deploy them in rea-
soning. On this picture, two and three-year-olds fail direct false-belief tests because, at that age, the 
direct-FB system still contains a non-representational theory of mind according to which people act 
based on how the world really is. On the other hand, infants pass indirect false-belief tests because 
the indirect-FB system contains the behaviour rule that people look for things where they last were 
in their line of sight (or something along those lines). Replacing Perner’s behaviour rule account 
with another proposal will change the part of the story that concerns the indirect-FB system but will 
leave the part about the direct-FB system substantially unaffected.  
Many late-emergentists have embraced the distinct-system view (e.g. Apperly & Butterfill, 
2009; Heyes & Frith, 2014; Low, Apperly, Rakoczy, & Butterfill, 2016; Rakoczy, 2017; Sabbagh et 
al., 2013; Wellman, 2014). And indeed, when looking at the data, this appears to be the most plausi-
ble option for late-emergentists. Same-system late-emergence accounts predict that two and three-
year-olds should fail not just direct false-belief tests but also indirect false-belief tests; this is because, 
on this type of view, the system that allows infants to pass indirect false-belief tests transforms into 
the system that causes two and three-year-olds to fail direct false-belief tests. We should thus see a u-
shaped trajectory, with children younger than two passing indirect false-belief tests, children between 
the ages of two and four failing both direct and indirect false-belief test, and children older than four 
passing both direct and indirect false-belief tests. What we see, instead, is that two- and three-year-
olds keep passing indirect false-belief tests while failing direct false-belief tests (e.g., Clements & 
Perner, 1994; Garnham & Ruffman, 2001; He et al., 2011, 2012; Ruffman, Garnham, Import, & 
Connolly, 2001; Southgate et al., 2007); indeed, the study by Clements and Perner (1994) shows that 
the very same three-year-olds who just looked at the empty location in anticipation for the agent's 
return will point to the actual location of the object when asked where the agent would go, display-
ing both responses in short succession. This seems to effectively rule out same-system late-emergent 
accounts.  
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1.3 Explaining Evidence for Late-Emergence Accounts 
We have just seen that a distinct-system type of account is not only a very popular choice 
among late-emergentists but may also be the only viable option within the late-emergence camp. 
Now, notice that the disagreement between hybrid and distinct-systems late-emergence accounts 
concerns mainly what the indirect-FB system would do. Specifically, the hybrid approach maintains 
that the indirect-FB system would allow infants to ascribe false beliefs, while distinct-system late-
emergence accounts deny this. The two types of approach are in substantial agreement, however, so 
far as the direct-FB goes: in particular, both maintain that the direct-FB system would not allow chil-
dren to ascribe false beliefs until about the age of four. This is important because it is this claim that 
allows distinct-system late-emergentists to explain all the evidence discussed in Chapter III. Since the 
hybrid approach also accepts this claim, it can explain that evidence in the very same way. 
Consider, for example, evidence suggesting that children who are more exposed to certain 
types of social stimuli (i.e. children who have siblings, and/or whose mothers are more likely to talk 
about mental states) tend to have better direct false-belief performance (this evidence was discussed 
in Chapter III, §1.4). This type of finding suggests that being exposed to certain types of social stim-
uli helps young children acquire belief-reasoning abilities. Those late-emergentists who embrace the 
distinct-system view will maintain that the system that underlies this process of acquisition is the di-
rect-FB system. Now, since the hybrid approach maintains that the direct-FB system develops just 
like late-emergence approaches suggest, it can endorse essentially the same type of explanation: so-
cial stimuli help young children acquire belief-reasoning abilities. The only qualification necessary is 
that the belief-reasoning abilities children would acquire are those grounded in the direct-FB system, 
not those grounded in the indirect-FB system, since those would already be present since infancy. 
1.4 An Argument for the Hybrid Approach 
The main argument for the hybrid approach is that it can explain the results of indirect false-
belief tests better than late-emergence accounts, and the results of direct false-belief tests better than 
early-emergence accounts. We saw in Chapter II that none of the proposals late-emergentists have 
put forward provides a compelling explanation of indirect false-belief results. To explain those re-
sults, I argued, we must grant that infants can ascribe false beliefs. The hybrid approach accepts this 
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claim, since it maintains that the indirect-FB system would sustain belief-reasoning abilities since in-
fancy. On the other hand, in Chapter III, we saw that the performance accounts that early-emer-
gentists have put forward struggle to explain the evidence that late-emergentists have gathered in 
support of their accounts, while in the last section I argued that the hybrid approach can explain 
those data as well as (indeed, in the very same way as) late-emergentists do. Overall, the hybrid ap-
proach thus seems to get the best of both worlds.  
1.5 The Hybrid Approach and the Nativism-Constructivism 
Debate 
As explained in Chapter I, one of the reasons the question of whether belief-reasoning abili-
ties emerge early on is worth investigating is that it has important implications for the debate be-
tween nativism and constructivism. In particular, early-emergence approaches are difficult to recon-
cile with a constructivist position, and thus provide support for nativism. Since we now have a new 
player in the game, it makes sense to ponder its implications for the debate. 
The hybrid approach maintains that there are two cognitive systems, each of which can sus-
tain belief-reasoning abilities independently from the other. Furthermore, it maintains that these two 
systems would follow different developmental trajectories. The question we are considering must 
thus be split into two parts: (a) does the hybrid approach support a nativist account of the indirect-
FB system, or does it support a constructivist account? (b) Does the hybrid approach support a na-
tivist account of the direct-FB system, or does it support a constructivist account? Let us consider 
each of these questions in turn. 
The indirect-FB system. So far as the indirect-FB system is concerned, the hybrid approach 
seems to straightforwardly support nativism. This is because, on the hybrid approach, the indirect-
FB system would already allow infants to ascribe false beliefs. This, in turn, provides evidence that 
many of the cognitive structures required for that purpose must be innate and domain-specific, just 
as nativism demands.  
The direct-FB system. The case of the direct-FB system is a bit more complicated. The hybrid 
approach maintains that the direct-FB system would not allow children younger than four to ascribe 
false-beliefs. This claim can be given a constructivist spin, in which case the direct-FB system would 
be domain-general and would contain only a bare minimum of innate structure. Thus, whereas the 
  
137 
 
indirect-FB system would come with many mental state concepts and folk psychological generalisa-
tions already built-in, the direct-FB system would have to acquire all those structures through learn-
ing, unaided by any domain-specific mechanisms or heuristics. Discovering that beliefs can be false 
would then be but one step in a continuous learning process. 
It is important to stress that there are other options, however. In particular, the late emer-
gence of a trait is not necessarily inconsistent with nativism (as mentioned in Chapter I). Indeed, na-
tivists have at least two options in explaining late emergence: slow maturation and “nativist” learn-
ing. 
Slow-Maturation Approaches. A slow-maturation type of account would argue that, while the 
direct-FB system comes with all the cognitive structures required for ascribing false beliefs already 
built-in, some of these structures would typically not reach maturation until about the age of four 
(Segal, 1996; Stich & Nichols, 1998; see also Scholl and Leslie, 1999 for discussion). Notably, it is 
possible to maintain that the direct-FB system is made up of several subs-systems that would reach 
maturation at different ages. Thus, for example, one can argue that the direct-FB system would com-
prise a subs-system for desire-reasoning and one for belief-reasoning, which would come on-line at 
different ages, explaining why young children pass the diverse-desire test but not the false-belief test. 
Furthermore, one can argue that the process of maturation is sensitive the stimuli the organism is 
exposed to. For example, a module may have a set of parameters that are set based on the stimuli 
the organism is exposed to, and which would determine what the mature module looks like (Segal, 
1996; Stich & Nichols, 1998). This would allow a slow-maturation account to accommodate evi-
dence that children who are exposed to more social stimuli (mental-state talk, siblings and the like) 
tend to have better direct-FB performance. Social stimuli would impact children's mentalising abili-
ties not by allowing them to learn about the mind but by setting parameters in their mentalising 
module. This type of account is thus largely consistent with the evidence discussed in chapter III. 
Nativist-learning Approach. In contrast, A nativist-learning type of approach would maintain 
that some of the cognitive structures that make up the direct-FB system are innate while others are 
learned thanks to domain-specific mechanisms (this option is discussed, though not endorsed, by 
Westra and Carruthers, 2017 and Scholl & Leslie, 1999). As mentioned in Chapter I, section §2.3, 
evidence from direct mentalising tests suggests that children possess at least some understanding of 
desire, perception and emotion as early as they have been tested. Thus, one can argue that the direct-
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FB system is a domain-specific learning mechanism, which comes with innate concepts of desire, 
perception and emotion already built in and would acquire the rest through learning. (This is con-
sistent, notice, with executive functioning and language also playing a facilitating role – the claim is 
that a domain-specific learning mechanism would be required, not sufficient.) We can thus expect 
this type of account to also be consistent with evidence discussed in chapter III. 
To sum up this discussion: so far as the indirect-FB system is concerned, the hybrid ap-
proach supports a nativist account, while so far as the direct-FB system is concerned, it is largely 
consistent with both nativist and constructivist options. 
2. Two Mentalising Systems 
As we have seen, the hybrid approach maintains that both the indirect-FB and the direct-FB 
systems sustain belief-reasoning abilities; it is thus committed to a two-systems account of mentalis-
ing. In this section, I compare the hybrid approach to another, very influential two-systems account, 
namely the one defended by Apperly and Butterfill (2009). Notably, in the years following the publi-
cation of Apperly and Butterfill's paper, the two-systems account has gained the support of several 
late-emergentists, rapidly becoming one of the main proposals in the late-emergence camp (Heyes & 
Frith, 2014; Low et al., 2016; Rakoczy, 2017; Wellman, 2014).  
Apperly and Butterfill argue that humans possess two mentalising systems with opposite 
processing profiles. This hypothesis, they argue, allows us to explain an otherwise puzzling pattern 
of results. We start in §2.1 by taking a look at this evidence. Then, in §2.2, I discuss Apperly and 
Butterfill's argument that explaining the evidence requires embracing the late-emergence approach. 
Finally, in §2.4 and §2.5, I argue that hybrid approach can actually explain the evidence better than 
the late-emergence approach Apperly and Butterfill’s defend. 
2.1 Evidence for Two Mentalising Systems 
Apperly and Butterfill argue that several sets of findings provide evidence for a two-systems 
account, including: (1) conflicting evidence on whether mentalising is automatic and efficient or con-
trolled and cognitively demanding; (2) conflicting evidence on whether mentalising is dependent on 
language; (3) evidence that non-human animals can mentalise; (4) conflicting evidence on the 
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emergence of mentalising abilities in children (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Butterfill & Apperly, 
2013). Let us take a closer look at this data. 
2.1.1 Automaticity 
The argument from automaticity moves from the observation that there is conflicting evi-
dence on whether mentalising is automatic and maintains that this evidence can be explained by pos-
iting two mentalising systems, one of which is automatic and efficient while the other is controlled 
and cognitively demanding.  
Evidence that mentalising is automatic has come from a variety of tasks (D. Buttelmann & 
Buttelmann, 2017; Kovács et al., 2010; Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews, & Bodley Scott, 
2010; Schneider, Bayliss, Becker, & Dux, 2012; Schneider, Nott, & Dux, 2014; van der Wel, Sebanz, 
& Knoblich, 2014). In the dot-perspective task by Dana Samson and colleagues (2010), for example, 
adult participants were first shown a screen with a digit, and then a picture of a room with red disks 
(“dots”) on the walls. The dots could be placed either on the left wall or on the right wall; a human 
avatar was standing in the middle of the room, facing the left wall. Participants were assigned to one 
of two tasks: the other-perspective task consisted in judging (by pressing one of two buttons) 
whether the number of dots the avatar could see was consistent with the previously shown digit; the 
self-perspective task, instead, consisted in judging whether the number of dots they themselves 
could see was consistent with the digit. In consistent trials, all the dots were on the left wall, so that all 
were visible to the avatar, while in inconsistent trials some dots were on the right wall, out of the ava-
tar's sight. Reaction times and errors were recorded over a vast number of trials. Samson and col-
leagues found that participants were slower to respond and more error prone on inconsistent versus 
consistent trials, and this regardless of the task they were assigned. Thus, when participants' own 
perspective was not consistent with the avatar's, they were not only slower to judge what the avatar 
could see (egocentric interference) but also slower to judge what they themselves could see (“alter-
centric” interference). This suggests that participants automatically calculated what the avatar could 
see, which then interfered with the processes involved in deciding which button to press. 
Further evidence that mentalising is automatic comes from anticipatory-looking false-belief 
tasks (Schneider, Bayliss, et al., 2012; Schneider, Nott, et al., 2014). Dana Schneider and colleagues 
(2012) submitted adult participants to repeated trials which involved looking at movies depicting 
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typical unexpected-transfer scenarios. In false-belief trials, the agent in the movie left the room be-
fore the object was moved, while in true-belief trials she left after the transfer. Importantly, the task 
participants were instructed to carry out had nothing to do with mentalising: in the first experiment, 
this consisted in pressing a button when one of the agents in the movie waved at the other; in the 
second experiment, instead, the task was to discriminate between high and low tones played at dif-
ferent points during the movie. At the end of the experiment, participants were asked open-ended 
questions designed to reveal whether they had consciously reasoned about the agent's belief (those 
that did were excluded from the analysis.) Despite this and the fact that what the agent believed was 
irrelevant to their task, participants looked significantly longer at the empty location in false-belief 
trials compared to true-belief trials, again suggesting that they had automatically calculated the 
agent's belief.  
Consistent with these findings, there is evidence suggesting that neither of these tasks (dot-
perspective or anticipatory-looking unexpected-transfer) is taxing on inhibitory control (Low, 2010; 
Qureshi, Apperly, & Samson, 2010)1. Adam Qureshi, Ian Apperly and Dana Samson (2010) carried 
out a dual-task experiment with adults using the dot-perspective task (based on Samson et al., 2010) 
plus an executive functioning task. While participants were slower to respond in all conditions when 
in the dual-task condition compared to the dot-perspective task alone, the presence of the executive 
functioning task did not erase the altercentric effect – if anything, this increased in magnitude. This 
suggests that calculating the avatar's perspective was not dependent on executive resources. On the 
other hand, the fact that response times were slower in dual-task conditions may reflect that the 
presence of executive functioning task slowed the processes required to decide which button to 
push and made it more difficult to inhibit the irrelevant perspective, thus resulting in increased ego-
centric and altercentric effects. 
The evidence considered so far points to mentalising processes being automatic and effi-
cient. There is also evidence pointing in the opposite direction, however. First, in the last two chap-
ters we have discussed at length evidence suggesting that executive functioning is required for pass-
ing direct false-belief tests. In particular, remember the finding by Powell and Carey (2017) discussed 
in Chapter III, §1.2, showing that depleting children's inhibitory control with a depletion task 
                                                 
1 A study by Schneider et al. 2014 seems to support the opposite conclusion; this will be discussed in Chapter 
VI. 
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immediately before a direct false-belief task negatively affected their performance. In chapter IV, I 
suggested that this result could be explained assuming that inhibitory control was tapped to resist 
the temptation of responding too soon. Another interpretation is also possible, however, one that 
Powell and Carey themselves defend: this is that inhibitory control is involved in mentalising itself. 
There is further evidence from adults that is also open to this interpretation (Bull, Phillips, & 
Conway, 2008; Lin, Keysar, & Epley, 2010; McKinnon & Moscovitch, 2007). Shuhong Lin, Boaz 
Keysar and Nicholas Epley (2010), for example, carried out a dual-task experiment using Keysar, 
Linn and Barr’s (2003) director task plus a working memory task. In the director task, a confederate 
(the “director”) instructs participants to give her an object and participants must determine which 
objects the director can see to determine which object she means. Thus, for example, the director 
might say, “pass me the pen” when there are two pens, only one of which is visible from her point 
of view. The working memory task involved memorising numbers, and had two conditions, a high-
load one and a low-load one. Participants were slower to react, more error prone and made a higher 
number of fixation on the “competitor” object (the one that was hidden from the director's view) in 
high-load versus low-load condition. Importantly, the effect disappeared when the competitor object 
was not present, suggesting that cognitive load was indeed due to mentalising rather than general 
task demands. 
Second, other studies suggest that mentalising is not automatic (Apperly, Riggs, Simpson, 
Chiavarino, & Samson, 2006; Back & Apperly, 2010; Keysar et al., 2003). Back and Apperly, for ex-
ample, showed participants an unexpected-transfer scenario and told them to track the location of 
the ball; then, they asked them either where the ball was or what the agent believed. Participants 
were significantly slower to respond to belief probes compared to reality probes, suggesting that they 
had not calculated what the agent believed until they were prompted to. 
To sum up: some studies suggest that mentalising is automatic and efficient, while others 
suggest that it is controlled and cognitively demanding; one way to account for this conflicting evi-
dence is to posit two mentalising systems, one of which would be automatic and efficient while the 
other would be controlled and cognitively demanding.  
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2.1.2 Language 
The argument from language moves from the observation that there is conflicting evidence 
on whether language is required for mentalising and maintains that this evidence can be explained by 
positing two mentalising systems, one of which can operate independently of language while the 
other cannot.  
Some of the evidence suggesting that language may be required for mentalising was dis-
cussed in the last two chapters (Chapter III, §1.3, §1.5). For example, direct false-belief performance 
correlates with language ability and can be improved through training on sentential complements; or 
that deaf children of hearing parents tend to have very poor direct false-belief performance. Further 
evidence comes from a study with adults by Ashley Newton and Jill de Villiers (2007). Newton and 
De Villiers carried out a dual-task experiment using a non-verbal false-belief task plus an interfer-
ence task. In the false-belief task, participants watched movies depicting unexpected-transfer scenar-
ios, with both false-belief and true-belief conditions. At the end, participants were shown both end-
ings side by side, one of which had a green background while the other had a red background; par-
ticipants had to respond by tapping either the red or the green section of a block they were holding. 
The interference task was either a verbal shadowing task or a rhythmic tapping task designed to have 
the similar attentional demands. Participants who were given the verbal shadowing task performed 
significantly worse on false-belief compared to true-belief conditions, while there was no significant 
difference for participants who were given the rhythmic tapping task. This suggests that even a non-
verbal false-belief tasks, like the one used in this study, make demands on language.  
On the other hand, there is also evidence suggesting that mentalising does not require lan-
guage. The fact that infants pass indirect false-belief tests, for example, strongly suggests this, as 
does the evidence that some non-human animals possess mentalising abilities (to be discussed pres-
ently.) In addition, there is also some neuropsychological evidence pointing to a similar conclusion. 
Thus, Apperly, Samson, Carroll, Hussain, and Humphreys (2006) found that PH, a patient with 
sever impairment in general language ability and syntax, scored almost perfectly on two non-verbal 
false-belief tasks.  
To sum up: some findings suggest that mentalising requires language, while other data sug-
gest the opposite conclusion. One way to explain this conflicting evidence is to posit two mentalis-
ing systems, one that is dependent on language and one that is not.  
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2.1.3 Infants and Non-Human Animals 
The argument from infants and non-human animals moves from the observation that in-
fants and non-human animals, both of which have poor executive functioning and language abilities, 
seem able to mentalise, and claims that this provides evidence for the existence of a second mental-
ising system that can operate independently of executive functioning and language.  
The evidence from infants was discussed at length in chapters I and II and should by now be 
familiar. Several non-human species have also been found able to pass indirect mentalising tasks (for 
reviews, see Call & Tomasello, 2008; Drayton & Santos, 2016; Emery & Clayton, 2009), however. In 
fact, two recent studies show that great apes can pass false-belief tests (D. Buttelmann, Buttelmann, 
Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2017; Krupenye, Kano, Hirata, Call, & Tomasello, 2016). Buttelmann 
and colleagues, for example, used an interactive unexpected-transfer task similar to that introduced 
by D. Buttelmann et al. (2009), where the experimenter comes back after the transfer and struggles 
to open the empty box. The task included true-belief, false-belief and ignorance conditions; the great 
apes in this study (chimpanzees, orangutan and bonobo) reached for the other box, the one contain-
ing the object, significantly more often in false-belief conditions compared to both true-belief and 
ignorance ones, suggesting that they understood the agent was trying to open the empty box because 
she believed the object she was looking for was inside it.  
The fact that infants and non-human animals pass mentalising tests is puzzling when one 
considers the evidence, discussed above, that mentalising requires both language and executive func-
tioning, since both groups have very little of both. The puzzle can be solved by arguing that there 
are really two systems for mentalising, only one of which requires language and executive function-
ing. The system that is not dependent on language and executive functioning may then be present 
both in infants and non-human animals, perhaps due to its being evolutionarily ancient and present 
in a common ancestor. 
2.1.4 Development of Belief-Reasoning Abilities 
The last piece of evidence is the discrepancy in the results of indirect and direct false-belief 
tests (outlined in chapter I, section §1, and discussed above). This discrepancy, Apperly and Butter-
fill argue, can be explained assuming that the two types of test recruit distinct mentalising systems, 
following different developmental trajectories.  
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2.1.5 Summary  
Altogether, the evidence discussed in this section suggests that humans possess two mental-
ising systems, one of which is fast, automatic, efficient, early developing and shared with some non-
human animals, while the other is slow, controlled, cognitively demanding, later-developing and 
unique to humans. To ease the exposition, in the following I will refer to the first as the fast system 
and to the second as the slow system. 
2.2 The Argument from Cognitive Demands 
On the face of it, the claim that humans possess two mentalising system with opposite pro-
cessing profiles seems entirely consistent with the hybrid approach. Apperly and Butterfill have an 
argument that suggests otherwise, however. The argument in question (call it the argument from cogni-
tive demands) purports to show that one cannot reason about beliefs or other propositional attitudes 
in a fast and efficient manner. Based on this argument, Apperly and Butterfill suggest that the fast 
system is likely to employ a simplified, minimal theory of mind which posits registrations instead of 
beliefs. Infants would thus have to rely on these minimal mentalising abilities to pass indirect false-
belief tests, a proposal we discussed (and rejected) in Chapter II, §3.3. Proper belief-reasoning abili-
ties, in contrast, would be dependent on the slow system and would only emerge around the fourth 
birthday. It is thus the argument from cognitive demands, together with the evidence reviewed in 
the last section, which leads Apperly and Butterfill to embrace the late-emergence approach. The ar-
gument from cognitive demands thus stands in the way of the hybrid approach. 
2.2.1 The Argument 
Apperly and Butterfill (2009) argue that reasoning about beliefs and other propositional atti-
tudes tends to be cognitively demanding because propositional attitudes have a number of problem-
atic features, including, most notably, the following: 
(1) They can take indefinitely complex propositions as their content; 
(2) They are intensional with an “s”, meaning that they not only represent objects and prop-
erties, but seem to always represent them under some mode of presentation or other; 
(3) They interact with each other and with both stimuli and behaviour in very complex ways; 
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(4) They are not just causes of action but reasons for action, and thus possess a normative 
dimension, being subject to the norms of rationality and truth. 
  
This list should look familiar; these are the features that supposedly separate beliefs from 
registrations (as discussed in Chapter II, section §3.3.) Registrations are supposed to be simpler than 
beliefs precisely because they lack the features mentioned in the list above; thus, while beliefs can 
take any proposition as their content, are intensional with an “s”, have a complex causal role and are 
subjects to norms of rationality, registrations can only have an object-location pair as their content, 
are extensional, have a relatively simple causal role and possess no normative dimension. As a result 
of this, one may expect reasoning about beliefs to be a more complex endeavour than reasoning 
about registrations.  
Take, for example, a hypothetical child called Charlie, who is trying to predict where Sally 
will go using a minimal theory of mind. This should involve very little processing, and of a very sim-
ple kind. First, Charlie would pay attention to Sally's line of sight to determine which objects she en-
counter; then, Charlie would ascribe to her a registration of the marble in the location where she last 
encountered it; finally, Charlie would predict that Sally will look for the marble in the location where 
she registers it. In contrast, suppose now that Charlie must rely on a more sophisticated theory of 
mind to predict where Sally will go, specifically a theory that posits beliefs instead of registrations. 
Charlie will now have to carry out considerably more processing to get to the same result. For exam-
ple, the fact that the basket is where Sally last saw the marble does not entail that she will take it to 
be there; it all depends on the other beliefs Sally happens to have. If, say, Sally knows that Anne is 
wont to pulling pranks at the expense of her friends, then she may anticipate that Anne will move 
the marble to the box. Thus, keeping track of where Sally last saw the marble will not suffice to de-
termine where she thinks the marble is; to figure out the latter, Charlie may also have to consider 
what other beliefs Sally is likely to have. Furthermore, even once Charlie has ascribed to Sally the be-
lief that the marble is in the basket, this again does not guarantee that she will look for it there, since 
beliefs do not lead to action directly but only by interacting with other beliefs, desires and emotions 
in complex ways. Overall, it thus seems reasonable to suppose that, if Charlie is reasoning in terms 
of beliefs as opposed to registrations, she will have to take into account a considerably larger num-
ber of facts before she can make a prediction, resulting in more processing.  
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2.2.2 An Objection and a Counterproposal 
The argument from cognitive demands seems compelling at first, but, I believe, breaks down 
on closer inspection. To see why, let us suppose that indirect-FB processes require the intervention 
of executive functioning to carry out their computations. In this case, it seems reasonable to expect 
that indirect-FB processes would be cognitively demanding even if they involved reasoning about 
registrations instead of beliefs. This is because executive processes are so limited in capacity that 
even seemingly simple computational operations are enough to deplete them. The average working 
memory span, for example, seems to be about four items (e.g. Cowan, 2000), while the focus of at-
tention is limited to one chunk of information at a time. Thus, if we suppose that the indirect-FB 
processes rely on working memory as a mental blackboard to carry out their computations, keeping 
track of what objects a person registers and where she registers them will rapidly use up all the space 
available (four items). On the other hand, if we suppose that indirect-FB processes do not recruit 
executive functioning, then it is unclear why they should consume any executive resources to begin 
with, independently of their complexity. Thus, it seems that for Apperly and Butterfill's argument to 
work, it must be the case that indirect-FB processes would recruit executive functioning if they in-
volve reasoning about beliefs but not if they involve reasoning about registrations. There is no rea-
son to suppose that this should be the case, however.2  
The type of consideration just aired suggests an alternative model of cognitive demands. The 
idea is disarmingly simple: the reason direct-FB processes are cognitively demanding while indirect-
FB processes are not is that the former are hooked up to the executive system and thus consume ex-
ecutive resources as they run, while the latter run autonomously and independently of the executive 
system. This type of suggestion is in line with what other dual-process theorists have argued in re-
cent years. Many authors have defended a distinction between intuitive (/System 1, /Type 1) and re-
flective (/System 2, /Type 2) processes, across many domains (for reviews of this literature, see 
                                                 
2 At times, Apperly and Butterfill seem to suggest that the evidence that direct false-belief tests load on executive 
functioning provides independent support for the claim that reasoning about beliefs must be cognitively demanding. 
I believe this is a red herring, however; for what we are debating is not whether reasoning about beliefs is ever cognitively 
demanding but whether it must always be so. In particular, I am not disputing that the belief-reasoning processes based 
in direct-FB system would be cognitively demanding; the question at hand is whether it is possible for the indirect-FB 
system to sustain belief-reasoning processes that are not so. Clearly, pointing to evidence suggesting that passing a direct 
false-belief tests requires executive functioning cannot resolve the issue. 
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Evans, 2003; Evans, 2008). This distinction seems to map quite well onto the processing profiles 
that Apperly and Butterfill propose for their two mentalising systems. For example, intuitive pro-
cesses are typically taken to be fast, automatic, conscious, and efficient, while reflective processes are 
typically taken to be slow, controlled, conscious and cognitively demanding. Now, some dual-pro-
cess theorists have argued that the defining feature of reflective versus intuitive processes is that 
only the former make constitutive use of working memory; notably, this is taken to explain why in-
tuitive processes tend to be efficient (Carruthers, 2015; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Stanovich & 
Toplak, 2012). If this type of account is on the right track, then it should remove much of the moti-
vation behind Apperly and Butterfill's minimal theory of mind account.  
2.2.3 Abduction 
Apperly and Butterfill mention another feature of belief-reasoning which, they argue, is likely 
to lead to increased cognitive demands. This is based on the observation that reasoning about beliefs 
is likely to rely on abduction, and that abduction can be expected to be cognitively demanding. 
Abductive reasoning involves inferring that a given proposition (or theory, or hypothesis 
etc.) is true on the grounds that it explains a given phenomenon better than the alternatives. Thus, 
for example, suppose you are watching a movie in the cosiness of your home, at night, when sud-
denly you hear a noise coming from upstairs -- a noise that sounds suspiciously like someone trying 
to break in. It must be a burglar! What else could make such a noise? Thus, you grab a knife from 
the kitchen and go investigate. Now, notice that the premise that someone or something made a sus-
picious noise does not entail the conclusion that a burglar is trying to break in, since, in principle, 
there is an infinite number of other things that could have caused that same noise; maybe a bird flew 
against a window, or maybe a piece of furniture fell down, or maybe you were spooked by the movie 
and simply imagined it. This makes your inference a non-sequitur when evaluated according to the 
standards of deductive logic. Even so, the fact that a burglar strikes you as the most plausible expla-
nation does seem to provide you with some reason to believe it. This is an example of abductive rea-
soning. 
An important feature of abductive reasoning is that it is not monotonic: while a set of premises 
S may support a conclusion C, there is no guarantee that a larger set of premises S+A, which in-
cludes S plus an additional set of premises A, will continue to support C. To return to our example: 
  
148 
 
if you knew that your adolescent daughter was secretly seeing someone, the possibility of the noise 
being caused by him or her trying to sneak into your daughter's room behind your back may seem 
more a more likely explanation than a burglar trying to break in, since, after all, the lights are on and 
it is not that late at night. Adding one premise to our original set has now led to a very different con-
clusion. This has a very important implication: the only way to make sure that a given hypothesis re-
ally provides the best explanation is to consider everything one knows. Of course, much of the infor-
mation one considers may ultimately prove to be irrelevant, but there is no way of knowing this be-
fore considering it, and thus no way of restricting the set of premises that must be taken into ac-
count. As a result, abductive reasoning has been argued to be very hard to implement computation-
ally, since conducting an exhaustive search over a large body of information is likely to result in a 
combinatorial explosion. And yet, abductive reasoning seems to be incredibly common, both in eve-
ryday life and in the sciences, which raises the question: how do we manage to do it3?  
Apperly (2011) suggests two ways of making abductive processes tractable, both of which 
involve limiting the amount of information taken into account. The first involves making part of the 
information stored in the mind strictly off-limits to certain cognitive systems. For example, a system 
that is informationally encapsulated can only consult, in the course of its processing, the information 
that is stored within the module itself; and this will typically be but a small portion of all the infor-
mation stored in the mind. This would be an example of what Apperly calls “hard constraint”. The 
second method, in contrast, involves using more efficient, non-exhaustive search algorithms that rely 
on heuristics to preselect the information that is worth considering. This will also result in only a 
subset of all the information stored in the mind being taken into consideration, but what and how 
much information is selected will vary depending on the task at hand. Thus, in Apperly's terms, this 
would count as a “soft constraint”. Now, Apperly claims that systems with hard constraints can be 
expected to be faster and more efficient but also severely limited in what they can do, while systems 
with soft constraints can be expected to be slower and more cognitively demanding, but also more 
flexible. Indeed, he suggests that the reason the fast system is fast and efficient, while the slow 
                                                 
3 Perhaps the most influential exposition of this problem is due to Jerry Fodor (1983). Fodor argued that the 
process of belief fixation relies on a process of inference to the best explanation; since inference to the best explanation 
cannot be modelled in computational terms, and since there is, within cognitive science, no viable alternative to the 
computational theory of mind, the obvious conclusion -- Fodor alleged -- is that cognitive science cannot explain belief 
fixation. 
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system is slow and cognitively demanding, is precisely that the first is informationally encapsulated, 
while the second is a central process that relies on scripts, norms and other heuristics to preselect 
information for further processing (Apperly, 2011, pp. 119-142).  
Notably, Apperly seems to think that the fact that the fast system, being encapsulated, has 
no access to the information stored in the rest of the mind, is the reason the system can only ascribe 
registrations and not beliefs. This last step in the argument is important from our point of view: af-
ter all, the hybrid approach is consistent with the fast system being modular and thus limited in im-
portant ways, so long as these limitations do not prevent it from sustaining belief-reasoning abilities. 
Unfortunately, however, Apperly (2011) does not elaborate on why the modularity of the fast system 
should result in this particular type of limitation. Furthermore, notice that it is unclear why abductive 
processes that are only “softly” constrained should necessarily impose substantial demands on exec-
utive functioning.  
2.3 Explaining Evidence of Signature Limits 
Apperly and Butterfill (2009) argue that the fast system, since it employs a minimal theory of 
mind, should exhibit several “signature limits”. In particular, since the fast system reasons about reg-
istrations, which are not intensional states, it should not provide an understanding of how people rep-
resent the objects they represent. Consequently, Apperly and Butterfill argue that the fast system 
should be unable to sustain level-2 perspective-taking or tracking of beliefs about identity, both of 
which seems to presuppose an understanding not just of what objects agents represent but of how 
they represent them. There is evidence which seems to suggest that these signature limits do indeed 
occur. I will, argue, however, that this evidence is better explained on the hybrid approach. 
2.3.1 Level-2 Perspective-Taking 
In §2.1.1, we discussed a study by Samson et al. (2010) showing that participants automati-
cally calculate what another person can see, which then interferes with their own visual perspective 
in an unrelated task, creating an altercentric effect. Apperly and Butterfill (2009, p. 963) suggest that 
how things look to other people, in contrast, should not be automatically calculated, since it involves 
ascribing intensional mental states, which is something the fast system cannot do. To test this pre-
diction, Andrew Surtees, Stephen Butterfill and Ian Apperly (2011) showed their participants (a 
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group of six-year-olds and a group of adults) a picture of an avatar sitting at a table across from 
them, with a digit placed either on a wall on the side or lying flat on the table, and instructed them to 
judge (pressing one of two buttons) either what number they themselves could see, or what number 
the avatar could see. Crucially, in “ambiguous” trials, the digit was a 6 or a 9. Thus, when the digit 
was on the table as opposed to the side wall, participants would see a different number from the av-
atar (e.g., one would see a 6 and the other would see a 9.) This counts as level-2 perspective taking: 
participants must judge how something looks when seen from a different point of view. The crucial 
finding is that there was no significant difference in the time it took participants to say what number 
they saw in ambiguous trials compared to unambiguous trials. Thus, in this case, no altercentric ef-
fect was found, suggesting that participants did not calculate how the number looked to the avatar. 
Surtees et al. (2011) take this finding to support Apperly and Butterfill’s account. This is be-
cause Apperly and Butterfill (2009) argue that level-2 perspective-taking requires an understanding 
of intensionality, which should be off-limits to the fast system. However, this reasoning appears to 
be based on conflating two senses in which an object can be said to be “represented as” something. 
Consider the following sentences: 
(1) The digit I am looking at is a 9; 
(2) The digit I am looking at is a 6; 
(3) The digit on the table is a 9. 
Suppose the digit on the table and the digit I am looking at are one and the same. Then, (1) 
and (3) could be said to present the digit in different ways: in one case as “the digit I am looking at” 
and in the other as “the digit on the table”. These are different ways of referring, picking out or 
thinking about the digit. Nonetheless, both (1) and (3) predicate of the digit the property of being a 
9. Thus, while in one sense (1) and (3) represent the digit in different ways (as the digit I am looking 
at v. the digit on the table) in another they represent it in the same way (as being a 9). The opposite 
could be said of (1) and (2): they present the digit in the same way but predicate a different property 
of it (being a 9 v. being a 6). 
Why is this important? It is true that without an understanding of intensionality, one could 
not understand that different people may think of the same object under different modes of presen-
tations; that is, after all, what intensionality is all about. On the other hand, understanding intension-
ality is not required to understand that different people predicate different properties of the same 
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object and thus, in this sense, represent it differently. Now, crucially, it seems that the latter would 
be sufficient for level-2 perspective taking. In our example, level-2 perspective taking requires under-
standing whether the avatar sees the digit as a 9 or 6, but the mode of presentation under which the 
avatar thinks of the digit (as the digit I am looking at or as the digit on the table) is immaterial. If this 
is right, then there is no reason to think that level-2 perspective-taking requires an understanding of 
intensionality. In our example, it seems it would suffice to ascribe to the agent a registration of the 
digit as (having the property of) being a “9” (say). In which case, the motivation Apperly and Butter-
fill provide for the fast system not being to sustain level-2 perspective-taking does not stand up to 
scrutiny19. 
On the other hand, while at first pass the finding by Surtees et al. (2011) may seem incon-
sistent with the hybrid approach, in fact it isn’t. A study by Surtees, Apperly, and Samson (2013) 
provides convincing evidence that level-2 perspective-taking requires mentally rotating the object in 
question. We have long known that the time it takes to mentally rotate an image depends on the an-
gle of rotation from the starting position (Shepard & Metzler, 1971). That is, the further we need to 
mentally rotate an image, the longer it takes. Now, the study by Surtees et al. (2013) shows that the 
time it takes participants to judge what number an avatar can see varies as a function of the angular 
disparity between avatar and participant. This suggests that participants rotated the digit to see how 
it would look from the avatar perspective. Thus, the greater the angular disparity between partici-
pants and the avatar, the further participants had to rotate the digit, resulting in longer reaction 
times. Notably, Surtees and colleagues found the very same effect when participants were asked to 
judge whether the digit was on the avatar’s left or right, another task that has been argued to require 
mental rotation (Michelon & Zacks, 2006). Now, mental rotation is known to rely on working 
                                                 
19 Now it is true, of course, that in Apperly and Butterfill’s (2009) original account registrations could only take 
object-locations pairs as their content; properties other than location (like, for example, being a “9”) could not be reg-
istered. Thus, it may be objected, even if level-2 perspective taking does not presuppose an understanding of inten-
sionality (as I have argued) it should still be off-limits for the fast system. Two considerations. First, Apperly and 
Butterfill themselves suggest that their account may be extended to allow for properties other than location to be 
registered (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009, p. 963; Butterfill & Apperly, 2013, p. 620). Second, several indirect false-belief 
studies show that infants can track beliefs about properties other than location (D. Buttelmann et al., 2014; F. 
Buttelmann et al., 2015; He et al., 2011; Scott & Baillargeon, 2009; Scott et al., 2010; Scott et al., 2015; Song & 
Baillargeon, 2008). Thus, Apperly and Butterfill seem to face a dilemma: unless they allow properties other than loca-
tion to be registered, they cannot explain these indirect false-belief studies; on the other hand, if they allow properties 
other than location to be registered, they have problems explaining why Surtees et al. (2011) found no altercentric 
interference from level-2 perspective taking. 
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memory (e.g. Hyun & Luck, 2007) and I have argued in §2.2.2 that the fast system would not be able 
to use working memory as a workspace for its computations. Given that level-2 perspective-taking 
requires mental rotation and that mental rotation relies on working memory, we have good reason to 
assume that the fast system would not be able to do level-2 perspective taking, even though it may 
well possess the conceptual sophistication required to represent how things look to other people. 
The finding by Surtees et al. (2011) is thus easily accommodated on the hybrid approach. 
2.3.2 False Beliefs About Identity 
Another prediction made by Apperly and Butterfill is that the fast system should not be able 
to track beliefs about identity, since this seems to presuppose an understanding of intensionality. 
Two studies have found evidence consistent with this prediction (Low et al., 2014; Low & Watts, 
2013). In the study by Jason Low and Joseph Watts, for example, three-year-olds, four-year-olds and 
adults were tested with a false-belief task that combined anticipatory-looking and direct paradigms, 
and which involved watching a video depicting a misidentification scenario. The apparatus used in 
the video included a table and two specially designed boxes, each placed on a different side 
(left/right) of the table. The boxes had openings on the sides and on the front (i.e., the side facing 
participants) that were covered by fringes. During the familiarisation trials, objects that were either 
red or blue in colour moved from one box to the other, and the agent always reached for the blue 
object. In the belief induction phase, a small toy robot moved from one box to the other; the side 
participants could see was red. After entering the second box, the robot came out from the side fac-
ing participants, where the agent could not see it, and rotated, revealing that it was blue on the other 
side. Then, the robot moved back into the box again and came out from the lateral opening, return-
ing to the first box, this time showing its red side to the agent. At this point, a sound signalled that 
the agent was about to reach. After a pause, during which their anticipatory-looks were recorded, 
participants were asked the test question, e.g., which box will the agent look in? If participant under-
stand that the agent, not having seen the robot rotate, is not aware that “the red robot” and “the 
blue robot” are the same, they should expect her to reach for the second box, since the agent saw a 
blue robot going in and a red robot coming out. If participants do not understand this, however, 
they should expect her to reach for the first box, since the other box is empty. Low and Watts found 
that while responses to the test question improved with age, the vast majority of the participants in 
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each age group made first-looks towards the first box. The authors take this as evidence that the fast 
system does not enable tracking of beliefs about identity, just like Apperly and Butterfill's two-sys-
tems account predicts. 
However, the evidence on this issue is conflicting, for other indirect false-belief studies seem 
to show that infants can, in fact, track beliefs about identity (F. Buttelmann et al., 2015; Scott & 
Baillargeon, 2009; Scott et al., 2015; Song & Baillargeon, 2008). Apperly and Butterfill’s account is 
consistent with the findings by Low and colleagues, but (as argued in Chapter II, §3.3) it cannot ex-
plain the results of these other indirect false-belief studies. In contrast, the hybrid approach has an 
easy explanation for this apparently conflicting pattern of results. As Carruthers (2016) notes, the 
tasks used by Low and colleagues, just like the task used by Surtees et al. (2011), are likely to require 
mental rotation. As participants first saw the red robot moving into the second box, they would 
have ascribed to the agent a belief that there was a red robot in the second box. When they realised 
the robot had a blue side and a red side, participants would then have to retrieve a memory of the 
red robot and mentally rotate it to figure out what it must have looked like (i.e., blue) to the agent as 
it first moved into the second box. As argued above, the fast system should not be able to rely on 
working memory to use mental rotation. On the other hand, the fast system should have no trouble 
ascribing beliefs about identity when this does not involve mental rotation; and indeed, the studies 
that have found evidence that infants can ascribe beliefs about identity do not require mental rota-
tion to be passed. In the experiments infants have been shown to pass the false belief about identity 
typically results from the fact that the agent cannot tell two objects apart (since they looked the 
same), not from a misleading appearance as in the experiments by Low and colleagues (Low et al., 
2014; Low & Watts, 2013). Thus, the evidence lines up with the prediction made by the hybrid ap-
proach, namely that the fast system should sustain ascription of false beliefs and other mental states 
so long as this does not require using working memory. Even in this case, then, the hybrid account 
offers a best explanation of the evidence.  
2.4 The Argument from Higher-Order States 
One of the supposed perks of having a fast mentalising system is that it can support real-
time, fast-paced social interactions. There is reason to believe, however, that the fast system could 
not do this effectively unless it enabled ascription of higher-order states, that is, of representational 
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states that take other representational states as their content (e.g., “she thinks that I want her to believe 
that I am competent”). As we will see, this ability is likely to be particularly handy in two types of so-
cial interaction: those that involve groups of people, and those that involve communicative ex-
changes. The fact that the fast system would be able to ascribe higher-order states on the hybrid ap-
proach but on Apperly and Butterfill's own account should thus speak in favour of the former.  
2.4.1 Communication  
Neo-Gricean accounts of communication hold that inferring speaker meaning involves rea-
soning about the intentions and beliefs of the speaker, thus entertaining higher-order beliefs about 
those states. Relevance theory, for example, maintains that inferring speakers meaning involves as-
cribing to the speaker two intentions: first, an informative intention to induce a certain belief in the 
audience; and, second, a communicative intention that the audience be aware of the informative in-
tention (Sperber, 2000). Suppose Mary is eating crackers and, noticing that Peter is looking at her, 
she expresses her satisfaction (“mmm..so good!”) as she looks back at him. What is being communi-
cated? According to relevance theory, Mary will have an informative intention to affect Peter's be-
liefs (e.g., to make him believe that she likes crackers), plus a communicative intention that Peter be-
lieve that she has that informative intention. Thus, to infer what Mary meant to communicate, Peter 
would have to represent that Mary intends him to believe that she intends him to believe that she 
likes crackers.  
While not all neo-Gricean theories require the audience to entertain fifth-order representa-
tions, many still require them to entertain higher-order representations. Thus, Robert Thompson's 
(2014a) account, despite being presented as a more modest alternative to relevance theory, still re-
quires the audience to represent that the speaker intends them to believe that the speaker intends to 
produce a response in them. 
Notably, this feature of neo-Gricean accounts has often been perceived as problematic. 
From a young age, children engage in conversation and seem able to understand, at least in some 
cases if not in others, what people tell them. In fact, several authors have argued that infants are al-
ready able to understand communicative intentions, which helps them in social and language learn-
ing (Bloom, 2000; Csibra, 2010; Tomasello, 2008). If the neo-Gricean picture is correct, however, 
understanding a communicative intention requires entertaining and manipulating very complex, 
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higher-order representations. This clashes with the evidence that five and six-year-olds struggle with 
direct second-order false-belief tasks (Perner & Wimmer, 1985), which require them to entertain a 
third-order representation (e.g., “John thinks Mary thinks the van is still at the old place”). Further-
more, holding in mind a third-order representation seems taxing even for adults; indeed, the study 
by McKinnon and Moscovitch (2007) shows that this places a significant cognitive load. And yet, 
communication is often swift and effortless. Faced with this problem, some neo-Griceans have sug-
gested that communication may be sub-served by a dedicated mentalising module, employing algo-
rithms that allow it to manipulate higher-order representation in an efficient manner (e.g. Sperber & 
Wilson, 2002).  
Now, Apperly and Butterfill (2009, p. 964) are clear that one of the functions of the fast sys-
tem would be that of supporting real-time communicative exchanges. On their account, however, 
registrations do not allow embedding, and thus cannot take other mental states as their content. Pe-
ter would be able to represent that Mary registers the crackers, but there is no way he could repre-
sent that Mary intends him to “register” that she intends him to register the crackers. As a result, 
Apperly and Butterfill’s fast system would be unable to carry out the type of computations that neo-
Gricean accounts require. Thompson (2014b) argues that this speaks against Apperly and Butterfill’s 
account.  
The hybrid approach solves this problem, however, since it maintains that the reason the fast 
system is efficient has to do with its being independent of the executive system. An implication of 
this model of cognitive demands is that the fast system may handle relatively complex representa-
tional structures (like higher-order states) without placing heavy demands on executive resources. 
2.4.2 Group Interaction 
José Luiz Bermudez (2003) discusses a “computational worry” concerning the fact that at-
tempting to mentalise in a social group may result in a combinatorial explosion. Suppose there is a 
group of three people (A, B and C) each trying to predict what the others will do. To predict what B 
will do, A must first understand what B thinks, in particular what she thinks A and C will do. What 
B thinks C will do, however, depends on what B thinks C thinks, in particular what B thinks C 
thinks A and B will do; and of course, what C thinks A will do depends on what C thinks A thinks. 
Thus, even in a group of just three people, relying on mentalising to predict what the others will do 
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may lead to a rapid escalation to increasingly higher orders of meta-representation, of the form B 
thinks that C thinks that A thinks that... and so on. Of course, at any time, one may decide to hop off 
the carousel and simply take a guess. Nonetheless, Bermudez argues that, even waving the peril of 
an infinite regress, entertaining a higher-order representation may still result in significant cognitive 
demands. Since many social interactions, including those that involve more than two people, seem 
to unfold relatively quickly, Bermudez suggests that they may be sub-served not by mentalising but 
by some leaner form of social understanding.  
On a two-systems account of mentalising, however, this looks like the type of problem the 
fast system is supposed to solve; and whether the fast system can ascribe beliefs as opposed to regis-
trations seems to be an important factor in determining how well the problem can be solved. A may 
be able to ascribe to B a registration of the ball (say), but not a registration of C as registering the 
ball. If the fast system represents beliefs, instead, there would be no in-principle restriction on the 
orders of meta-representation that can be entertained.  
2.4.3 Summary 
Apperly and Butterfill (2009) argue that the fast system would sustain mentalising in the 
context of fast-paced social interactions. However, there is reason to think that the fast system 
would not be able to do so effectively for social interactions that involve a communicative exchange 
or more than two people – not unless it allowed ascription of higher-order states. Since the hybrid 
approach is consistent with this possibility, while Apperly and Butterfill’ minimal theory of mind 
account is not, this provides yet another reason to opt for the hybrid approach. 
3. Conclusions 
In this chapter, I have introduced and defended the hybrid approach, a new way of dealing 
with the developmental puzzle of belief-reasoning. The hybrid approach is similar to the early-
emergence approach in that it agrees that infants can ascribe false beliefs; however, its account of 
direct false-belief results is closer to that defended by late-emergentists. Despite the fact that no 
one has defended this approach before, it arguably provides a better account of the evidence com-
pared to the late-emergence approach. The evidence that the hybrid approach can explain better 
includes not only the results of indirect false-belief tests (which, as we have seen in Chapter II, late-
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emergentists have trouble explaining) but also the evidence that Apperly and Butterfill adduce in 
support of their very influential two-systems account (as argued in §2).  
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VI 
SHOWDOWN: HYBRID 
APPROACH V. PROCESSING-
TIME ACCOUNT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In chapter IV, I defended my own early-emergence account, called the processing-time ac-
count, and argued that it can explain not just the results of indirect false-belief tests but also the 
results of direct false-belief tests. In Chapter V, however, I introduced and defended a new way of 
solving the puzzle, i.e. the hybrid approach, and argued that it can also explain both sets of findings. 
The question we need to address now, then, is: which of the two is the most plausible, better 
supported option? The processing-time account or the hybrid approach?  
The disagreement between these two types of account focuses on two issues: first, how many 
mentalising systems do humans possess? The processing-time account answers “one”, while the 
hybrid approach answers “two”; second, do direct and indirect false-belief tests recruit the same 
mentalising system, or distinct mentalising systems? The processing-time account answers “same 
system”, while the hybrid approach answers “distinct systems”. Evidence that relates to the first 
question will be discussed in §1, while evidence that relates to the second question will be discussed 
in §2. 
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1. One or Two Mentalising Systems? 
1.1 Parsimony 
One argument in favour of the processing-time account is that it is the most parsimonious 
option. This is because, while the hybrid approach posits two mentalising systems, the processing-
time account posits only one. Since it is unreasonable to needlessly multiply cognitive systems, the 
processing-time account should be our first choice. 
I think this is right so far as it goes; though, of course, parsimony considerations only apply 
when two accounts can explain all the data under consideration and are equivalent in respect to all 
their other theoretical virtues. Still, the argument from parsimony provides the processing-time 
account with a tactical advantage, making it the default choice.  
1.2 Evidence for Two-Systems Accounts 
In Chapter V, §2.1 we discussed several findings supporting the existence of two mentalising 
systems. These findings included: (i) conflicting evidence on whether mentalising is automatic and 
efficient as opposed to controlled and cognitively demanding; (ii) conflicting evidence on whether 
mentalising is dependent on language; (iii) evidence of mentalising in non-human animals and in-
fants; (iv) conflicting evidence concerning the emergence of belief-reasoning abilities. One of the 
main questions we need to address, then, is whether the processing-time account can explain this 
evidence.  
1.2.1 Development of Belief-Reasoning Abilities 
We saw in Chapter III, §2, that most early-emergence accounts struggle to provide a con-
vincing account of the results of direct false-belief tests; so long as this is true, the discrepancy in 
the results of direct and indirect false-belief tests provides evidence for the hybrid approach. How-
ever, in Chapter IV, I have argued that the processing-time account can explain the discrepancy 
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(§3). If this is correct, then it removes one important piece of evidence supporting the hybrid ap-
proach. 
1.2.2 Language 
I have argued in Chapter IV, §3.3, that the processing-time account can account for the 
relationship between language ability and direct false-belief performance in children on the hypoth-
esis that language ability (i) leads to faster processing of linguistic stimuli, (ii) mediates the beneficial 
effect of experiential factors and (iii) facilitates reasoning about mental states in natural language 
(e.g., in episodes of inner speech). If I am right, then these data do not allow us to decide between 
the processing-time account and the hybrid approach, since both can explain them.  
In Chapter V, §2.1.2, however, we also mentioned a study by Newton and de Villiers (2007) 
showing that a verbal shadowing task disrupted adults’ performance on a concurrent, non-verbal 
false-belief task. This finding is puzzling for the processing-time account because the false-belief 
task used by Newton and de Villiers did not include any linguistic stimuli whatsoever, not even a 
direct question, and was thus not just non-verbal but indirect as well; on the processing-time ac-
count, language has essentially no role to play in this type of test. 
Carruthers (2011, p. 253) provides a possible explanation. The mentalising system may have 
been recruited to interpret the speech in the verbal shadowing task, which may have then prevented 
it from correctly processing the behaviour of the agent in the false-belief video; in other words, the 
two tasks did not interfere because they both required language, but because they both required 
mentalising. The rhythmic tapping task that was as used a control, in contrast, required neither 
language or mentalising. In effect, the study may have confounded language ability and mentalising 
abilities.  
1.2.3 Automaticity 
What about the evidence that mentalising appears to be automatic and efficient in some 
studies but controlled and cognitively demanding in others? Whether early-emergence accounts 
(including the processing-time account) can explain these data depends on whether it is possible 
for one mentalising system to switch between different “modes” of operation, each with its own 
processing profile. Several authors have argued that there is no reason to believe the contrary 
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(Carruthers, 2016, 2017; Thompson, 2015). Carruthers (2016, pp. 158-159), for example, embraces 
a distinction between intuitive and reflective mentalising, where the former relies on a mentalising 
module operating autonomously while the latter relies on the mentalising module operating in con-
junction with working memory, language and other executive resources (see also Carruthers, 2011, 
pp. 236-240). If this type of position is on the right track, then early-emergence accounts (including 
the processing-time account) may be able to explain why mentalising is automatic and efficient in 
some cases and controlled and cognitively demanding in others.   
1.2.4 Infants and Non-Human Animals 
If it is true that one mentalising system could switch between “automatic” and “controlled” 
modes of operation, then early-emergentists should have no trouble explaining evidence of men-
talising in infants and non-human animals, for this evidence is only problematic if one assumes that 
mentalising necessarily requires language and executive functioning.  
1.2.5 Summary 
  In conclusion, the evidence for two mentalising systems discussed in Chapter V, §2.1, was 
found to be inconclusive, since one system may be able to switch between different modes of 
operation, thus removing the need to posit two mentalising systems. 
1.3 Misalignment of Processing Features 
Let us consider, now, some evidence that supports Some researchers have pointed out that 
mentalising processes exhibit a processing profile that fits neither that of the fast system nor that 
of the slow system. This, these authors suggest, is better explained by positing just one mentalising 
system, which operates in different manners depending on the context. Thus, sometimes the sys-
tem will operate in a fast and efficient manner, sometimes in a slow and cognitively demanding 
manner, and sometimes a mix of the two. In particular, Westra (2016b) argues that level-1 perspec-
tive-taking is an unencapsulated and spontaneous process, while level-2 perspective-taking is some-
times fast and sometimes slow; Carruthers (2016), instead, argues that the mentalising processes 
recruited in indirect false-belief tests are spontaneous. Both authors take this to speak against two-
systems accounts of mentalising. Let us consider each of these challenges in turn. 
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1.3.1 Level-1 Perspective-Taking Is Unencapsulated 
Westra (2016b) claims that evidence coming from studies of gaze-cuing provides evidence 
that level-1 perspective-taking is unencapsulated. In a typical gaze-cuing study, participants are 
shown a face, looking either towards the left corner or towards the right corner. Immediately after, 
a stimulus, for example a letter or a digit, appears either on the right corner or on the left corner. 
Participants are told to ignore the face and simply focus on detecting the stimulus by pressing a 
button. Nonetheless, studies employing this type of paradigm have found that participants are 
faster at detecting the stimulus when it appears in the direction the face was looking at. Crucially, 
however, several studies have found that this effect is sensitive to the background information 
participants possess. For example, participants are less likely to be cued by the gaze of a robot – 
unless they are told that an experimenter is controlling its gaze, that is (Wiese, Wykowska, Zwickel, 
& Müller, 2012). Similarly, participants are cued by ambiguous eye-like shapes when they are told 
that the shapes are eyes but not when they are told that they are wheels of a car (Ristic & Kingstone, 
2005), or by the gaze of a face wearing goggles when they have worn transparent goggles but not 
when they have worn opaque goggles (Teufel, Alexis, Clayton, & Davis, 2010). 
Why is this problematic for two-system accounts? After all, being encapsulated is not part of 
the processing profile of the indirect-FB system. Remember, however, that Apperly (2011) suggests 
the indirect-FB system may have the processing profile it has because it is encapsulated (as discussed 
in Chapter V, §2.2.3). Thus, Westra takes evidence that level-1 perspective-taking is not encapsu-
lated to speak against Apperly's two-systems account. Notice however, that the evidence from gaze-
cuing studies mentioned by Westra is consistent with indirect-FB processes being fast, automatic 
and efficient. Indeed, as Westra himself notes, gaze-cuing happens very rapidly (in the order of 
milliseconds), outside of conscious awareness, and with no apparent cognitive demands. Thus, 
even though the evidence does not support Apperly's suggestion concerning what makes indirect-
FB processes faster and more efficient than direct-FB processes, it is entirely consistent with the 
hypothesis that there are two mentalising systems with different processing profiles. This evidence 
simply motivates two-systems theorists to look for an alternative model of how cognitive demands 
are generated. I put forward one such alternative in Chapter V, §2.2.2, where I argued that indirect-
FB processes tend to be fast, efficient and automatic because they can run autonomously, without 
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relying on working memory or other executive resources. This is consistent with the claim that 
indirect-FB processes are not encapsulated.  
In addition, the results mentioned by Westra seem open to a different interpretation. It is 
possible that the background information that was found to affect the cue-gazing affect was “at-
tached” to the visual experiences the indirect-FB system received as inputs, thus affecting whether 
the system was triggered into action. When I tell you that an ambiguous stimulus represents a pair 
of eyes, this information is likely to affect your perception of the stimulus, in such a way that you 
will now perceive the ambiguous marks as eyes. This may be thought of as conceptual content being 
attached to a sensory, non-conceptual representation. We can visualise this by imagining that the 
non-conceptual representation is a picture, while the conceptual interpretation is the notes scrib-
bled all over it. Now, there is good reason to expect that processes that operate post-perceptually 
will receive as input not just the picture but the notes as well, and that their activation will be 
dependent on whether the scribbles include any keywords pertaining to their domain of expertise. 
Thus, if the picture has “these are eyes!” written over it, with an arrow connecting “these” to the 
ambiguous marks, this may lead the indirect-FB system into engaging in level-1 perspective-taking, 
resulting in a cue-gazing effect. 
To sum up, not only (i) the hybrid approach is consistent with the fast system not be encap-
sulated, but (ii) the evidence discussed by Westra (2016b) falls short of showing that the fast system 
is not encapsulated.  
1.3.2 Level-2 Perspective-Taking Can Be Fast 
Westra (2016b) also points to two studies which found an altercentric effect for level-2 per-
spective taking (Elekes, Varga, & Király, 2016; Surtees, Apperly, & Samson, 2016). In the study by 
Fruzsina Elekes, Máté Varga and Ildikó Király (2016), for example, each participant was sitting at 
a table opposite to another participant, with a screen lying flat on the table. In the perspective-
dependent condition, both participants carried out a number-identification task, which consisted 
in judging (by pressing buttons) whether the number shown on the screen was the same they heard 
in audio recording. In the non-perspective-dependent condition, instead, one of the participants 
was given the number task while the other was given a colour task which consisted in judging (again 
by pressing buttons) whether the digit on the screen was the same colour as the one in the previous 
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trial. Elekes and colleagues found that, when the digit was ambiguous (e.g. 2, 5, 6 or 9), participants 
in the number task were slower to press the button, thus showing an altercentric effect. Im-
portantly, this effect was only present in the perspective-dependent condition; this suggests that 
participants only track how objects look to people involved in the same task, which might explain 
why Surtees et al. (2011) found no interference effect (their study was discussed in Chapter V, 
§2.4.1). Westra (2016b) takes this type of finding to show that, when participants possess sufficient 
motivation to do so, they can quickly and efficiently calculate what an object looks like to another 
person; he then argues that this speaks against two-systems accounts since these accounts maintain 
that level-2 perspective-taking should be slow and cognitively demanding.  
As Westra himself points out, however, these results are somewhat puzzling for early-emer-
gentists as well. This is because, to explain why Surtees et al. (2011) found no altercentric effect 
from level-2 perspective-taking in in their study, early-emergentists argue that level-2 perspective-
taking requires mentally rotating the digit, which is cognitively demanding and relatively slow cog-
nitive process. Given this, participants will not engage in mental rotation in the absence of a moti-
vation to either predict or explain the behaviour of the other person (Carruthers, 2017; Westra, 
2016b). This means, however, that early-emergence accounts essentially agree with two-systems 
accounts that level-2 perspective-taking should be a relatively slow and cognitively demanding pro-
cess. Thus, evidence that level-2 perspective-taking is fast and efficient really speaks against both. 
To obviate this problem, Westra suggests that, when the participants in the studies by Elekes et al. 
(2016) and Surtees et al. (2016) were told the other person was going to be carrying out the same 
task, they memorised mentalising schemas (e.g., if I see 6 she sees 9) which they then retrieved 
during the task. Notice, however, that this solves the problem for the hybrid approach as well. We 
can divide level-2 perspective-taking in two phases: phase 1 consists in calculating how an object 
would look when seen from another perspective; phase 2 consists in ascribing that perspective to 
another person. Thus, in the case of the digit “6”, phase 1 one would involve calculating that the 
digit will look like a “9” when seen from across the table; phase 2 would involve ascribing this 
perspective to the person sitting across the table (“she sees a 9”). Now, on Westra's interpretation, 
phase 1 happened before the task; what happened during the task is phase 2. Thus, on his inter-
pretation, these results do not show that level-2 perspective-taking can be fast and efficient; they 
simply show that phase 2 (ascribing an already calculated perspective) can be. Notice that it is phase 
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1 that involves mental rotation, not phase 2. Furthermore, remember that I argued (in Chapter V, 
§2.4.1) that the hybrid approach should maintain, following Carruthers (2017), that level-2 perspec-
tive-taking is cognitively demanding because it involves mental rotation. It follows that the hybrid 
account is not committed to the claim that phase 2 should be cognitively demanding, hence it is 
every bit as consistent with these results as the early-emergence accounts that Carruthers' and 
Westra's defend.  
1.3.3 Indirect-FB Processes Are Spontaneous 
According to Carruthers (2016), the study by Schneider, Lam, Bayliss, and Dux (2012) shows 
that the mentalising processes recruited by indirect false-belief tests are spontaneous and not auto-
matic. (Automatic processes are those that are activated independently of any goals the subject may 
have; spontaneous processes are those whose activation is dependent on covert, unconscious 
goals.) Now, Schneider, Lam, et al. (2012) carried out dual-task experiment using an anticipatory-
looking unexpected-transfer task as a primary task and a working memory task as a secondary task. 
The working memory task had a high-load and a low-load condition. In the low-load condition, 
participants simply listened to the audio recording of a voice reading a random sequence of letters.  
In the high-load condition, participants were instructed to count the number of 2-back repetitions 
(e.g. “N, A, N” is a 2-back repetition of the letter “N”). Schneider and colleagues found that the 
secondary task (both high-load and low-load) disrupted participants' anticipatory looking to the 
empty box. Specifically, with the secondary task, there was no significant difference in looking 
behaviour in the true-belief and false-belief conditions. This seems to show that mentalising in 
indirect false-belief tasks makes at least some cognitive demands. Carruthers (2016) suggests that, 
in this type of task, participants automatically calculate the false belief of the agent and then store 
it in long-term memory. When they hear the sound signalling the agent's return, participants then 
retrieve that information from long-term memory and use it to predict her action. He argues that 
this operation of retrieving from memory is likely to be caused by an unconscious standing goal to 
predict other people's behaviour, while also being dependent on executive resources. Under cog-
nitive load, the covert goal is deactivated to save resources, thus resulting in no anticipatory looking. 
Carruthers takes this to show that, at least in this type of task, mentalising is neither automatic nor 
controlled, but spontaneous.  
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It is not clear how damaging this conclusion is for two-systems accounts, however, since it 
seems that spontaneous processes would still be closer to automatic processes than controlled ones 
in terms of their processing profile: they are fast, unconscious, and make relatively minimal cogni-
tive demands. As discussed in Chapter V, §2.1, Apperly and Butterfill (2009) argue that the evidence 
that mentalising is sometimes automatic and sometimes controlled supports a two-systems account 
of mentalising. If what the evidence shows is that mentalising is sometimes controlled and some-
times non-controlled (i.e., either automatic or spontaneous), as Carruthers suggests, Apperly and 
Butterfill's argument still retains its force. 
In any case, the result by Schneider and colleagues is also open to a different interpretation. 
Selective attention is often assumed to determine which mental contents are broadcast to the rest 
of the mind for further processing. It is thus reasonable to assume that the contents the indirect-
FB system will receive as input are those targeted by attention. Now, the working memory task 
used clearly required participants to focus their attention on the auditory stimuli as opposed to the 
visual ones (especially so in the high-load condition). This means that the indirect-FB system will 
have received, as inputs, the auditory stimuli and not the visual ones; in which case it can be hardly 
blamed for not computing what the actor in the video was going to do20. (Notice that for this 
explanation to work, it is not required to argue that the indirect-FB system did not process any 
visual stimuli; missing some of them, such as, for example, the change of location, will be sufficient 
to impair its ability to predict the agent's behaviour.) 
1.3.4 Level-1 Perspective-Taking Is Spontaneous 
Westra (2016b) argues that the results of the study by Qureshi et al. (2010), which we dis-
cussed in Chapter V, §2.1.1, also show that level-1 perspective-taking is spontaneous, that is, de-
pendent on covert goals. Qureshi et al. (2010) found, remember, that the presence of a secondary, 
executively-taxing task did not erase the altercentric effect due to level-1 perspective-taking. The 
study also found, however, that reaction times in all conditions were higher when the secondary 
task was present; the authors took this to show that while perspective-calculation is efficient, 
                                                 
20 But does this not mean that, in some sense, the indirect-FB system requires attention? No; it only means that 
attention plays a role in selecting the inputs the indirect-FB system receives. This is consistent with saying that the 
indirect-FB system does not require attention (or any other executive resource) to carry out its processing. 
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perspective-selection is not. Now, Westra argues that since one cannot carry out level-1 perspec-
tive-taking without carrying out perspective-selection, the results do show that level-1 perspective-
taking is affected by cognitive load.  
There is reason to resist Westra's interpretation, however. The task participants were assigned 
was that of judging whether the number of dots on the wall was the same as a previously shown 
digit. This task will require comparing a representation kept in working memory (the previously 
shown digit) with the number of dots one currently perceive, and then planning the response (push-
ing this or that button). In doing this, participants will also have to inhibit the interference from 
the avatar's perspective, which will require inhibitory control. Overall, these processes clearly re-
quire executive resources. Thus, it is not exactly surprising that people took longer to press the 
button when given a secondary, executively-taxing task! 
1.3.5 Summary 
The evidence that Westra (2016b) and Carruthers (2016) discuss falls short of establishing 
their claim – i.e., that mentalising processes sometimes exhibit a mixed processing profile. Thus, 
this objection against two-systems account can be dismissed. 
 
2. Same System or Distinct Systems? 
2.1 Is the Distinct-Systems View Ad Hoc? 
Distinct-system accounts (including both distinct-systems late-emergence accounts and hy-
brid accounts) maintain that direct false-belief tests recruit the direct-FB system, which, in children 
under four, provides the wrong answer. One can wonder why this should be the case, however. In 
particular, one can wonder why two and three-year-olds do not recruit their indirect-FB system, 
since this would allow them to answer correctly. Even worse, one can argue that the claim that the 
indirect-FB system would not be recruited in direct-FB tests is just an ad hoc assumption. In other 
words: there seems to be no reason to believe that the indirect-FB system should not be recruited 
in direct false-belief tests, except that the assumption is needed to explain why young children fail 
those tests. 
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Carruthers (2016) raises this type of objection to Apperly and Butterfill's two-systems ac-
count. Carruthers takes Apperly and Butterfill to be committed to the claim that the outputs of the 
indirect-FB system would not be accessible to higher cognition. He argues, however, that there is 
evidence suggesting otherwise. Consider, for example, the interactive false-belief test by D. 
Buttelmann et al. (2009). In this study, after E2 moved the object and locked the boxes, E1 came 
back and struggled to open the box where she had left the toy. Most of the infants in this study 
tried to help E1 by pointing or crawling to the other box, the one that contained the toy she was 
looking for. Now, Carruthers argues that infants' behaviour in this type of test is likely to be under 
the control of the executive system, which means that the outputs of the indirect-FB system cannot 
be able to inform infants' behaviour unless they are accessible to their executive system. If they are, 
then we face the problem I was sketching above: why do these outputs not inform children's point-
ing in direct false-belief tests, just like they inform their crawling and pointing in the study by 
Buttelmann and colleagues? Perhaps, Carruthers suggests, the outputs of the indirect-FB system 
are accessible to the executive systems that control non-communicative actions but not to those 
that control verbal or communicative acts; but this, he argues, is ad hoc and implausible. Even 
worse, it threatens the consistency of the account, for Apperly and Butterfill hold that, in adults at 
least, the outputs of the indirect-FB system can sometimes affect reaction-times in verbal report. 
Clearly this interference could not take place were the outputs of the indirect-FB system inaccessi-
ble for planning of communicative acts. 
Carruthers’ objection seems rather compelling if we take the “inaccessibility route”, arguing 
that the indirect-FB system is not recruited in indirect false-belief tests because it is inaccessible to 
the executive system. There may be other options, however. In particular, conceding that the out-
puts of the indirect-FB system must be accessible to the executive system (as Carruthers convinc-
ingly argues) does not entail that participants’ responses will be based on those outputs. After all, 
the outputs of the direct-FB system, as well, must be accessible to the executive system. We can 
thus imagine the executive system as a real executive (i.e., the CEO of a company) who, after asking 
his technical experts to solve a problem, receives two conflicting responses: one expert (represent-
ing the direct-FB system) claims that they should point to the box, while the other (representing 
the indirect-FB system) argues that they should point to the basket. Clearly, the executive cannot 
listen to both. Furthermore, how is the executive supposed to know which suggestion is correct? 
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Thus, even if we concede that the executive system will receive the outputs of the indirect-FB 
system, there is really no reason to expect that it will select a response that is consistent with them. 
Now, notice that the problem is not entirely solved yet, for we still need to explain why the 
executive system would listen to the indirect-FB system in interactive false-belief tasks (such as D. 
Buttelmann et al., 2009) but not in direct false-belief tasks. In the absence of a proper justification, 
it seems ad hoc to assume that this would be the case – which brings us back to our original problem. 
A possible solution appeals to the distinction between intuitive and reflective processes (Chapter 
V, §2.2.2). The suggestion is that the indirect-FB system would sustain “intuitive” forms of men-
talising, whereas the direct-FB system would sustain mentalising of a more “reflective” kind. As 
mentioned in Chapter V, this hypothesis lines up well with the two processing profiles sketched by 
Apperly and Butterfill: intuitive processes are supposed to be fast, automatic, unconscious, and 
efficient, while reflective processes are supposed to be slow, controlled, conscious and cognitively 
demanding. Now, the solution may simply be that when infants see that the agent needs help, they 
rush to her aid, and are thus more inclined to accept their intuitions (provided by the indirect-FB 
system) without questioning them. In direct false-belief tests, in contrast, children may be more 
likely to engage in reflective thinking to check whether their intuitions are correct, which will result 
in the direct-FB system taking over.  
Interestingly, if this type of response is endorsed, the hybrid approach makes precisely the 
opposite prediction compared to the processing-time account. The processing-time accounts pre-
dicts that children who are more impulsive, being more likely to answer before they can complete 
the processing required to answer correctly, should have worse direct false-belief performance. The 
hybrid approach, in contrast, predicts that children who are more impulsive, being more likely to 
base their answer on the intuitions provided by the indirect-FB system, should have a better chance 
of passing.  
A study by Wendy Garnham and Perner (2001) seems to corroborate the prediction of the 
hybrid approach. Garnham and Perner included several types of tasks in their study, including both 
an interactive and a direct false-belief task, both using an unexpected-transfer type of scenario. In 
the interactive task, children had to place an obstacle to block the agent (a toy mouse) from reaching 
its intended location; the obstacle could be placed on the way to the empty location or on the way 
to the location containing the object (a piece of cheese). Garnham and Perner divided their 
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participants (a group of children aged two to four) in spontaneous-responders, who responded 
quickly, and prompted-responders, who took longer and had to be re-prompted. Spontaneous-
responders performed better than prompted-responders both on the interactive task and on the 
direct task, just as the hybrid approach predicts21. 
In conclusion, the objection that the distinct-system view is ad hoc can be dismissed. 
2.2 Evidence for Performance Accounts 
As mentioned in section Chapter IV, §2, several studies have shown that, in direct false-belief 
tests, young children can be brought above chance with relatively minor changes to the procedure. 
For example, Siegal and Beattie (1991) showed that including the adverb “first” in the test question 
of an explicit false belief test (“where will Jane look first for her kitten?”) was sufficient to bring 
three-year-olds from below-chance to above-chance. Since it shows that children can be made to 
pass direct false-belief tests by removing or attenuating the factors that are likely to negatively affect 
their performance, this type of finding provides evidence for early-emergence accounts (including, 
of course, the processing-time account). On the other hand, this evidence speaks directly against 
the hybrid approach, which maintains that the reason most three-year-olds have trouble passing 
direct false-belief tests is that the system typically recruited in those tests (the direct-FB system) 
does not yet allow them to ascribe false beliefs. If this were the case, then three-year-olds should 
continue to fail even once potential performance-hindering factors are removed. 
How serious is this problem? On reflection, it seems that most of this evidence can be ac-
commodated by making a relatively small revision to the hybrid approach. This is because most of 
the results in question have focused on children with a mean age of about three years and a half. 
As a result, this evidence is consistent with the possibility that the belief-reasoning abilities 
grounded in the direct false-belief system may emerge a few months earlier than originally assumed, 
by three years and a half instead of four, while being absent in the younger children. Children 
                                                 
21 This effect may be an experimental artefact, however. It appears from the description of the procedure 
(Garnham & Perner, 2001, p. 424) that the authors waited only one second before repeating the question. One second 
is not a very long time at all; instead of giving children who had not responded more time think, it seems the authors 
did precisely the opposite, pressing them with a second question shortly after the first one. This may very well have a 
disruptive effect, pushing children to hurry and answer before they are ready, thus increasing the likelihood they would 
resort to attribute-substitution (see Chapter 4, §1 for details). 
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younger than three-and-a-half would thus fail because their direct-FB system does not yet allow 
them to ascribe false beliefs, while children between three-and-a-half and four would fail because 
of performance difficulties and would thus benefit from the removal of performance-hindering 
factors. 
In fact, somewhat paradoxically, some late-emergentists have argued that this evidence actu-
ally speaks against early-emergence approaches (Wellman et al., 2001). This is for two reasons. (a) 
First, Wellman and colleagues pointed out that none of the task manipulations they included in 
their meta-analysis interacted with age; that is, it was still the case that younger children performed 
worse than older ones. This, they argued, is not what early-emergence accounts predict; on those 
accounts, one would expect younger children to perform as well as their older peers after the factors 
that were hindering their performance were removed. (b) Second, Wellman and colleagues pointed 
out that there was no evidence that children younger than three could be made to pass direct false-
belief tests; and this, arguably, not for lack of trying. This, they argued, shows that the difficulties 
of younger children are not just a reflection of performance-related factors but have a deeper, 
conceptual root.  
Both arguments can be resisted, however. First, early-emergence accounts do not necessarily 
predict that removing the factors that hinder performance should help younger children more than 
older ones (e.g., Scholl & Leslie, 2001). Specifically, on the processing-time account, whether chil-
dren pass or fail depends on two variables: their required processing time (RPT) and time available 
for processing (TAP). Children pass if their RPT is lower or equal to their TAP and fail otherwise. 
RPT can be expected to decrease as children grow older, while TAP can be expected to increase; 
thus, older children perform better than younger ones. Now, I argued in chapter IV, §2, that the 
task manipulations at hand help by decreasing children's RPT. Thus, for example, temporal markers 
like the one used by Siegal and Beattie (1991) help because, by clarifying the question, they reduce 
the time it takes children to process it. Notice, however, that this cannot be expected to improve 
performance in all children. This is because, to improve performance, RPT must be not only de-
creased but brought below threshold, and this may not always be the case. Children whose RPT is 
too far above threshold will not be helped, and we can expect more of the younger children to be 
in this type of situation, compared to the older children. Thus, it would be unreasonable to expect 
that any task manipulation could erase age-related differences in performance. 
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As for the second argument, while it is true that at the time Wellman and colleagues were 
writing no study had managed to make children younger than three pass a direct false-belief tests, 
there is now an exception: this is the study by Setoh et al. (2016) discussed in Chapter IV, §2.2.1. 
Their experiment shows that two-and-a-half-year-olds can pass an undisclosed-location task if 
given two response-generation practice trials. The importance of this result cannot be overstated: 
it seems to effectively erase the discrepancy between the results of direct false-belief and indirect 
false-belief tests. As a result, the hybrid approach would lose the main piece of evidence in its 
support: given that two years and a half is the youngest age at which children have ever been given 
a direct false-belief test, the fact that they pass means that there is no evidence that children ever 
fail direct false-belief tests for any reason other than performance difficulties.  
It is, of course, never advisable to draw strong conclusions from a single study, since it may 
not replicate, and/or it may be open to alternative, low-level explanations. If the finding by Setoh 
et al. (2016) proves to be robust, however, it may well tilt the scales in favour of the processing-
time account.  
2.3 Evidence from Neuroscience 
Hybrid and processing-time approaches make distinctive predictions concerning what corti-
cal areas should “light up” in neuroimaging studies using indirect-FB tasks compared to those using 
direct-FB tasks. Specifically, the processing-time account (as other early-emergence accounts) pre-
dicts significant overlap between the areas activated in the two types of task, while the hybrid ap-
proach predicts little to no overlap. In addition, the processing-time accounts predicts that disrup-
tion (due, for example, to lesion) in the mentalising areas that underlie performance in direct false-
belief tests should also result in impaired performance on indirect false-belief tests, while the hybrid 
approach makes the opposite prediction. Thus, neuroscience potentially provides a very straight-
forward way of testing these accounts. 
Now, as mentioned in Chapter III, §1.7, neuroimaging studies show that a number of areas 
are differentially activated during direct false-belief tasks. These areas include mainly the Temporo-
Parietal Junction (TPJ), the medial Pre-Frontal Cortex (mPFC), the Superior Temporal Sulcus 
(STS), and the Pre-Cuneus (PC). The TPJ, in particular, has been argued to be a core component 
of the mentalising network (Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003). Patients with lesions in the left TPJ, for 
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example, exhibit impaired performance on direct false-belief tests (Biervoye, Dricot, Ivanoiu, & 
Samson, 2016; Samson, Apperly, Chiavarino, & Humphreys, 2004). Thus, the important question 
for us is whether any of these areas (and the TPJ in particular) would also be activated when pas-
sively watching a false-belief scenario unfold, as in typical indirect false-belief tasks. A few studies 
have started investigating this question, and their results seem consistent with the processing-time 
account but not with the hybrid approach (Hyde, Betancourt, & Simon, 2015; Kovács, Kühn, 
Gergely, Csibra, & Brass, 2014; Schneider, Slaughter, Becker, & Dux, 2014). Let us take a look at 
the evidence.  
In the study by Ágnes Kovács and colleagues (2014), which used fMRI, subjects were shown 
movie clips based on a previous study (Kovács et al., 2010). In these movies, a ball first rolls behind 
an occluder, then either (a) nothing happens, (b) the ball rolls out again and out of sight, (c) the 
ball rolls out but then rolls back behind the occluder again. In the test phase, the occluder is lowered 
revealing either the ball or no ball. In the movies there is also an agent (a Smurf) watching the 
events. In some conditions the Smurf is present throughout and thus is aware of all the movements 
of the ball, while in others he is absent during some of the movements. In the original study by 
Kovács et al. (2010), adult participants were instructed to press a button as soon as they detected 
the ball; their finding was that what the Smurf believed, though irrelevant to the task, influenced 
participants’ reaction times as much as their own beliefs. Thus, in the condition where both partic-
ipants and the Smurf believed that there was a ball behind the occluder, participants were quicker 
to press the button as they saw the ball compared to a condition where only them, but not the 
Smurf, believed the ball to be behind the occluder. The authors thus found an altercentric effect, 
similar to that found by Samson et al. (2010) in their level-1 perspective-taking study (discussed in 
Chapter V, §2.1) which can be taken as evidence that participants automatically computed what the 
Smurf believed. Now, Kovács et al. (2014) showed the same videos to another group of partici-
pants, while they were laying in a MRI scanner; they found that both the right TPJ and the mPFC 
were activated, although the right TPJ more so when only the Smurf had a false belief that the ball 
was behind the occluder, and the mPFC more so when the Smurf had a true belief that the ball 
was behind the occluder. 
The study by Daniel Hyde and colleagues (2015) found a similar result. Hyde and colleagues 
showed adult participants movie clips depicting an unexpected-transfer scenario (along the lines of 
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Southgate et al., 2007) and looked at activity in the right TPJ using a technique called functional near-
infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS). There were three conditions: false-belief, true-belief and direct-percep-
tion. In the false-belief condition a puppet moved the object from one box to the other as the actor 
was looking away. In the true-belief condition, instead, the actor witnessed the change of location. 
Finally, the direct-perception condition was the same as the false-belief condition, except that the 
boxes were transparent, and thus the actor could see that the object had been moved as she looked 
back at the boxes after the transfer. Participants were told to pay attention to the movies but were 
given no specific task. Hyde and colleague found a peak of activity in the right TPJ in false-belief 
conditions but not in true-belief or direct-perception conditions. Intriguingly, this peak took place 
during the change of location, and thus precisely as the actor's belief became false.  
The two studies just described suggest that the TPJ is involved specifically in representing 
false beliefs about the location of objects, and that it is recruited in indirect false-belief tasks as 
well, in line with what the processing-time account predicts. The study by Schneider, Slaughter, et 
al. (2014), found a slightly different result. Schneider and colleagues used fMRI to record neural 
activity as participants watched unexpected-transfer movies (based on Schneider et al. 2012) which 
included both true-belief and false-belief conditions. Participants were instructed to discriminate 
between high and low tones that played during the videos. Schneider and colleagues found that 
only the PC and left STS were significantly more active in false-belief versus true-belief conditions, 
while no significant difference was found for either the left or the right TPJs. Still, Schneider and 
colleagues did find that the TPJ was highly active compared to baseline. Thus, despite the incon-
sistency with the two results mentioned above, this study also seems to support the processing-
time account. Remember that patients with a lesion in the TPJ have been found to have impaired 
direct false-belief performance; on the hybrid approach, this suggests that the TPJ implements the 
direct-FB system (or one of its components.) Furthermore, remember that, on the hybrid approach, 
the direct-FB system sustains mentalising processes that are controlled and conscious. Crucially, 
both Hyde and colleagues and Schneider and colleagues, after showing the videos, asked their par-
ticipants questions designed to reveal whether they had engaged in conscious mentalising, and 
found no evidence they had done so. When these considerations are taken into account, the hybrid 
approach predicts that the TPJ should not be highly activated, either in the false-belief condition 
or in the true-belief condition, while Schneider and colleagues found that it was active in both. 
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Is there a way to make the hybrid approach compatible with these results? It seems the only 
way would be to argue that both the neural network that implements the indirect-FB system and 
that which implements the direct-FB systems are located in the TPJ. This hypothesis is very difficult 
to rule out. Notice, however, that in the absence of a reason to believe that this should be the case, 
this move is ad hoc, and thus weakens the account. 
3. Conclusions 
Some of the main objections against two-systems accounts (§1.3) and the distinct-systems 
view (§2.1) were found wanting. On the other hand, the processing-time account may be able to 
explain the evidence adduced for two-systems accounts (§1.2). In addition, evidence for perfor-
mance accounts (§2.2; see also Chapter IV, §2) and evidence from neuroscience (§2.3), together 
with considerations of parsimony (§1.1), were all found to support the processing-time account. 
Thus, while none of these arguments are conclusive, the processing-time account comes out on 
top.  
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VII 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So, can infants reason about beliefs? Surprisingly, the answer is “yes” – or at least: this is, in 
my opinion, what the evidence in our possess clearly suggests. First, as argued in Chapter II, that 
infants can ascribe false beliefs is the best explanation for the results of indirect false-belief tests. 
Second, as argued in Chapters III-V, evidence that is often taken to support the opposite conclu-
sion can be accommodated in (at least) two ways.  
The first, and most conventional option is to defend a performance account. In Chapter IV, 
I defended my own performance account, called the processing-time account, and argued that it 
can explain away practically all the evidence for late-emergence accounts. Since (as seen in Chapter 
III) other performance accounts have trouble accommodating these data, this provides strong sup-
port for the processing-time account.  
The second option, which (to the best of my knowledge) has so far gone unnoticed, consists 
in defending (what I have called) the hybrid approach. As explained in chapter V, the hybrid ap-
proach consists in arguing that direct and indirect false-belief tests recruit distinct cognitive systems, 
each of which can independently sustain the ability to reason about beliefs, but which follow dif-
ferent developmental trajectories. The hybrid approach allows us to explain the results of indirect 
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false-belief tests similarly to early-emergentists (thus maintaining that infants can ascribe false be-
liefs) while explaining the results of direct false-belief tests similarly to late-emergentists.  
To sum up, there are two ways of explaining the discrepancy in the results of direct and 
indirect false-belief tests: we can take either the same-system path or the distinct-systems path. In 
chapter IV (plus Chapter V, §1.2) I have argued that, among same-system accounts, the processing-
time account is our best option. In chapter V I have argued that, among distinct-systems accounts, 
the hybrid approach is our best option. Since both types of account are committed to the claim 
that infants can ascribe false beliefs, this claim turns out to be strongly supported by the evidence.  
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